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Editors’ Introduction
In June 2016 shortly before the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) 
Conference in Israel, the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism published a piece by Israel 
Charny. In his article—based on an online survey and his readings of some articles—Charny 
declared the Journal for Genocide Research as biased. More concretely, he stated that the journal 
publishes articles that minimize the Holocaust and/or are anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. Charny 
refers explicitly to several articles, and names their authors. The Genocide Studies and Prevention 
(GSP) Editorial Board has decided to give the Senior Editor of the Journal for Genocide Research, 
Dirk Moses, and the authors named in Charny’s article the room to react to the criticism. Their 
submission underwent an internal review by the Editorial Board of GSP and was accepted for 
publication.
In addition to this response piece, this issue contains five research articles, covering a wide 
variety of subjects. Eltion Meka addresses the question of minority rights and the interplay of 
European integration and ethnic reconciliation in Macadonia. Genevieve Parent evaluates the 
psychosocial consequences of genocide denial in the aftermath of extreme violence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In their article, Riccardo Armillei, Nikki Marczak, and Panayiotis Diamadis explore 
two so-called hidden genocides, those of Assyrians and Romani within the wider contexts of the 
rather well known Turkish Genocide of Armenians and the Holocaust, respectively. And, finally, 
two articles seek to expand the scholarship of the Rwandan Genocide in new directions. Claudine 
Kuradusenge discusses the Rwandan Hutu diaspora in Belgium and its struggles to relate to the 
former motherland and the genocide, while Daniel Rothbart and Jessica Cooley investigate the 
motivations of rescuers during the Rwandan Genocide.
This issue also features for the first time a research field note in GSP’s “State of the Field” section. 
This section contains essays written by expert practitioners and scholars that are relevant to the 
current state of research and practice in the field of atrocity, violence, and genocide prevention—
broadly and inclusively defined. In this issue, anthropologist Julie Fleischman describes her 
ongoing work with human remains from the Cambodian Genocide.
The wide range of topics, disciplines, histories (both geographically and temporally), and 
author nationalities and institutional affiliations, demonstrates not only the widths but also the 
internationality of the field of genocide studies. Several years ago, the Executive Board of the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS)—taking advantage of new European Union 
tenure requirements to publish in open access double-blind peer-reviewed journals, and the 
demand around the world to make scholarship of the highest qualify free and accessible through 
digital formats—decided to partner with university publishers and platforms that could support 
the distribution of GSP as an open-access journal. This decision has yielded important results. 
As of October 2016, GSP has surpassed 43,000 unique downloads in the past year. IP addresses 
downloading issues of GSP have been recorded from academic institutions on every continent 
on in the world. Individual articles—especially on understudied cases—have been downloaded 
over 3,000 times. For example, Kjell Anderson’s article on West Papua in Issue 9.2 has been, to 
date, downloaded nearly 3,100 times. This represents tremendous reach for a scholarly journal, 
with levels of readership that rival major disciplinary publications. As a result of this new global 
readership, GSP is beginning to receive manuscript submissions from scholars all over the world. 
Looking ahead to 2017, we at GSP are excited to continue cultivating and sustaining a global 
conversation on the prevention and study of genocide, mass violence, and other issues closely 
related to our field.   
Mentorship Program
GSP, in partnership with the IAGS Executive Board, is pleased to announce a mentorship program 
for emerging scholars. In its early stages, the mentorship program will focus on assisting emerging 
scholars (i.e., students in graduate programs who intend to work in genocide studies; post-doctoral 
researchers; non-tenure-track Ph.D. holders; and recently-graduated scholars who are within the 
first three years of their first professional position) with advice on preparing a specific piece of 
work for publication.
The manuscript in question should be of regular journal length and at a stage where it is very 
near ready for publication. Manuscripts that are underdeveloped, improperly formatted, or in a 
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state that is far from being suitable for external peer-review, may be denied access to the mentoring 
program until they are revised. To support this program, IAGS and GSP are seeking the following:
• Volunteer, established scholars, who are IAGS members and are willing to work with an 
emerging scholar in readying a journal article or book chapter for publication. Please send 
us your name, contact information, areas of expertise, and the languages you are able to 
work in. You will not be asked to work with more than one emerging scholar per year, 
unless you specifically state your willingness to do so. If you receive a manuscript that you 
feel is not yet ready for mentoring, you may request it be returned to the emerging scholar 
for further revision.
• Emerging scholars who would like advice from an established scholar to help ready 
a journal article or book chapter for publication. Along with your name and contact 
information, please send an abstract for the specific piece for which you would like to be 
mentored and the language in which you would like to mentored. We will do our best to 
accommodate your request, but remain dependent on the availability of a suitable mentor.
GSP will also refer journal submissions to this program when they receive articles that show 
promise, but require further polishing before being distributed for peer review. Publication in 
GSP is not guaranteed through this program. This is a volunteer-based program solely designed 
to build helping networks between established and emerging IAGS scholars—it is not available to 
non-members.
Please send all information to awoolford@genocidescholars.org, Andrew Woolford, IAGS 
President.
Christian Gudehus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Melanie O’Brien
Randle DeFalco
Gudehus, Irvin-Erickson, O’Brien, and DeFalco
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Abstract: Israel Charny has published an article, “Holocaust Minimization, Anti-Israel Themes, and Antisemitism: 
Bias at the Journal of Genocide Research” (JGR) in the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism. His specific 
allegations are bundled together in a single sentence: “minimization of the Holocaust, delegitimization of the State 
of Israel, and repeat[ing] common themes of contemporary antisemitism.” We write as the authors of articles and 
contributors to the JGR attacked by Charny. His allegations are false and we reject them. This article shows how 
they are based on distortions, misquotations, and falsifications of our work.
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Introduction1
Israel Charny has published an article, “Holocaust Minimization, Anti-Israel Themes, and 
Antisemitism: Bias at the Journal of Genocide Research” (JGR), based on a survey of genocide 
scholars, in the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism (JSA).2 He summarized its arguments in a piece 
in the Jerusalem Post Magazine (JPM), and the JSA editor promoted it on the email listserv of the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS).3 The JPM then published a letter by Yehuda 
Bauer criticizing its decision to publish such an attack on another journal, defending author Raz 
Segal, and questioning the methodology of Charny’s survey. A week later, it printed an abridged 
1 Co-authorship does not imply assent to arguments contained in others’ articles discussed here. 
2 Israel W. Charny, “Holocaust Minimization, Anti-Israel Themes, and Antisemitism: Bias at the Journal of Genocide 
Research,” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 7 (2016): 1–28, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.jsantisemitism.org/
images/journals/articles/Holocaust-Minimization-Anti-Israel-&-Antisemitism-at-JGR.pdf. References to this article 
will appear in parentheses in the text.
3 Israel W. Charny, “Genocide Scholars Who Minimize the Holocaust—and Who are Coming to Town,” Jerusalem Post Magazine, 
May 25, 2016; Letter from Steven Baum, Editor of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism, IAGS listserv, June 5, 2016.  
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letter signed by 30 scholars that expressed shock at Charny’s article and deplored its publication 
in the JPM.4 
Evidently, these 30 scholars were struck by Charny’s rhetorical excesses. Among them, his JSA 
article refers to JGR authors as “hate-mongering genocide scholars,” and compares the president 
of the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) to the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin 
(notes 1 and 23). “Antisemitism” in particular hangs in his article, never defined, never justified, 
and left to his respondents to rate, featuring in his title less as insinuation than denunciation. The 
specific allegations are bundled together in a single sentence: “minimization of the Holocaust, 
delegitimization of the State of Israel, and repeat[ing] common themes of contemporary 
antisemitism” (3). 
We write as the authors of articles and contributors to the JGR attacked by Charny in the 
aforementioned publications. His allegations are false and we reject them. They are based on 
distortions, misquotations, and falsifications of our work. As such, his articles are thus unworthy 
of scholarly consideration. But as they are publicly accessible, and because he levels such grave 
accusations, we respond in detail, even though the academic community has already dismissed 
them. We proceed as follows: first, we analyze the methodology of his survey, and then each 
author dissects Charny’s treatment of his article. We conclude by contextualizing Charny’s article 
in various strands of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 
The Survey 
Charny conducted a scientifically meaningless survey of people he regards as genocide scholars. 
In the first instance, he personally invited a large number of people to take part (46 responded), 
and then another 30 apparently completed the survey after it was (inadvertently) advertised on the 
IAGS listserv. It broke most of the principal rules of social survey construction, which has well-
established and accepted methodological standards.5 We briefly itemize the flaws.
First, the survey was based on a biased sample. Because the sample aimed to represent the 
views of Holocaust and genocide scholars, it should have been based on a recognizable, inclusive, 
and verifiable list of the members of the field, such as the membership of the IAGS and INoGS. 
Instead, it was based on a personally selected mailing list that is unavailable to any other scholar to 
verify. Moreover, as Charny admits, the sample deliberately excluded those likely to present views 
contrary to his own, viz. members of INoGS, which publishes JGR, further skewing the sample. 
Second, Charny prejudiced the survey further by advertising his own views when inviting 
people to participate; the respondents knew in advance the results he expected. Moreover, he “sent 
out [many of the invitations] individually often with personal comments added to the standard 
draft,” possibly influencing the respondents’ results further. He describes the second wave of 
respondents (who were not hand-picked) as championing the JGR: in other words, he explains the 
apparently more positive assessments by the second wave of respondents by depicting them as 
partial to the JGR rather than reflecting a less biased sample, thereby illustrating his own lack of 
open-mindedness on the issue.
Third, Charny selected a small sample of JGR articles on the basis of his own pre-occupations 
rather than offering a sample justified by a representative analysis of its content. He then provided 
the respondents with biased summaries and extracts of these articles; respondents were not 
furnished with the articles or their abstracts. (The bias of his summaries is analyzed in the following 
sections.) 
Fourth, to evaluate the articles, Charny offered only three questionable categories, none of 
which is clearly defined. The first category, the “minimization of the Holocaust,” seems to mean 
4 Yehuda Bauer, letter to the editor, JPM, June 10, 2016. Dirk Moses’s letter was published next to Bauer’s. “Shock” and 
“deplore” are taken from the collective letter published on June 17, distributed on the IAGS listserv on June 22; 
it appears as an appendix to this article with an extended list of scholars who agreed to add their name after its 
publication. 
5 Alan Aldridge, Surveying The Social World: Principles and Practice in Survey Research (Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 2001). A guide like Robert Lee Miller and John D Brewer, eds., The A-Z of Social Research: A Dictionary of Key 
Social Science Research Concepts (London: Sage, 2003) would have enabled Charny to avoid the elementary mistakes 
itemized below.
Goldberg, Kehoe, Moses, Segal, Shaw, and Wolf
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the minimization of its significance and implications, rather than of the events and their horror. 
Because this distinction was not made clear to the survey respondents, how they understood 
“minimization” is thus unknown. Even more opaque was the following option given to respondents 
in assessing the article summaries and extracts: “This is legitimate criticism of the Holocaust” (8). 
While, presumably, Charny meant legitimate criticism of Holocaust memory, this option injected 
another dose of uncertainty into how respondents understood the survey.
Charny’s second dimension, “delegitimization of the State of Israel,” was defined in emotive 
terms that imported a political position into the criterion of scientific analysis: 
The founding of Israel is no longer to be recognized as an expression of a heroic national 
movement called Zionism, or that the wish for a Jewish nation was in response to ongoing 
pogroms, mass killings and antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust. The attack on 
the basic legitimacy and moral justification of Israel sets a stage as well for far less [sic.] tears 
in the future should any of the current dangers to Israel’s existence ever materialize (7). 
The third dimension, repeating “common themes of contemporary antisemitism” (3) was again 
undefined. Charny appears to assume a version of the idea of the “new antisemitism,” in which 
some types of criticism of Israel are axiomatically considered antisemitic, but he does not explain 
or engage with the difficulties of this highly contested idea.6 Even the standard of the US State 
Department definition of antisemitism holds that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any 
other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic.”7 These considerations may have been evident to 
most of the survey respondents, for they disagreed with Charny’s antisemitism allegation. They 
also may have registered that a miniscule number of pieces in the JGR touch on Israel: five out of 
some 130 since 2010.8
Overall, given the survey’s construction, it is remarkable how many respondents did not 
follow Charny’s assertions, undermining the article’s major hypothesis about antisemitism. He 
does not recognize, let alone account for, this disjuncture between allegation and outcome, yet 
the former appears in the article’s title as an implied fact. The JSA editor, Steven Baum, claimed 
on the IAGS listserv that Charny’s study is an “objective, scientific study.”9 Plainly, it is no 
such thing. 
   
Raz Segal and Rethinking the Holocaust in Hungary
Charny begins with an article by Raz Segal that addresses a key question about the role of the 
Hungarian government in the mass deportations of Jews from Hungary during World War 
II.10 What is striking here is that Charny does not actually refer to the article at all. He quotes a 
few sentences from the abstract—one is misquoted—disregarding the main arguments and the 
significant number of diverse primary sources in the article, including accounts by Jews.
One main argument in Segal’s article is that wartime Hungarian authorities targeted Jews as 
part of a broader Hungarian policy of mass violence against non-Magyar groups, with the goal of 
6 The European Union dropped its working definition of antisemitism in 2013, a move criticized by the USA: Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, “EU Drops its ‘Working Definition’ of Anti-Semitism,” Times of Israel, December 5, 2013; “US 
Says Europe Needs ‘Working Definition’ of Anti-Semitism,” Jerusalem Post, March 17, 2016, accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/US-says-Europe-needs-working-definition-of-anti-Semitism-448246. Among his 
various pieces on the subject, see most recently Brian Klug, “What Do We Mean When We Say ‘Antisemitism’? Echoes 
of Shattering Glass,” accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.jmberlin.de/antisemitism-today/Klug.pdf.
7 Fact Sheet, Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, Washington, DC, June 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/
drl/rls/fs/2010/122352.htm. Italics in the original.
8 Besides the pieces Charny attacks by Amos Goldberg (one with Bashir Bashir) and Martin Shaw, which are discussed 
below, there are: Zach Levey, “Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra Civil War, 1967–70,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, nos. 
2-3 (2014): 263–280, and Daniel Blatman, “Holocaust Scholarship: Towards a Post-Uniqueness Era,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 17, no. 1 (2015): 21–43. 
9 Letter from Steven Baum, Editor of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism, IAGS Listserve June 5, 2016.
10 Raz Segal, “Beyond Holocaust Studies: Rethinking the Holocaust in Hungary,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 1 
(2014): 1–23. 
Response to Charny’s Attack on the Journal of Genocide Research
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using windows of opportunities during the war to establish an ethno-national “Greater Hungary.” 
This project, anchored in the modern history of Hungary, at times clashed with German interests 
and plans, and at times coincided with them. Thus, it was German authorities in east Galicia that 
stopped the mass deportations of Jews and Roma from Hungary, across the Carpathian Mountains, 
in July and August 1941, while a bit less than three years later, the Nazi genocide of the Jews 
intersected terribly successfully with what today we would call Hungarian designs of “ethnic 
cleansing.” 
Charny, for his part, writes that understanding this complex history means nothing to the 
suffering of Jews. Yet, the suffering of victims—not only Jews—is not the subject of the article, 
and in fact, Segal has written extensively about Jews and their suffering during the Holocaust.11 
Furthermore, describing and comprehending complex historical events and processes—as 
historians of any period and topic do—is of particular significance for Holocaust and genocide 
scholars: as we analyze states today poised to engage in mass violence, it is precisely such analyses 
that we hope will encourage efforts to prevent or at least minimize genocide and mass violence, 
and hence the suffering of victims. 
What troubles Charny, however, is Segal’s use of quotation marks for the terms “final solution” 
and “the Holocaust.” It is unclear why putting a Nazi term—“final solution”—in quotation marks 
is problematic, and how precisely it gives the impression that the destruction of Jews in Hungary 
during World War II was “not that real” (3): it is standard in German-language historiography. 
Note how Charny in effect suggests that Segal is a Holocaust denier, but what scholars are signaling 
here is merely that they are using a Nazi term. 
By contrast, Segal’s choice of “the Holocaust”—with quotation marks—serves to emphasize 
that it is a concept that could cloud more than clarify all the processes and events of genocidal 
violence that together we call “the Holocaust.” This is, to be clear, the exact opposite of saying that 
the Holocaust was not real; indeed, it is meant to uncover and explain more of its reality—in this 
case, how and why the mass murder of around half a million Jews from Hungary unfolded during 
World War II. Ironically, Charny’s distortion of Segal’s article stands as a stark disservice to the 
memory of the victims he allegedly so cherishes. 
What is at stake here for Charny is the idea of the Holocaust as central, above and beyond any 
other event in history. It is, in other words, an attempt to maintain at all costs a hierarchy of mass 
violence, and it is dogmatic in its rejection of evidence to the contrary. Adhering to this dogma 
means that we simply miss a major part of the history of the Holocaust in Hungary—the drive to 
create a “Greater Hungary” with as small a non-Magyar population as possible. This does not at 
all mean that Jews were not targeted as Jews by the Hungarian state; the broader approach Segal 
adopts helps us understand better why and how they were targeted as Jews. It allows us to see 
how they were integral parts of multiethnic and multi-religious societies that the Hungarian state 
sought to destroy, independently of the twists and turns of German anti-Jewish policies. Holocaust 
historiography is advancing by integrating anti-Jewish polices and practices in these densely inter-
related contexts. Charny’s zero-sum logic, in which attention to the fate of non-Jews somehow 
detracts from the specificity of Jewish experiences, stands in the way of this scholarship by tagging 
historians as antisemites. 
Thomas Kehoe on the Intentions behind Nazi Propaganda for the Arabs during World War Two
Charny misquotes and consequently badly misrepresents Thomas Kehoe’s arguments about how 
the Nazis formulated their propaganda for the Arabs during World War Two.12 His summation 
of Kehoe’s argument for participants was: “About Nazi propaganda for the Arabs in World War 
Two, ‘This study casts doubt…[that] the [Nazi] calls to violence [by the Arabs] were an effort to 
expand killing of Jews beyond Europe… Anti-Jewish rhetoric figured third [the implication is as a 
11 Raz Segal, Days of Ruin: The Jews of Munkács during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Publications, 2013); Segal, “The 
Jews of Huszt between the World Wars and in the Holocaust,” Yalkut Moreshet: Holocaust Documentation and Research 4 
(2006): 80–119.
12 Thomas J. Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit: Understanding and Contextualizing the Intentions behind Nazi 
Propaganda for the Arabs during World War Two,” Journal of Genocide Research 14, no. 2 (2012): 137–157.
Goldberg, Kehoe, Moses, Segal, Shaw, and Wolf
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low priority] in the hierarchy of target themes” (13). Charny’s misquoting is apparent from the full 
context in the section of Kehoe’s article Charny dissected and reassembled: 
Full of vitriol, violent invective and hate, there can be little doubt that Nazi Arabic propaganda 
aimed to incite an Arab revolt and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, including 
mass killing of Jews. Certain authors have addressed these calls to violence as an effort to 
expand the killing of Jews beyond Europe. The content study performed in this article casts doubt 
on the extent to which their analyses fully explain the propagandists’ goals. Anti-Jewish 
rhetoric figured third in the hierarchy of target themes. Furthermore, the Nazi propagandists 
reshaped it from a paranoid, European anti-Semitism into a threat of foreign domination 
that complemented the dominant, anti-imperialist message focused on the British and US 
presence in Arab lands.13
In the next paragraph, Kehoe reiterates the Nazi focus on killing Jews and its significance to 
the Holocaust, writing: “[The Nazis] seized on well-known Arab anti-imperialist sentiment whilst 
simultaneously fanning the flames of Jew-hatred, all in the service of inciting Arab insurrection 
and violence”.14 
Beyond the blatant reorganization of Kehoe’s words, when his writing is seen in its full context 
it should be apparent he did not argue that killing Jews was a “low priority” or that his study casts 
doubt on Nazi attempts to extend the Holocaust, as Charny claims (13). The opposite is the case. 
There is no doubt the Nazis were keen to encourage Arabs to murder Jews. Charny’s assertion that 
Kehoe ignored the Nazis’ Holocaust policies in the Middle East overlooks Kehoe’s discussion of 
this issue in the first pages of the article. Indeed, he writes, “The Nazis almost assuredly intended 
the destruction of North African and Middle Eastern Jewry”.15
Kehoe was concerned with the question of how the Nazis formulated their Arabic propaganda 
and their key aims. His analysis of this question was confined to the context of an ongoing war in 
North Africa, which he clearly explains. A simple analysis of the propaganda’s content indicated a 
focus on anti-imperialist themes. This is a quantitative reality, and one that Jeffrey Herf, the other 
scholar to have written on this topic, also acknowledges as fact.16 
The debate around how the Nazis constructed their Arabic propaganda is about formulation, 
not overarching intention. Kehoe agrees with the other scholars who have examined this 
propaganda that the Nazis intended Jewish extermination and tried to motivate Arabs to 
kill Jews. The reason Kehoe suggests for a high rate of anti-imperialist messages in the Arabic 
propaganda is developed from the consensus of analyses regarding how the Nazis formulated 
their propaganda, which holds that the Nazis targeted known sources of tension in their intended 
audience in order to shape actions they desired.17 In the case of their Arabic propaganda, 
anti-imperialism was the issue the Nazi propagandists deemed most likely to provoke 
Arab support for the German war effort, which would of course have meant violence against 
Jews and Allied forces. The reason that “anti-Jewish rhetoric was third in the hierarchy of target 
themes”, as Kehoe writes, was not because the murder of Jews was unimportant to the Nazis, but 
because the Nazis believed other themes would more likely motivate the violent responses they 
wanted from their Arab audience. This argument is further supported by documents from the 
Nazi Foreign Office. A memo from mid-1942 provided a step-by-step guide for constructing radio 
propaganda that targeted—what the Nazis believed to be—sources of Arab tension. Arab violence 
would have served a dual purpose, benefiting the immediate German war effort and killing Jews. 
If the Germans had won, there is no doubt Middle Eastern Jewry would have been destroyed.18
13 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 152. Charny’s selected parts are italicized.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.,142.
16 Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arabs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 5.
17 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 140-141. See also Herf, Nazi Propaganda, 262–263.
18 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 141.
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Charny misquotes Kehoe, and in so doing misrepresents a nuanced argument about how 
the Nazis constructed their Arabic propaganda. He has consequently betrayed the fundamental 
principles of good scholarship and honest intellectual debate, creating a quintessential straw man. 
There is no doubt the Nazis sought the destruction of all Jews, a truly horrible intention and crime 
that should be remembered and memorialized forever. The dispassionate academic analysis of 
how they sought to achieve such ends, through waging a wider war of conquest, encouraging 
foreign support, and motivating different forms of violence, does not detract from this reality.
Gerhard Wolf on the Wannssee Conference and Nazi Living Space
Regarding Gerhard Wolf’s article, it seems that Charny is most appalled by Wolf’s claim that the 
Wannsee Conference, and by extension the Holocaust, should be analyzed in the larger context 
of the quest for German living space.19 When it comes to the Holocaust, this is by now a fairly 
uncontroversial argument, with the various steps of radicalization of anti-Jewish policy regularly 
explained as embedded in a complicated web of events at home, at the front, and in the occupied 
territories.20 All were aimed, at least in part, at expanding the German Volksgemeinschaft beyond the 
borders of the Reich. Hardly any historian would question, for example, that it was the invasion 
of Poland that finally pushed the persecution of inmates of mental asylums and so-called asocials 
towards mass murder. And as we have known since at least Henry Friedlander’s work from 
1995, aptly titled The Origins of Nazi Genocide, techniques and procedures used to kill over two 
million Jews in places like Treblinka were pioneered here, during Action T4, the first mass murder 
campaign of the Nazi regime.21 Before Herbert Lange became the first commander of the first 
extermination camp in Kulmhof, he headed a unit that had killed thousands of Polish inmates of 
mental asylums in a gas van. And when the regime opted to kill all Polish Jews, it was the T4 team 
that designed and staffed the extermination camps. Charny’s claim that one of the reasons for the 
archetypal significance—read: uniqueness—of the Holocaust was the first use of gas chambers is 
another example of how unfamiliar he is with this research (19). 
One could point to very similar dynamics in the administration of the occupied territories, 
and in the way the war was waged. It is exceedingly obvious, for example, that the self-imposed 
constraints and dystopian aims of the Germanization policies in Poland and the failure of the 
ghettoization and deportation plans radicalized anti-Jewish policies there, and that the specific 
targeting of the civilian population, Jews and non-Jews alike, during the invasion of the Soviet 
Union first facilitated the murder of Jews in large numbers. 
Wolf’s re-interpretation of the Wannsee Conference is part of this wider discussion, i.e. the 
attempt to embed and analyze anti-Jewish policies in the wider context of violent German policies 
to remake the demographic composition of conquered Europe. Some of the arguments he presents 
are not even particularly new. Interrogating the role of the Wannsee Conference in the history of 
the Holocaust started decades ago. Most historians now agree that if it was an important milestone 
in the history of the Holocaust, this was less for any decision taken there, than for the successful 
attempt by Heydrich to have the state bureaucracy accept his coordinating role in anti-Jewish 
policy. 
Charny also seems annoyed by Wolf’s claim that Wannsee “did not call for a systematic and 
immediate mass murder of all Jews” (3). This discussion, too, has been underway for years. Wolf 
is by no means the first to argue that we should take the wording of the minutes more seriously. 
In the past, the most notorious passage about forcing “Jews fit to work … eastwards constructing 
19 Gerhard Wolf, “The Wannsee Conference in 1942 and the National Socialist Living Space Dystopia,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 17, no. 2 (2015): 153–175.
20 See for example Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), and Christopher R. 
Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 
21 Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: from Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995) and, more recently, Sara Berger, Experten der Vernichtung: Das T4-Reinhard-Netzwerk in den Lagern 
Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013).
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roads”22 was read as a badly veiled statement proposing the immediate killing of all European 
Jews in the extermination camps in the east. This consensus has now dissipated, with ever-more 
historians arguing that, when set against the developments within the SS apparatus and Himmler’s 
ambitious plans to install the SS as a principal force in the Germanization and settlement of the 
occupied east, as detailed in the Generalplan Ost, the intention to use Jews as slave laborers and kill 
them through murderous building projects might accurately represent SS planning at the turn of 
the year 1941/42.23 
Wolf’s article builds on these discussions, showing that the impact of Germanization policies 
for understanding the Wannsee Conference might be even greater—a reflection not merely of plans 
for the future, but of lessons from the past, i.e., the shortcomings and failures in Poland. His article 
tries to show how intertwined were anti-Jewish and anti-Polish policies, and how both aimed at 
ethnically cleansing annexed Poland. 
For Charny, in his follow-up article in the JPM, this notion is “crazy.” He fears that showing 
that anti-Jewish policies were not formulated and did not operate in a vacuum would “minimize” 
the Holocaust.24 Even more perversely, he also claims in this article that Wolf would argue that 
the “Wannsee Conference was not about Jews!”25 The exact opposite is the case. What Wolf tries to 
show is that because of various developments—mainly the enforced cessation of deporting Poles 
and the further radicalization of antisemitic violence in other parts of the occupied east—Heydrich 
tried to reclaim lost influence by centralizing antisemitic policies in the RSHA. For this reason, the 
Wannsee Conference was solely about Jews, unlike the other two conferences he headed in the 
previous two years. 
This argument has not been made before. Obviously, Wolf’s interpretation is just one 
intervention into an ongoing discussion. Given that little material on Wannsee has survived, every 
analysis of the role of the conference is dependent on its perceived context. If, for example, one 
holds the position that the decision to kill all Jews had been taken already before the end of the year 
1941—a position not primarily influenced by what happened at Wannsee—then one will be much 
more inclined to interpret the minutes as just another example of Nazi cover language. However, 
if one is open to the argument that this decision emerged a few months later—retroactively 
legitimizing crimes already under way, or even to a model that downplays discrete decisions and 
instead stresses the process of radicalization—then his explanation makes more sense. 
What makes Charny’s treatment of this article more outrageous still is that he is not content with 
insulting Wolf. He also denounces the entire University of Sussex as a “hotbed of anti-Israel and 
Holocaust downgrading scholars.” Needless to say this claim, again, is not backed up by anything 
resembling evidence. As before, the opposite is correct. Only a few years after the university was 
established in 1961, the Columbus Centre for Studies of Persecution and Genocide was established, 
the first of its kind and a stimulating environment that produced pioneering studies like The Aryan 
Myth by Leon Poliakov and Warrant for Genocide by Norman Cohn, the center’s founder.26 During the 
following decades, the study of violence, genocide and the Holocaust became an important part of 
research across the university. Charny evidently knows none of this history. 
He is equally ignorant of the present. He claims absurdly that Wolf argues that the Wannsee 
Conference “was not part of the final solution,” only to then speculate what the staff of the Museum 
22 As reprinted in Mark Roseman, The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 113.
23 See, for example, Herman Kaienburg, “Vernichtung durch Arbeit”: Der Fall Neuengamme, die Wirtschaftsbestrebungen 
der SS und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Existenbedingungen der KZ-Gefangenen (Bonn: Dietz, 1990), Dieter Pohl, 
Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–44: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen 
Massenverbrechens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996) and Jan Erik Schulte, “Die Wannsee Konferenz und die Zwangsarbeit 
von Juden: Eine Fallstudie zur Judenverfolgung 1941/42,” in Interessen, Strukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse: Für eine 
politische Kontextualisierung des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Manfred Grieger, Christian Jansen and Irmtrud Wojak (Essen: 
Klartext, 2010), 57–90.
24 Charny, “Genocide Scholars Who Minimize the Holocaust.”
25 Ibid.
26 Leon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth. A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe (London: Chatto and Windus and 
Heinemann for Sussex University Press, 1974), and Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-
Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967).
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of the House of the Wannsee Conference would think of this notion. He seems ignorant of the fact 
that Wolf worked at the museum for eight years before starting at Sussex University. He seems 
also not to know that Wolf is the Deputy Director of the History Department’s Centre for German-
Jewish Studies at Sussex, the only one of its kind in the UK. Founded in 1994, the Centre’s research 
focuses on the history of German-speaking Jewry in Europe, houses a large archive spanning over 
300 years, and offers a wide teaching portfolio, from Moses Mendelssohn and the Haskalah to the 
so-called Kristallnacht pogrom and the Holocaust and to current Jewish life in Germany. In addition, 
the Centre hosts events aimed at a wider audience, like the annual Hannah Arendt Lecture and 
Holocaust Memorial Day, which attract hundreds of visitors from outside the university. Very 
recently, the History Department has also broadened its expertise in the research of Israel and 
the Middle East by appointing David Tal to the Yossi Harel Chair in Modern Israel Studies. This 
chair was made possible by generous donations by Lord Weidenfeld and others, who clearly did 
not think that Sussex was a “hotbed for anti-Israel scholars.” We agree that antisemitism has not 
vanished and constitutes a serious problem in Europe and beyond. In combatting it, however, one 
is ill advised to cheapen the problem by hurling accusations of antisemitism at colleagues who do 
not necessarily share one’s own partisan views. These unfounded accusations are not only inimical 
to any academic discussion, but also minimize the seriousness of the problems about which Charny 
himself claims to be concerned. 
Amos Goldberg, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust and the Nakba
Charny attacks two of Amos Goldberg’s articles. The first one critically analyses the Israeli Yad 
Vashem Holocaust museum. The article claims that the museum portrays what some theorists 
call “a redemptive narrative” which tends to deny any part of the story that distracts from its 
mythical mission.27 Charny does not challenge Goldberg’s overall thesis, but relates to his critique 
that the museum hardly relates to other victims of Nazism. Charny actually agrees with this 
critique. Moreover, he even goes as far as saying that “Goldberg is also correct in that Yad Vashem 
fails to confront criticisms of its ignoring other peoples” (5). However, Goldberg’s way of making 
the argument was not to Charny’s taste, and therefore he concludes: “but in his remarks there 
is a suggestion of a possible innuendo of joining in contemporary ‘New Left’ attacks on Israel” (5. 
Emphasis added). So here is the allegation: The article appears to express “a minimization of the 
Holocaust, delegitimization of the State of Israel, and repeat common themes of contemporary 
antisemitism” because it possibly suggests an innuendo that could be somehow considered as 
mirroring some vicious “contemporary ‘New Left’ attacks on Israel” (5). 
What is this “contemporary ‘New Left’ attack on Israel”? Why is it an illegitimate critique? 
And how is Goldberg’s wording associated with such an illegitimate attack? Charny fails to even 
hint at answers to these questions, leaving crucial gaps in his argument. In footnote 16, he repeats 
this structure once again and writes: “I consider the criticism of Yad Vashem for not relating its 
exhibition to the genocides of other peoples, as correct, but the statement edges toward a possibly 
nasty twist” (emphasis added). So this possible nasty twist (which again is not explained) is enough 
for Charny to define Goldberg as an antisemitic de-legitimator of the State of Israel, and a Holocaust 
minimizer.
The second article to which Charny refers was co-written by Goldberg and Bashir Bashir two 
years later.28 It suggests a way for Jews and Palestinians to jointly deliberate on the Holocaust 
and the Nakba. The article suggests that only if the two peoples will acknowledge each other’s 
traumatic histories may they attain a historical reconciliation. The article, which is theoretical in 
nature, explores the conditions for such a joint conversation. It repeatedly emphasizes that one 
cannot compare the two events, for obvious reasons. However, as they both function as the two 
nations’ “foundational pasts” (Alon Confino),29 they should be addressed together. Bashir and 
27 Amos Goldberg, “The ‘Jewish Narrative’ in the Yad Vashem Global Holocaust Museum,” Journal of Genocide Research 14, 
no. 2 (2012): 187–213. 
28 Amos Goldberg and Bashir Bashir, “Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba: Disruptive Empathy and Binationalism 
in Israel/Palestine: Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 1 (2014): 77–99.
29 Alon Confino, Foundational Pasts: The Holocaust as Historical Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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Goldberg mostly draw on Dominick La Capra’s concept of “empathic unsettlement,” which was 
coined by LaCapra in his writings on the Holocaust, and which means that in the wake of the 
Holocaust and other catastrophes of the twentieth century, a moral obligation exists to empathize 
with the other while acknowledging his utter otherness.30 
However, Charny’s main allegation here does not have to do with what is written, but with 
what Bashir and Goldberg fail to mention: that the Zionist Jews who committed the Nakba were 
actually the victims of the Arab assault that threatened to annihilate them once again three years 
after the end of the Holocaust. 
As is well known, these issues are hotly debated among scholarly specialists on the history 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is beyond the scope of this article to rehash this debate in order to 
show how complex this chapter of history really was—far beyond Charny’s ideological clichés. 
The major point that should be made here is that the article did not relate to the origins of the 
1948 events. It tries to explain why Jews and Palestinians find it so difficult to talk about these 
historical events. It asserts that: “[t]he vast majority of Israeli Jews generally perceive the Holocaust 
as a catastrophe that justifies their Zionist position favoring a Jewish nation-state on the land of 
Israel/Palestine. There is a prevalent sense among many Jews, including many Holocaust survivors, 
that they must establish a robust sovereignty of their own in the wake of the Holocaust.”31 At 
the same time, “Many Palestinians … regard Zionism and the State of Israel as bearing prime 
responsibility for their catastrophe and suffering.”32 
But the most absurd of his allegations comes when he claims that the authors fail to acknowledge 
“that the wish for a Jewish nation [sic] was in response to ongoing pogroms, mass killings and 
antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust” (7). This allegation is a complete absurdity, as this 
is precisely one of the major points of this article. Acknowledging the bloody history of the Jews 
in Europe disrupts the traditional Palestinian national narrative, just as acknowledging the Nakba 
disrupts the Zionist traditional narrative. This double move should lead, according to this article, 
to recognizing “the right to national self-determination of both national groups,” while insisting 
on a solution along binational lines, while emphasizing “that this right ought not be realised in the 
form of an exclusive ethnic state.”33
Thus the issue at stake here is not the history of Zionism and the conflict, but whether there 
is only one legitimate way to historically narrate Zionism and the conflict. It is time for Charny 
to acknowledge that while he might think “[t]he founding of Israel [should] … be recognized 
as an expression of a heroic national movement called Zionism” (7), there are others who think 
differently—among them even Zionists. Not everyone who fails to tell the Zionist story the way 
Charny wishes it to be told is expressing antisemitism, delegimitizing Israel, or minimizing the 
Holocaust. 
Martin Shaw and the Palestine-Israel Debate
As we have seen, Charny has a highly idealized view of Zionism (“a heroic national movement”) 
and sees the establishment of the State of Israel only as a “response to ongoing pogroms, mass 
killings and antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust.” (7) Although he recognizes that Israel 
committed atrocities in its founding war, and refers to the “Nakba,” his motivation in dealing with 
these issues is not to understand the tragic sequence of events through which the persecution and 
mass murder of European Jews were combined with the destruction of Arab society in Palestine, 
but to uphold “the basic legitimacy and moral justification of Israel” and ward off what he perceives 
as “the current dangers to Israel’s existence” (7).
It is in this light that Charny approaches a contribution to JGR by Martin Shaw. He states that 
“an article was presented in which the author claimed from the outset that Zionism was based on a 
genocidal ideal, and that Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 was in fulfillment of that intention” 
30 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 40–42.
31 Goldberg and Bashir, “Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba,” 81.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.,94.
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(4). In fact, Shaw did not write an article in JGR, but engaged in a short debate (originally conducted 
by email) with Omer Bartov34 about an article he had earlier published in Holy Land Studies.35 As 
in the case of Segal, Charny does not appear to have read the article in which Shaw laid out his 
full case: he does not reference it, and is obviously ignorant of those of its arguments that were not 
repeated in the short JGR exchange. He merely presents three quotations from the debate out of 
context. 
Charny charges Shaw with ignoring “the plain facts that the Nakba developed in response to 
the threatened destruction of the Jewish community in the newly founded State of Israel after Israel 
had accepted the U.N. partition into Jewish and Arab states” (6). However, these are not “plain 
facts,” as becomes clear once we admit other, related facts about the historical context: e.g. that 
the Arabs, the majority of Palestine’s population, rejected the plan because it gave the larger part 
of the territory to the Jewish minority; that (as Benny Morris documented 30 years ago) deliberate 
Zionist policies contributed to the removal and flight of the Palestinians in 1948;36 and that the 
intentional character of the process was confirmed by Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian return in 
the aftermath. 
As to Charny’s allegations that Shaw stated that “Zionism was based on a genocidal ideal, 
and that Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 was in fulfilment of that intention” (4), if Charny 
had read the original article, he would have known that Shaw cited Morris to the effect that 
the 1948 war “was initiated by the Arab side”;37 that he acknowledged that “Zionist rejection 
of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was conditioned by Arab attacks on Jewish 
communities, especially during their 1929 uprising”38; and that he argued (citing Mark Levene) 
against the idea that the Zionist movement had a single, long-term “intention” to remove the 
Arab population. 
Obviously, Charny’s main concern, reflecting his commitment to the State of Israel, is with 
Shaw’s application of the idea of genocide to Palestine. Shaw pointed out that “none of the 
‘revisionist’ historians who now dominate the field doubts that deliberate Israeli policies made a 
substantial contribution to the destruction of the larger part of historical Arab society in Palestine.”39 
Shaw argued that this was true whether the 1948 removal was the result of Israel’s taking 
advantage of the “opportunity” to remove it, as Morris continues to argue,40 or also of extensive 
“pre-planning,” as Ilan Pappe’s more recent research suggests.41 In this light, Shaw proposed that, 
within the framework of a broad Lemkinian concept (in terms of which “ethnic cleansing” can be 
considered genocide42), there is “prima facie a strong case for considering the [1948] events partially 
within a genocide framework.”43
Charny is unable to engage with this proposition in conceptual or historical terms, but only 
through the starkly political lens of the “delegitimization” of the state. If Charny had paid attention, 
he would have seen that Shaw warned against politicizing genocide studies, and made it clear 
that for him the implication of his argument was only that Israel should “come to terms with the 
genocide of 1948 and its enduring injustice,” if it is to hope for security.44 In response to Bartov, he 
34 Martin Shaw and Omer Bartov, ‘The Question of Genocide in Palestine in 1948: an Exchange Between Martin Shaw and 
Omer Bartov,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, nos. 3-4 (2010): 243–259.
35 Martin Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical Perspective on Genocide,” Holy Land Studies 9, no. 1 (2010): 1–24.
36 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
While Charny approves of Morris’s work, he does not engage with Shaw’s use of it.
37 Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical Perspective,” 13.
38 Ibid., 11.
39 Ibid.,13, cited in Shaw and Bartov, “The Question of Genocide,” 245.
40 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
41 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (London: One World, 2007).
42 Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical Perspective,” 14–17; see also Martin Shaw, What is Genocide?, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 66–83.
43 Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical perspective”. 17.
44 Ibid., 20.
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explicitly refuted the contention of “delegitimization.”45 Elsewhere, he has publicly advocated a 
two-state solution.46
Why Now? The Emotional Challenges of Studying Genocide47
As with any genocide, scholars need to approach the Holocaust with sensitivity because of 
the understandable emotions it evokes. It is not yet the kind of past about which all historians 
can easily write with detachment, as they do, say, of the sixteenth-century Reformation, which 
remained the subject of intense intra-Christian polemics until relatively recently. The Holocaust 
and other modern genocides remain instances of “hot” rather than “cold” memory, in part because 
scholars include(d) among their number surviving victims and perpetrators, witnesses, and 
their children, who, like everyone, are liable to the emotional pull of collective identification.48 
A vivid sense of the past’s presence is conveyed by an online response to an article about 
Holocaust literature:
The Holocaust, at least for we Jews, is a very real event in our own personal history. It 
has meaning and consequences for our lives far more immediate than any fiction could 
represent. Not even historical scholarship is adequate to the event. For us our understanding 
of its lessons within the context of our Diaspora experience represents nothing less than life 
and death.49
Scholars should not deny others the intense emotions they may feel about the subject, whether 
existential angst or anticipatory fear; experiencing them is all too human. Nor can they extricate 
themselves entirely from such formative contexts, as the famous Israeli historian Jacob L. Talmon 
observed in an essay entitled “Uniqueness and Universality of Jewish History”:
No historian … can be a complete rationalist. He must be something of a poet, he must have 
a little of the philosopher, and he must be touched just a bit by some kind of mysticism. The 
sorting out of evidence, the detective’s skill in ferreting out inaccuracy and inconsistency, are 
of little help when the historian strikes against the hard residue of mystery and enigma, the 
ultimate causes and the great problems of human life.50
Of the Jewish historian in particular, Talmon continued that he
becomes a kind of martyr in his [sic] permanent and anguished intimacy with the mystery 
of Jewish martyrdom and survival. Whether he be Orthodox in belief or has discarded all 
religious practice, he cannot help but be sustained by a faith which can neither be provided 
nor disproved.51
45 Shaw and Bartov, “The Question of Genocide in Palestine,” 258.
46 Martin Shaw, “A Viable Two-State Solution Needs the Idealism and Utopianism of the One-State Idea’, Democratiya 
19, Spring-Summer 2009, accessed July 15, 2016, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-content/files_
mf/1389827037d16Symposium.pdf.
47 The conclusion draws on A. Dirk Moses, “Anxieties in Holocaust and Genocide Studies,” in Probing the Ethics of 
Holocaust Culture, ed. Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner, and Todd Presner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2016 forthcoming), 332–354, 474–483.
48 Charles S. Maier, “Heißes und kaltes Gedächtnis: Über die politische Halbwertszeit von Nazismus und 
Kommunismus,” Transit 22 (2001/2002): 153–165.
49 David Turner comment on Marc Tracy, “Higher Truth,” Tablet Magazine, December 2, 2010, accessed December 2, 
2010, http://www.tabletmag.com/arts-and-culture/books/51978/higher-truth. This was the original site, however, the 
comment is now on Turner’s blog: http://israelzionismdiaspora.blogspot.it/2010/12/conversations-with-holocaust-
denier.html.
50 Jacob L. Talmon, “Uniqueness and Universality of Jewish History,” in The Unique and the Universal: Some Historical 
Reflections (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1965), 89.
51 Ibid., 89.
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That Talmon, who was born in Poland in 1916, wrote in such terms fifty years ago is hardly 
surprising given the calamitous lows and dizzying highs of Jewish experiences in the first half 
of the twentieth century. But can historians like Talmon speak for the communities they purport 
to ventriloquize? We know many scholars of genocide who, though at times anguished, neither 
experience states of intimacy with mysteries of any kind, nor are tempted by the metaphysics of 
martyrdom.
Even so, continuing intense anxieties about trends in genocide research and status of Holocaust 
memory, evident in Charny’s articles, indicates that Talmon’s observations are pertinent. Take 
Walter Reich, former director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., and 
currently Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Professor of International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior 
at George Washington University in the United States. He itemized those anxieties in the following 
terms:
• Distorting the very definition of the Holocaust—6 million vs. 11 million
• Trivializing Holocaust memory
• Dismissing the victimization of the Jews to advance the victimization of others
• Distorting the Holocaust in popular culture, especially film
• Academicizing the Holocaust
• The effects of Holocaust kitsch
• The effects of the seamier efforts to recover Holocaust assets
• The effects of using the Holocaust to achieve political, diplomatic, and military ends.52
Trivializing the Holocaust is a particularly common complaint, as is the objection to its categorization 
as “just another case of genocide” or an example of “man’s inhumanity to man.”53
For the traumatized subject and those who identify with them, these perceived trivializations 
seem outrageous. This subject requires absolute certainties as a psychologically essential cognitive 
structure. Without the consolation of abiding truths, the suffering of such subjects may be literally 
unbearable.54 Scholarship is thereby confronted with a challenge, for it presumes that “the living 
inhabit the present and … the dead inhabit the past.”55 How does it deal with the fact that scholars of 
genocide can be emotionally implicated in its causes and consequences, and experience permanent 
and anguished intimacy with the mystery of martyrdom and survival? 
The American-Polish writer Eva Hoffman, daughter of Holocaust survivors, responds to this 
dilemma by positing a scholarly maxim: “It behooves us, with utmost care and compassion, to use 
our vantage point outside traumatic history itself in order to bring to it interpretations that may not 
be available to the victims; and perhaps, even, in our thinking and analysis, to move beyond the 
point of trauma itself.”56 The scholar need not be captured by the traumatic history, she is arguing. 
Studying genocide, then, requires two operations: separating oneself from all participants’ 
perspectives, and engaging in comparative analysis in time and place. The benefit of hindsight 
confers an epistemological privilege: “An international, cross-cultural, or culturally intermingled 
perspective comes to us as easily as certain kinds of exclusive ethnic and religious attachments 
came to our ancestors,” writes Hoffman. “Translated backwards, this can lead to a comparative 
approach to history.”57 Hoffman understands the social scientific challenge for all scholars of 
genocide: “If we want to call upon the Shoah to deepen our comprehension of atrocity, then we 
need to study not only anti-Semitism but the process of ethnic and religious hatred, the patterns of 
52 Walter Reich, “The Use and Abuse of Holocaust Memory,” American Enterprise Institute Online, November 14, 2005, 
accessed July 15, 2016, https://www.aei.org/publication/the-use-and-abuse-of-holocaust-memory.
53 Michael Shafir, “The ‘Comparative Trivialization’ of the Holocaust,” East European Perspectives 5, no. 2 (January 22, 
2003), accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342472.html.
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fanatical belief, the causes of neighborly violence, and the mechanisms through which these can be 
contained.”58 A scholar’s analytical rather than affective self should be prioritized when publishing 
in an academic forum. Self-control and critical self-reflection are preconditions for non-dogmatic 
scholarship. 
The potential for such scholarship is embedded in Charny’s stated commitment to comparison 
and eschewal of uniqueness claims. He has promoted Genocide Studies in Israel, where it has been 
marginalized, and he has suffered at the hands of Israeli authorities for his advocacy of recognition 
for the Armenian genocide. He spoke from conviction when he averred that “He is committed to the 
ideal that understanding the processes which brought about the unbearable evil of the Holocaust 
be joined with the age-old Jewish tradition of contributing to the greater ethical development of 
human civilization, and that a unique memorial to the Holocaust be forged in the development of 
new concepts of prevention of genocide to all peoples.”59 Holocaust memory is thus invested with 
a world-historical agenda of genocide prevention and the promotion of human rights, which will 
serve as a “unique memorial.” Functionally, his formulation repeats the idiom of uniqueness. 
Anxiety about the viability of this agenda is apparent in Charny’s indignation that negotiations 
over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights immediately after the war were not motivated 
or accompanied by expressions of outrage about the Holocaust (2, 4-5, 22). This conclusion he 
disparages is based on study of the thousands of pages of documentation from 1946 to 1948 that 
are freely available on the website of the United Nations (UN). At no point did UN delegates 
explicitly refer to the mass murder of Jews during the proceedings of the relevant UN committees 
even as they invoked other instances of Nazi crimes. The reasons for this silence at the UN suggest, 
among other factors, a climate of latent antisemitism, as well as the active and passive complicity 
of some UN member states in the Holocaust itself. This finding is in line with the great mass 
of publications on postwar Holocaust memory, according to which the annihilation of European 
Jewry was often conflated with Nazi evil generally during the 1940s, with the distinctive features 
of the Holocaust were omitted or obscured, particularly outside of Jewish milieux. It gives no-
one pleasure to discover that the genocide of Jews was not spoken of as a discrete phenomenon 
at the UN during the drafting of the Universal Declaration, at least not according to official UN 
documents. The article in question is simply reporting empirical findings.60 Charny criticizes it for 
not reproducing his own imagination of the way things were (4-5, 22). Scholarship is impossible 
under such conditions. 
This and other above-mentioned anxieties have a history. Ran Zwigenberg’s book about 
Hiroshima and the Holocaust provides important context for the current anxieties in Holocaust 
and genocide studies.61 Briefly, he identifies three stages in memory work concerning victims of the 
American atomic attacks on Japan and the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. In the first, from 1945 
to the 1960s, triumphalist narratives incorporated the collective of victims into the risen/surviving 
nation. Individual survivors were largely ignored in this period of reconstruction that celebrated 
the pacifist or the partisan. In the second, which lasted until the late 1970s, the victims’ voices came 
to the fore as subjects of identification and empathy; now they were the heroes. Since the 1980s, 
in the third and ongoing phrase, other victim groups emerged to challenge Japanese and Jewish 
claims to unique victim status. This skeletal version of the argument allows us to detect in the 
various defenses of Holocaust monumentalization the nostalgia of some scholars for the second 
memory phase, during which many of them were socialized.
The cultural contingency of such interpretations about the world historical status of major 
events or phenomena is indicated by the half-forgotten point that as late as the 1980s, “Hiroshima” 
(that is, atomic weapons) was routinely paired with “Auschwitz” (that is, the Holocaust) as the 
58 Ibid.
59 Israel W. Charny, “Narrative Biography,” Prevent Genocide, accessed July 15, 2016, http://preventgenocide.org/education/
events/charnyCV2000.htm.
60 Marco Duranti, “The Holocaust, the Legacy of 1789, and the Birth of International Human Rights Law: Revisiting the 
Foundation Myth,” Journal of Genocide Research 14, no. 2 (2012): 159–186.
61 Ran Zwigenberg, Hiroshima: The Origins of Global Memory Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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principal challenge to human civilization.62 Beliefs about historical significance can change: this 
is the source of anxiety, as Zwigenberg found when he compared memories of the Holocaust and 
Hiroshima:
Bringing back Hiroshima does not diminish the importance of the Holocaust. This is not the 
view of many of my compatriots. For many in Israel, and among Jews especially in the USA, 
the Holocaust was a unique event that cannot be compared or tied to any other tragedy. This 
view is the lynchpin of a peculiar form of Jewish nationalism that centers on victimization 
and precludes any wider view of the tragedy. In the many presentations and talks I have 
given on the topic, I have always been confronted by some version of that view. In some 
cases, even the possibility of comparison is frowned upon. Many Israelis and Jews seem 
to fear even the suggestion of looking at the Holocaust in the context of postwar history in 
general; fearing context might lead to relativization and downgrading of the horror.63
Zwigenberg’s report of his experiences mirror ours: judging by Charny’s article and its resonance 
with some readers, conducting research on the Holocaust threatens “a peculiar form of Jewish 
nationalism that centers on victimization and precludes any wider view of the tragedy,” as 
Zwigenberg puts it.64 This nationalism may indeed be one of the strongest influences on this 
perspective on the Holocaust. But, like many discourses, it has gained a wider currency, informing 
the common sense in the Holocaust Studies field, and complicating the conversation with Genocide 
Studies.
Conclusion
The current controversy shows that the marginal genre of feeling and reasoning that perceives 
enemies behind every corner is trying to set the general agenda of Genocide Studies. So far, the 
evidence suggests that this attempt has failed. This failure is an opportunity to reflect on the 
challenges of the field. Given our subject matter, intensity of commitments and emotions is hardly 
surprising. Hyper-vigilance can intrude into scholarship wherever the fate of human groups is 
at stake. We believe that good scholarship heeds the advice of Eva Hoffman, whose reflective 
capacities honed by the professional study of literature enable her to articulate and practice the 
necessary, almost austere self-discipline to temper hyper-vigilance: “we need to achieve a certain 
thoughtful separation from received ideas as, in our personal lives, we needed to separate ourselves, 
thoughtfully and with sympathy, from our persecuted parents.”65 In other words, our professional 
disciplining promotes our analytical self over our affective self, or at least separates them as much 
as possible. We control the latter, not only for the sake of our scholarship, but also to avoid the 
unconscious cultivation of aggression experienced as self-defense against putative attacks. 
Such an approach entails studying the circumstances in which lethal ideologies of difference 
are generated, rather than taking their existence for granted. This is the program that Raphael 
Lemkin entreated in the scholarly study of genocide.66 In following Lemkin, Genocide Studies has 
made great strides in the last fifteen years; never before has the field been so plural and global. True, 
by treating the Holocaust like other historical events, these developments challenge the hegemonic 
status of Israel Charny’s favored memory regime, namely the compensatory redemptive narrative 
that he and others have invested in the Holocaust’s incalculable suffering. Robust debate about all 
these issues is essential to the vitality of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Attacking colleagues and 
arguments in the manner we have experienced recently is not the way to engage in scholarly and 
intellectual exchange.67
62 Examples: Bertrand Russell, “The Bomb and Civilization,” Forward 39 (August 18, 1945); E. P. Thompson, Exterminism 
and Cold War (London: Verso, 1982), 1–34.
63 Zwigenberg, Hiroshima, 9.
64 Ibid.
65 Hoffman, After Such Knowledge, 197–199.
66 A. Dirk Moses, “The Holocaust and World History: Raphael Lemkin and Comparative Methodology,” in The Holocaust 
and Historical Methodology, ed. Dan Stone (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 272–289.
67 Donald Bloxham, “Holocaust Studies and Genocide Studies: Past, Present and Future,” in Genocide Matters: Ongoing 
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Appendix
The Jerusalem Post Magazine (June 17, 2016, p. 6) published an abridged version of this letter. The 
number of signers has been augmented by the names of scholars who wished to join the list. 
HOLOCAUST ‘MINIMIZED’
We, the undersigned scholars of Jewish and European history, many of whom deal with the 
Holocaust and other genocides, were shocked by Israel Charny’s article (“Genocide scholars who 
minimize the Holocaust – and some who are coming to town”) in the The Jerusalem Post (May 25, 
2016), and deplore the decision of this reputable newspaper to publish it. We support the eminent 
Journal of Genocide Research and we stand behind the scholars who publish their research in it. Our 
field enjoys a range of perspectives and methodological approaches, and this diversity is key to 
its vitality and continuing relevance. We are dismayed by Mr. Charny’s (who is not a Holocaust 
scholar) partisan orthodoxy that seeks to morally discredit those he accuses of biases—including 
antisemitism. And, although Mr. Charny is no statistician either, he grounds his claims in figures 
that lend an aura of credibility but in fact mean nothing. Far from advancing scholarship, Mr. 
Charny chills the room with character assassination.
Prof. Taner Akçam, Robert Aram, Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen and Marian Mugar Chair in 
Armenian Genocide Studies, Clark University 
Dr. Avril Alba, Roth Lecturer in Holocaust Studies and Jewish Civilization, School of Languages 
and Cultures, The University of Sydney 
Prof. Aleida Assmann, Professor of English Literature and Literary Theory, University of Konstanz 
Prof. Frank Bajohr, Director of the Center for Holocaust Studies at the Institute for Contemporary 
History, and Professor at Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich
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Prof. Daniel Blatman, The Max and Rita Haber Chair in Contemporary Jewry and Holocaust 
Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to take stock of the European integration literature in reference to Eastern 
Europe in order to better understand how international forces affect minority rights. The article will focus on the 
status of the Albanian minority in the case of the Republic of Macedonia and attempt to illustrate how European 
integration has contributed to or hindered ethnic reconciliation between the ethnic Albanian minority and 
Macedonian majority through a historical-sociological analysis. Additionally, by linking the protection of minority 
rights to democratic consolidation, this article will show how the former is largely dependent on the latter.
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Introduction 
At the time of writing, the Srebrenica Genocide of July 1995 is mourning its 20th anniversary. It 
has been over two decades since the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, yet some of the 
former republics of the Yugoslav Federation are still struggling with building and maintaining 
modern democratic states. The Bosnian experiment has been an utter failure; Kosovo remains a 
contested state; while the Republic of Macedonia (henceforth Macedonia), once the frontrunner of 
European integration in the Western Balkans has fallen back on hard times. There are a number 
of peculiarities respective to each of the three aforementioned cases. However, what is common 
to all three has been minority rights issues and the failure to properly consolidate a modern 
democratic state.
The European Union (EU) has acted as a powerful stabilizing force in the region by providing 
a pathway to full EU membership. However, due to a combination of factors—enlargement fatigue 
after the 2004/07 Eastern enlargement and the recent global financial crisis—the EU’s influence 
in the Western Balkans has deteriorated as the region’s leaders have realized that another EU 
enlargement is not on the horizon for the near future. Coincidentally or not, at a time when the EU’s 
normative power in the region is being questioned, a number of states have reverted back toward 
authoritarian tendencies, with Macedonia being a prime example of this trend. The EU therefore, 
seems to be repeating a mistake it made in the 1990s. As British historian Garton Ash argued in a 
1998 Foreign Affairs article, after the collapse of communism, EU leaders were too preoccupied with 
addressing the Union’s internal concerns, that they allowed Sarajevo to burn.1 
The post-communist transformation of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans in particular 
were unique for a number of reasons as they relate to this article. Unlike previous political 
transformations from the developing world, East European transformations had to initiate change 
from two fronts—political as well as economic. Political in the sense of regime change, and economic 
in the sense of developing market economics. If the dual nature of Eastern transformations did 
not pose difficult enough choices for political leaders, Brzezinski has argued that the collapse of 
communism turned Eastern Europe into a “volcano of nations”.2 Offe has interpreted this to mean 
that in addition to the dual nature of Eastern transitions, the question of nationhood for a number 
of states has resulted in a “triple transition”.3 
The purpose of this article will therefore be to analyze the political transformation of 
Macedonia through a historical-sociological analysis with a particular reference to the status of the 
Albanian minority. Even though Macedonia hosts a number of other minorities, it is the Albanian 
one which has been the most difficult to accommodate, as well as the one through which ethnic 
politics have revolved around. As Macedonian scholar Daskalovski has argued, among all factors 
1 Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs 77, (1998), 61.
2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Post-Communist Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 5 (1989), 1.
3 Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” 
Social Research 71, no. 3 (1991).
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that have influenced the political transformation of Macedonia, none has had as great an effect 
as the “disputing of the character of the state by Macedonian Albanians.”4 This is not to neglect 
the status of other non-majority communities in Macedonia, whose input is also relevant for the 
consolidation of democracy. Rather, by focusing on the largest non-majority group, the paper will 
be better positioned to analyze the development of minority rights, and the impact such rights have 
had on the consolidation of democracy. 
Macedonia was chosen as a case study because it represents a rare case through which to study 
the situation of minorities in the democratic transition of a post-conflict or post-genocidal society. 
Genocide in the context of this article is defined as a political process that seeks to violently remove 
minorities from a political community or society.5 Additionally, according to Gurr, Macedonia 
represents a clear case of genocide prevention through the international community’s action early 
in the conflict.6 Macedonia therefore provides an important case study for post-conflict/genocidal 
studies and a number of anomalies as it relates to democratic theory and minority rights. For 
example, Macedonia was the first Western Balkan state to sign a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with the EU in 2001, which was supposed to serve as a stepping-stone for full EU 
membership. In 2005, Macedonia again became the first state in the region to be granted official EU 
candidate status, which was to signal the beginning of accession negotiations. Still, a decade later 
and negotiations are yet to begin. In fact, along with Turkey, which has been an official candidate 
since 1997, Macedonia has failed to satisfy EU demands in order to begin negotiations despite 
a decade of candidacy status. According to the 2014 Progress Report, which the EU produces 
annually to monitor a candidate’s progress, “the EU accession process for the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia is at an impasse.”7 The European integration literature has long established 
that the prospect for EU membership generates support for the consolidation of democracy. 
However, Macedonia seems to have resisted this theoretical expectation. Therefore, as defined by 
Eckstein, the Macedonian case will be regarded as a heuristic case study through which it would be 
possible to seek out potentially generalizable relations between European integration, democratic 
consolidation and minority rights.8
It should also be emphasized at this early point, that this article will analyze the democratization 
and minority rights literatures concomitantly in order to better illustrate the relationship between 
the two sets of literatures. It is the argument of this article that democratic consolidation and minority 
rights are mutually inclusive. The article therefore asks: What is the relationship between democratic 
consolidation and minority rights in the case of Macedonia, and what role has European integration played 
in this relationship? In order to address the stated question, the first part of this article will take stock 
of the European integration literature as it relates to democratic consolidation and minority rights. 
4 Zhidas Daskalovski, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia,” The Global Review 
of Ethnopolitics 3, no. 2 (2004), 52. 
According to the 2002 Macedonian census, Macedonians consist of 64.2% of the population, Albanians 25.2%, Turks 
3.9%, Roma 2.7%, Serbs 1.8%, Bosnians 0.8%, and Vlachs 0.5%. 
5 According to Shaw, “Genocide is a form of violent social conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to 
destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction. Genocidal action is action 
in which armed power organizations treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative 
social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the 
groups.” See: Martin Shaw, What is genocide?, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 193. 
6 Ted Robert Gurr, “Options for the prevention and mitigation of genocide: strategies and examples for policy-makers,” 
Politorbis 47, no. 2 (2009). 
Although the Macedonian case does not represent a clear post-genocidal case, Gurr has argued that Macedonia 
represents a rare case in which the international community acted proactively to try and prevent potential 
genocidal violence (Gurr, Options for the prevention and mitigation of genocide: strategies and examples for policy-makers). 
Furthermore, the establishment of Macedonia as a state cannot be separated from the genocidal social and political 
context across the Balkans region in the 1990s which—to borrow a phrase from Hinton’s study of genocidal social 
processes—reified “manufactured identity-based differences” between people along ethnic and religious lines. See: 
Alexander Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 211.
7 European Commission, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, Brussels, (October 2014) 1.
8 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3, ed. Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 104.
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The second part will take an empirical look at the Macedonian case in order to contrast theoretical 
expectations with empirical realities. The third part will engage in a discussion, while part four will 
conclude the article.
Surveying the Literature
This article will work under the argument that democracy promotion, as applied through the 
European integration process encompasses the promotion of minority rights as well. At the 
conceptual level this should not be a problem. One can make a very strong argument that democracy 
promotion by definition encompasses the equal representation of the constituent minorities of a 
given state. However, this fusion becomes problematic when thinking of causal mechanisms, as 
the promotion of democracy requires different strategies and instruments from the promotion 
of minority rights when thinking of causal models, such as what type of promotion works and 
under what conditions. Thus, we must bear in mind this analytical difficulty when attempting 
to fuse the two concepts together. Nonetheless, this article will attempt to bifurcate the impact of 
the European integration process in Macedonia into two parts—the impact on democracy and the 
impact on minority rights.
The theoretical argument that European integration contributes to the consolidation of 
democracy first emerged after the Southern Enlargement of the EU in which Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain acceded into the European Economic Community. Since the 1980s democracy 
promotion through European integration, or otherwise referred to as the international dimension 
of democratization, has emerged as a growing body of literature in political science and 
international relations.9 The relationship between international and domestic forces in the process 
of democratization, however, remains unclear. Despite a large body of literature showing that a 
relationship exists between international democracy promotion and domestic change, the causal 
mechanisms of this relationship remain ambiguous. For example, in a recent assessment of the 
impact of European integration in Eastern Europe, Vachudova argues that despite an overreaching 
consensus, that under certain conditions external actors are able to make a positive contribution 
to democratization, the type of domestic change external actors are able to bring about remains 
unclear.10 In an influential earlier work, Vachudova, while reaching a similar conclusion was able 
to show how domestic factors, such as whether the local elites represented liberal or illiberal 
tendencies, mitigated the impact of European integration.11
While Vachudova’s findings were able to show how domestic forces mitigate international 
forces, another set of literature has focused on the varieties of democracy promotion. Through 
an analysis of 36 countries in the immediate neighborhood of the EU (Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean) Schimmelfennig and Scholtz find that the only incentive to prove effective in 
compelling democratic reforms has been the offer of EU membership.12 According to the authors, 
the conditionality principle, which the EU applies to all recipients of its democracy aid, proved 
9 Peter Burnell, “Promoting Democracy,” Government and Opposition 48, no. 2 (2013): 265-287; Heather Grabbe, 
The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-in? International Organizations 
and Democratization.” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 515–549; Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, 
“How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals Or Promoting 
Consolidation?,” World Politics 67, no. 1 (2015): 72-113; Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and 
Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka, 
“Introduction: The State of Democracy 20 Years on Domestic and External Factors,” East European Politics & Societies 
27, no. 1 (2013): 3-25; Milada Anna Vachudova, “External Actors and Regime Change: How Post-Communism 
Transformed Comparative Politics,” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 29, no. 2 (2015): 519–530; Laurence 
Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001).
10 Milada Anna Vachudova, “External Actors and Regime Change: How Post-Communism Transformed Comparative 
Politics,” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 29, no. 2 (2015), 523.
11 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 1-24.
12 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood Political 
Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange,” European Union Politics 9, no. 2 (2008).
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effective only when a credible membership incentive was offered. Ethier takes a broader survey of 
democracy promotion by comparing EU, US, and World Bank initiatives and finds that conditional 
approaches work better than incentivized approaches; while at the same time strengthening the role 
of EU enlargement in democracy promotion by showing that conditionality works only in cases in 
which full EU membership is offered.13 While the literature shows that EU membership contributes 
to democratization, it remains unclear as to what type of political systems such as, parliamentary 
or presidential, multiparty or two-party, are better effected by democracy promotion.  
The efficacy of human rights promotion is equally unclear. According to Moravcsik, “the 
most important preconditions for the creation of and compliance with the sort of highly refined 
regime norms found in Europe are strong pre-existing norms, practices and institutions of 
liberal democracy, which permit causal mechanisms to operate through civil society and semi-
autonomous government institutions.”14 The first part of Moravcsik’s findings are clear—the 
presence of preexisting liberal norms are a precondition for the effective implementation of human 
rights regimes. The latter part, however, is ambiguous and it is precisely this part that human 
rights promoters struggle with. It is the creation of stable and effective civil society movements 
that poses difficulties for effective human rights protection. The highly influential edited volume of 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, reaches a similar conclusion: “The more open 
a society and culture to Western ideas and the more a country had a liberal past which included 
the recognition of human rights, the less likely it was that norm-violating governments would 
deny the validity of the international norms.”15 In other words, as a number of other studies have 
concluded, international forces play only a secondary role as the adoption of minority protection 
legislation has largely been explained by domestic factors.16 Mitchell makes an eloquent argument 
in reference to the promotion of minority rights by stating that there is a limited extent to which 
we can expect international forces to change hearts and minds among groups in Eastern Europe.17 
Yet, even if we were to assume that the promotion of human rights would have a universal effect 
across cases, there still remain a number of important questions in determining the components of 
the promotion strategy. As Subotić has recently argued in reference to the post-conflict transitions 
of Eastern Europe, transitional justice scholarship has yet to answer important questions such as: 
How can a transitional justice system be setup in conjunction with a political transition; are the 
two compatible; what is the role of sequencing; and more importantly, should transitional justice 
systems be setup in illiberal democracies.18 Nitzova perhaps gives the most accurate account of 
the difficulty in assimilating Eastern European nationalist movements into the democratization 
process by arguing that unlike Western European nationalist movements which followed the 
pattern of “state first, nation second”, the reverse pattern appears to be the case in Eastern Europe.19 
The difficulty of assimilating nationalist movements in Eastern Europe therefore rests at the heart 
of state formation which the democratization literature has labeled as an absolute necessity for 
democratic consolidation. As Linz and Stepan have argued, “without a state, no modern democracy 
13 Diane Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives,” Democratization 10, no. 1 
(2003). 
14 Andrew Moravcsik, “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe.” European 
Journal of International Relations 1, no. 2 (1995), 184. 
15 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 272.
16 James A. Mitchell, “The Assimilation of Racial Minorities into Central Eastern European Societies in the 21st Century: 
Central Eastern and Western Europe in Comparative Perspective,” J Pol Sci Pub Aff 3, no. 1 (2015): 1-5; Melanie H. 
Ram, “Democratization through European Integration: The Case of Minority Rights in the Czech Republic and 
Romania,” Studies in Comparative International Development 38, no. 2 (2003): 28-56; István Gergő Székely and István 
Horváth, “Diversity Recognition and Minority Representation in Central and Southeast Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis,” Nationalities Papers 42, no. 3 (2014): 426–448. 
17 Mitchell, The Assimilation of Racial Minorities, 5.
18 Jelena Subotić, “Out of Eastern Europe Legacies of Violence and the Challenge of Multiple Transitions.” East European 
Politics & Societies 29, no. 2 (2015), 410. 
19 Petya Nitzova, “Bulgaria: Minorities, Democratization, and National Sentiments.” Nationalities Papers 25, no. 4 (1997), 
736.
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is possible.”20 Thus, while transitioning societies are attempting on the one hand to consolidate a 
democratic system, on the other hand they are simultaneously struggling with the formation of a 
modern state.
The Macedonian transition to democracy following the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s represents 
an ideal case that infused democratization and nation building. As Daskalovski has argued, the 
“stateness” question in the Macedonian case has perhaps been the biggest issue in preventing 
the consolidation of democracy.21 European integration, however, according to Subotić has not 
contributed to addressing the “stateness” question, as post-conflict Balkans leaders have prioritized 
EU accession and only superficially and reluctantly carried out political reforms.22 The effect that 
European integration has had on the Balkans, argues Subotic, is that it has instrumentalized 
transitional justice into a political tool which elites use to mobilize popular support.23 Furthermore, 
according to Koinova, the EU has advanced contradictory messages in Macedonia.24 On the 
one hand, democratization initiatives as outlined in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
membership have consisted of one component of EU promotion strategies; while on the other 
hand, more pertinent security concerns have consisted of the second component. Koinova goes 
on to argue that as a result of the EU’s contradictory messages, Macedonian elites have learned 
to play a two-level game: having become cognizant that security concerns matter more to the 
international community than democratization concerns, politicians have learned to prioritize 
security issues and advance nationalist goals, while only minimal advancement has taken place 
in the fields of human and minority rights.25 Koinova’s findings therefore suggest that the impact 
of European integration in advancing human and minority rights has been only minimal in the 
case of Macedonia. 
 The Balkan experience with European integration is also echoed by the Slovakian experience. 
Through the analysis of the Slovak case, Nedelsky concludes that the combination of illiberal nation-
building with authoritarian tendencies has a strong potential to result in an authoritarian regime.26 
Macedonia in this respect seems to be following in the footsteps of Slovakia in the late 1990’s, 
which risked EU accession as a result of the authoritarian tendencies of the Mečiar government. 
However, unlike the Slovakian case in which the EU applied extensive public pressure in order 
to secure domestic change, in the Macedonian case such pressure is absent. Thus under certain 
conditions, European integration can have a paradoxical effect that strengthens and exacerbates 
ethnic divides rather than ameliorating them. 
Bieber has even gone a step further by arguing that international actors have institutionalized 
ethnicity by legitimizing ethnic divisions.27 Following the signing of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement in August of 2001 which ended the armed conflict between ethnic Albanians and the 
Macedonian Government, Engstrom warned that the agreement might end up having the opposite 
effect to that indented by undermining state capacity and hindering ethnic reconciliation.28 A 
decade and a half later, Popovska and Ristoska have reached precisely that conclusion by arguing 
that Macedonia has not shown any signs of ethnic reconciliation.29 
20 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South America, Southern Europe, and Post-
Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17.
21 Daskalovski, Democratic Consolidation and the ‘stateness’ Problem. 52.
22 Subotić, Out of Eastern Europe Legacies of Violence, 411.
23 Ibid., 416.
24 Maria Koinova, “Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature: The Impact of the EU on Human and 
Minority Rights in Macedonia,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 5 (2011). 
25 Ibid.
26 Nadya Nedelsky, “Constitutional Nationalism’s Implications for Minority Rights and Democratization: The Case of 
Slovakia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 1 (2003), 122.
27 Florian Bieber, Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies (Flensburg: 
European Centre for Minority Issues Flensburg, 2004), 9. 
28 Jenny Engstrom, “Multi-Ethnicity Or Bi-Nationalism-the Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian 
State,” JEMIE 1 (2002), 3.
29 Biljana Popovska and Zhanet Ristoska, “Process of Reconciliation in a Postconflict Macedonia,” Academicus International 
Scientific Journal 11 (2015), 74. 
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The literature on democracy and human rights promotion has shown considerable gaps, while 
the EU itself has officially recognized that there is no “ready-made recipe for political reform; 
while reforms take place differently from one country to another [emphasis added].”30 The political 
transformation of Macedonia has in many respects epitomized the difficulty of a multiple transition 
particularly at it relates to its “stateness” problem. The literature itself has also shown that, under 
certain conditions, European integration can have a number of unintended consequences. The 
following two sections will therefore look at the empirical realities of the Macedonian transformation 
through a historical-sociological analysis in order to better understand how democracy and human 
rights promotion through European integration have affected minority rights and the consolidation 
of democracy.
A Historical-Sociological Analysis 
Despite being the frontrunner for European integration in the Western Balkans, recent political 
crisis in Macedonia has caused the country’s integration process to reach an impasse. In February 
of 2015, the main opposition to the Gruevski government began leaking recordings of illegal 
wiretappings of some 5,000 officials, including high-level officials as well as the Prime Minister 
Gruevski himself.31 According to the EU’s recent investigation of the wiretaps, the current 
government has allegedly been involved in a number of illegal activities such as “electoral fraud, 
corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest, blackmail, extortion (pressure on 
public employees to vote for a certain party with the threat to be fired), criminal damage, severe 
procurement procedure infringements aimed at gaining an illicit profit, nepotism and cronyism.”32 
For a society still struggling with ethnic reconciliation, particularly between the Albanian minority 
and Macedonian majority, the wiretaps also implicate Gruevski’s coalition partner, the ethnic-
Albanian party, Democratic Union of Integration (DUI). The DUI has been complicit in the current 
government’s illegal activities, even in cases involving ethnic Albanians. For example, a recent 
International Crisis Group briefing reports that the wiretaps potentially implicate DUI in an alleged 
scapegoating effort by the current government in which seven ethnic Albanians were sentenced to 
life in prison for the murder of five ethnic Macedonians, despite the government “not knowing” 
who was guilty.33 The political crisis reached it’s peak in May 9th when an intense armed battle 
broke out in the northern city of Kumanova between Macedonian police forces and a group of 
ethnic Albanians. The details of the clash remain uncertain, yet what is certain is the deadly nature 
of the fighting which resulted in the death of ten gunmen and eight policemen. The Kumanova 
events have led many Macedonians (ethnic Albanians and Macedonians alike) to believe that the 
government staged the events in order to relieve pressure from the wiretapping scandal, which 
had resulted in mass protests in Skopje, as the government was refusing to step down and set up 
an interim government.34 
The current political crises in Macedonia underpin a number of issues that have prevented not 
only the consolidation of democracy, but ethnic reconciliation as well. This section of the article will 
therefore provide a historical-sociological analysis of the political transformation of Macedonia in 
30 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A new response to a 
changing Neighbourhood, (Brussels: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European 
Commission,2011). Accessed July 21, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0303:FI
N:en:PDF.
31 International Crisis Group (ICG), Macedonia: Defusing the Bomb, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°75. (Skopje/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 2015), 5.
32 European Commission, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on systemic 
Rule of Law issues relating to the communications interception revealed in Spring 2015, (Brussels: European Commission, 
2015), 6.
33 ICG, Macedonia: Defusing the Bomb, 7.
34 There have been numerous occasions in which the Macedonian government has supposedly engaged in dubious anti-
terrorist campaigns, despite international observers such as NATO unable to confirm the occurrence of such events. 
See: Edward P. Joseph, “The Balkans, Interrupted: The Protests in Macedonia are Only the Beginning,” Foreign Affairs, 
(2015), accessed July 28, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/2015-05-10/balkans-
interrupted. 
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order to better understand the current political crisis. In that respect, a brief historical overview of 
the early 1990s would provide an appropriate background through which to analyze the political 
development of the country.
The first post-communist elections of November 1990 produced three clear winners: the ethnic-
Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) with 25 out of 120 seats in the national Parliament; 
the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) with 37 seats; and the Socialist Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) 
with 31 seats. The two Macedonian parties represent the opposite ends of the political spectrum 
with VMRO-DPMNE representing the opposition movement to the communist party and SDSM 
as the successor communist party. Kacarska has argued that despite the two parties identifying 
with different ideological labels, “their declared orientations have remained largely unrelated to 
their respective socio-economic policy choices.”35 PDP on the other hand has focused exclusively 
on identity politics, while socio-economic issues are generally absent from the party’s program.36 
In 1994, however, PDP splintered into two factions: the moderate faction which remained part 
of PDP and the more radical faction, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). PDP ultimately 
disappeared into political obsolescence, while a new ethnic-Albanian party, DUI, emerged as the 
leading ethnic-Albanian party after the 2001 conflict.
One of the first issues that stirred ethnic tensions in Macedonia came with the adoption of the 
new constitution in 1991. The constitution’s preamble declared Macedonia to be “the national state 
of the Macedonian people”, whereas the old Yugoslav constitution had defined the country as the 
nation of “the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities”. This has perhaps been 
the biggest matter which Albanians has taken issue with, as it reduced the Albanian population 
into a minority group rather than a constitutive nation. Unsurprisingly, according to survey data 
conduced in the early 1990s, Albanians felt alienated in the post-socialist constitutional order as 
86% considered themselves second-class citizens.37 PDP ultimately boycotted the especial session 
on the approval of the new constitution, while the Albanian population boycotted the 1992 national 
census.38 Additionally, the new citizenship law adopted in 1992 gave ethnic Macedonians living 
abroad automatic citizenship, while Macedonian minorities were required to reside in the country 
for a period of 15 years. Discrimination reflected more broadly in government employment, as 
despite consisting of about 25% of the population, in 1997 Albanians represented only 10% of 
public servants and only 4% of the police force.39 
Despite the discriminatory politics of the Macedonian state, the events that led to the 2001 
armed conflict were in a way spontaneous and opportunistic. There was no prior indication that 
Macedonia would be engulfed in an internal armed conflict. However, the 1999 Kosovo War 
provided for an environment where Albanian groups within Macedonia, as well as ethnic Albanians 
from Kosovo and Serbia began an armed insurgence against the Macedonian state. Daskalovski 
has argued that at the early stages of the conflict, the insurgent group labeling themselves as 
the National Liberation Army had no clear aims, and claimed to be fighting against the ‘Slavo-
Macedonian’ oppression or a “Greater Albania”; while in the latter part of the conflict the rhetoric 
changed into fighting “for the human rights of Albanians in Macedonia.”40 The conflict ultimately 
ended through an internationally brokered peace deal known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
(OFA). OFA aimed at addressing the concerns of the Albanian minority, particularly amending the 
preamble of the constitution; greater political decentralization; equal representation in the public 
35 Simonida Kacarska, “The EU in Macedonian Party Politics—Consolidating and Driving” in EU integration and party 
politics in the Balkans, ed. Corina Stratula. (EPC Issue Paper No. 77, September 2014), 70.
36 Ibid.
37 Armend Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia,” Human Rights Review 9, no. 
1 (2008), 58. Worth pointing out that according to the same survey, only 35% of the Roma community felt the same 
way, while the Turks did not consider it an issue. 
38 MAR- Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004-2015 Minorities at Risk Project, (2015), 
Accessed July 28th, 2015, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=34301. 
39 Ulf Brunnbauer, “The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments,” JEMIE 1 (2002), 13.
40 Daskalovski, Democratic Consolidation and the ‘stateness’ Problem, 61.
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sector; making minority languages official languages in local governance units in which 20% of the 
population was a non-majority group; and finally a principle of double-majority in which national 
legislation which affected “culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use 
of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of 
municipalities” would require the majority of representatives in the national Parliament as well as 
the majority of votes from representative of non-majority communities.  
 OFA, however, was met with resistance by the Macedonian population. According to survey 
data, 51% of ethnic Macedonians disapproved of the agreement, while only 44% approved it; 
the Albanian population on the other hand approved it with 78%.41 The nationalist VMRO even 
attempted to organize a referendum against the agreement, but ultimately failed in their effort after 
pressure from the EU and US. The implementation of OFA, however, while effective in addressing 
certain minority issues, has failed in others, while at the same time having a number of unintended 
consequences. The most effective of OFA’s initiatives has arguably been the language initiative, 
which has resulted in Albanian becoming an official language in 29 out of 85 municipalities. Yet 
even the language initiative has resulted in a number of unintended consequences. As Mirjana 
Maleska explains: language has become an impediment to ethnic reconciliation as not only is 
either side been unwilling to learn the language of the “other”, but at the same time, language 
is used as a mechanism of differentiation and separation.42 Equal representation has also been 
effective to a certain extent. For example, by 2004, Albanian representation in the police force had 
reached 13.3%43; while by 2015, Albanians were represented in 18.9% of non-managerial and 14.5% 
of managerial jobs in the public sector.44 It is worth highlighting that the implementation of OFA 
resulted in the negligence of other non-majority groups such as Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, and Roma.45
Other OFA initiatives, however, have had more negative consequences than positive ones. 
Take political decentralization as an illustration. According to an OSCE survey on decentralization 
in Macedonia, most municipal leaders and administrators believe that there has been a significant 
transfer of power to the municipal level, especially relating to education, communal services, and 
urban planning; however, at the same time, most survey participants felt that the biggest challenge 
to the effective implementation of their competences has been lack of financial resources.46 Thus, as 
municipal leaders are dependent on the central government for financial resources, their autonomy 
as decentralized governing units decreases. According to an International Crisis Group report, the 
Association of the Units for Local Self Government has “fallen under the patronage of the ruling 
parties.”47 In an analysis of decentralization in Macedonia, Lyon has gone as far as to argue that 
while decentralization has increased the space of local citizens to participate in local matters, the 
over-dominance of national parties has undermined decentralization and its potential benefits.48 
The double-majority principle on the other hand which was supposed to act as a procedural 
safeguard for minority interests in policy-making has been sidelined through legal loopholes which 
has allowed the government to implement a major nationalist project (the Skopje 2014 Project) 
without the approval of non-majority groups.49 
It would be a hard sell to argue that Macedonia has achieved either democratic consolidation 
or reconciled its ethnic grievances. While it would be even more difficult to accept that European 
41 Brunnbauer, The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, 13.
42 Reka, The Ohrid Agreement, 65.
43 Ibid., 61.
44 ICG, Macedonia: Defusing the Bomb, 8.
45 According to official Macedonian government statistics, from 2002 until 2006, it was only the Albanian non-majority 
group which benefited from the implementation of OFA in public sector employment, while the rest of the groups did 
not see an improvement in public employment. See: Koinova, Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature, 
823. 
46 OSCE, Decentralization Assessment Report 2006-2011, December 2011, (Skopje, Macedonia: OSCE Mission to Skopje), 6-8.
47 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, Europe Report N°212 – 11 (August 2011), 20.
48 Aisling Lyon, “Political Decentralization and the Strengthening of Consensual, Participatory Local Democracy in the 
Republic of Macedonia,” Democratization 22, no. 1 (2015).
49 ICG, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, 3.
Meka
31
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
integration has not had some negative consequences for the consolidation of democracy and ethnic 
reconciliation. In the following section, this article will engage in a theoretical discussion in order 
to better discern the mechanisms through which the political transformation of Macedonia, in 
conjunction with the process of European integration has failed to adequately protect minority 
rights. 
Discussion
I will begin this section with a look at some of the theoretical debates on the link between ethnicity 
(minorities) and democratization. Conceptually, democracy is defined either in minimalist or in 
maximalist terms. Thus whereas a minimalist definition of democracy would constitute simply free 
and fair elections; a maximalist definition incorporates other democratic qualities such as a vibrant 
civil society, an independent judiciary, and even political culture.50 Therefore, in reference to the 
protection of minority rights, it is the maximalist definition of democracy that more accurately 
captures minority issues. Thus when this article refers to democratic consolidation, it is referring 
to the more maximalist definition of democracy. The relationship between the two—ethnicity 
and democracy—however, remains unclear as there is no consensus whether ethnicity hinders 
democratization. In an assessment of the relationship between the two concepts, Beissinger has 
argued that while ethnicity does matter for democratization, it seldom does so in a direct way.51 
Similarly, in an assessment of the relationship between nationalism and democracy, Helbling finds 
that rather than being competing logics, the compatibility of the two is more a matter of degree.52 
The role of minority rights in the failure of democratic consolidation in Macedonia has often 
been cited as one of the core causes. To a certain extent that is accurate. Minority issues have been 
at the forefront of Macedonia’s political transformation since the end of communism. However, 
without properly placing ethnicity in the process of democratization, it is hard to disentangle the 
causal mechanism of that relationship. As Schmitter and Santiso have argued, in addition to the 
what questions, that is, what to reform, politicians are also faced with questions of when.53 That is, 
when to change something, in what order, and what tempo. The temporal dimension of democracy 
is arguably as important as the structural and functional dimension and is of particular significance 
in divided societies as it interacts with heartfelt issues such as language, culture and identity. Thus 
when a transition is interacted with a divided society, political decisions are more likely to have 
unintended consequences. 
For example, Beissinger has argued that the injection of political competition can result 
in “ethnic outbidding” as politicians seek to maximize popular support from particular ethnic 
groups.54 Furthermore, as politicians learn to play the “ethnic card” in orders to gain popular 
support, ethnic grievances are exacerbated.55 It is worth pointing out that during the early phase 
of the democratization process, ethnic politics are more pronounced, as the absence of interest-
based politics turns ethnic politics into the only game in town, especially for ethnic-based parties. 
The Macedonian case exemplifies this effect very clearly. As was discussed earlier, the four major 
political parties in Macedonia have not shown any levels of ideological institutionalization along 
the left-right dimension, while ethnic-Albanian parties in particular have focused exclusively on 
identity politics. According to the latest Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, it is difficult 
to see how the main political parties aggregate societal interests; while the perception among the 
population is that political parties represent only “narrow cliquish interests” that do not benefit the 
general welfare of society.56 The most interesting finding from a recent study on democratization in 
50 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998).
51 Mark R. Beissinger, “A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008), 87.
52 Marc Helbling, “Nationalism and Democracy: Competing Or Complementary Logics?,” Living Reviews in Democracy 4 (2013).
53 Philippe C. Schmitter and Javier Santiso, “Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy,” International 
Political Science Review 19, no. 1 (1998).
54 Beissinger, A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization, 85.
55 Ibid. 
56 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), 2014 (Macedonia Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung), 
15.
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Macedonia shows that even the ethnic-Albanian party, DUI, has “disenfranchised Albanians who 
are not party members from potential positions in the local civil service and public administration.”57 
The politicization of the civil sector, particularly among ethnic-based political parties, perhaps 
provides the biggest indication of the manner through which minority rights have failed to be 
properly institutionalized in Macedonia. This is not a unique feature to the Macedonian political 
system, as the politicization of the civil sector is a common symptom of transitioning societies. 
Yet what is unique to the Macedonian case is the manner through which ethnic parties have been 
incorporated into the corruptive scheme of Macedonian politics. Ethnic parties have therefore failed to 
represent minority interests, as more narrow individual and cliquish interests have been prioritized. 
When European integration is incorporated into this theoretical discussion, we can discern a 
number of patterns that have either hindered or advanced the protection of minority rights and 
democratic consolidation. The reason for this is the manner through which the EU has advanced the 
integration process. According to Grabbe, the EU has assumed that integration and democratization 
are part of the same process, regardless of the fact that “EU policies and regulatory models were 
created to fit economies and societies at a very different level of development.”58 Therefore, under 
certain conditions, integration is problematic for democratization and minority rights because 
it advances norms and policies that are not necessarily compatible with an effective promotion 
strategy. Rather, a one-size fits all approach is adopted as acceding states must adopt EU policies as 
they stand, otherwise the European project risks setbacks. In other words, under certain conditions, 
human rights and democracy promotion by the EU may not necessarily result in positive change.
In addition to the failure of the EU’s promotion strategies, enlargement as a foreign policy 
goal has lost priority, which in effect has diminished the Union’s influence in the Western Balkans. 
Part of this is attributed to enlargement fatigue and the recent global financial and Euro zone crisis. 
However, in the case of Macedonia, an accession perspective has lost further credibility as a result of 
the country’s enduring name dispute with Greece.59 Thus when in 2008 Greece vetoed Macedonia’s 
entry into NATO due to the latter’s name, the Gruevski government turned the rejection into a 
political victory by playing into ethnic Macedonian claims of historical grievances.60 Interesting to 
highlight that despite the diverging views on a number of issues between the constitutive nations 
of the Macedonian state, most Macedonians and its non-majority groups are of the view that the 
name dispute is postponing integration toward Western led institutions such as EU and NATO.61 
The name dispute has also prevented the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU despite 
the country’s candidate status since 2005. According to the latest Progress Report on Macedonia, 
the European Commission contends that it is ready to open negotiations, yet the name dispute 
with Greece has prevented that from happening (European Commission 2014). The failure of the 
EU to follow-up on its enlargement promise has therefore allowed for nationalistic tendencies to 
flourish within the current government. 
According to the latest Freedom House Nations in Transit Report, Macedonia’s overall 
democracy score has deteriorated yearly since 2007, particularly the subcategories of media and 
judicial independence.62 As the current government is attempting to entrench its political power, 
57 Lyon, Political Decentralization , 163.
58 Heather Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,” International Political Science Review 
23, no. 3 (2002), 253.
59 The Greek-Macedonian dispute concerning the latter’s name revolves around the historic region Macedonia. Greece has 
been officially unwilling to recognize Macedonia by its official name “Republic of Macedonia” as the Greeks claim 
that would allow Macedonia to lay territorial claims in parts of present day Greece—historically part of the region of 
Macedonia. 
60 ICG, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, 1.
61 Ljupco Risteski and Armanda Kodra Hysa, “Strategies for Creating the Macedonian State and Nation and Rival Projects 
Between 1991 and 2012,” in Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe, ed. Pål Kolstø, (Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014), 168. 
According to the same 2011 survey, 77% of Macedonians, 80% of Albanians, and 71% of other non-majority groups 
were of the view that the name dispute is slowing down EU and NATO integration.
62 Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, “Nations in Transit 2015: Democracy on the Defensive in Europe and Eurasia,” 
(Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2015), 25.
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Macedonian society has also shown signs of democratic resilience. Following the release of the 
wiretaps in February of this year, large-scale protests began developing in Skopje calling for the 
step-down of the current government. What stood out as unique in the 2015 anti-government 
protests was the fact that ethnic Albanians and Macedonians alike protested together in solidarity 
against the present government. This is a rare occurrence, as according to Shikova, civil-motivated 
protests are generally absent in Macedonia as more ethnic and partisan motivated protest have 
dominated the sphere of civil unrest.63 The recent crisis therefore provided an opportunistic 
window through which to reconcile ethnic grievances between the major groups in Macedonia. 
Yet despite this opportune moment, the Gruevski government has managed to divert attention 
from the protests to the ethnically charged May events in Kumanova. It is highly likely that the 
early scheduled elections of December 2016 will result in a victory for the opposition. Yet what 
remains uncertain is the extent to which a change in administration will provide for a environment 
which ethnic reconciliation takes place, democratic qualities are improved, and integration toward 
Western led institutions begins in earnest. 
Conclusion
What we’ve seen in the political transformation of Macedonia is the institutionalization of a 
pattern of politics that has disregarded and neglected minority rights. This conclusion is widely 
counterintuitive to what was discussed above, as there was clearly a minority rights component 
to the Macedonian transformation. However, while on the surface minority rights were at the 
forefront of the country’s political transformation, below the surface, individualistic power-
driven and corrupt motives were the driver of political decisions, rather than genuine concerns for 
minority rights. This was most apparent in DUI’s politicization of civil sector employment, which 
disenfranchised ethnic Albanians not supportive of the party. The unwillingness of the Albanian 
based parties to demand genuine political change for minority protection was only exacerbated 
by the disapproval of the OFA by ethnic Macedonians, which provided ethnic Macedonian parties 
with popular support for nationalistic projects. 
It is becoming apparent in the Western Balkans that as EU influence is diminishing, 
political reforms have ceased, and authoritarian tendencies have been on the rise. Macedonia 
exemplifies this regional trend more clearly than any other one. For the EU to improve its 
promotion strategies, however, it must first address some of its internal contradictions. In 
terms of democracy promotion, it must first develop country specific promotion strategies 
informed by previous experiences. Following the 2004/07 Eastern Enlargement and the troubling 
democratic performance of Bulgaria and Romania after accession, the EU took proactive steps 
to improve its enlargement policy. Specifically, this included the introduction of two new 
chapters in accession negotiations—Chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental rights, and 
Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security. According to an EU official, lessons learned from 
the Eastern Enlargement—specifically the negligence of the political criteria—have resulted in 
the reinforcement of democracy promotion.64 Yet, even if we assume that the new enlargement 
policy is an improvement from the previous one, there is no reason to believe, for example, that 
the same policy will have the same effects in post-conflict Macedonia and Serbia compared to 
Albania, which did not undergo a violent conflict in the post-communist period. Additionally, in 
reference to minority rights, the EU has been criticized for a blatant display of hypocrisy. Minority 
rights consist of a major components of the EU’s enlargement policies, however, within its own 
territories, EU members have failed to apply the same protective measures as the ones promoted in 
Eastern Europe.65 
63 Natalija Shikova, “Exercising the Right to Protest: The Indicator of Country’s Democratic Capacity and the Case of 
Macedonia” Facta Universitatis, Series: Law and Politics 12, no. 2 (2014).
64 Peter Simmons, The Impact of EU Democracy Promotion: The View from Brussels, (London: Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence in European Law and Governance: King’s College London, 2011), 22.
65 Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, “Motioned, Debated, Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in 
International Affairs,” Transworld. (Working Paper 06, 2012).
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Perhaps the EU’s best course of action would be to tap into those common views that all 
Macedonians share toward Western led institution, particularly by addressing Macedonia’s 
name dispute with Greece, which has acted as a stumbling block for NATO integration and 
the beginning of EU negotiations. Additionally, the EU has much experience to learn from. 
The Slovak experience showed that European integration can be a powerful force in defeating 
a “authoritarian” regime. Thus by applying public pressure in a highly euro-enthusiastic 
society such as Macedonia, the EU can force domestic change. However, a delicate line most 
be walked between security issues on the one hand which have the tendency to advance 
nationalist goals, and minority concern which also have the tendency to institutionalize 
ethnic divisions.
It should not, however, be misconstrued that this article is underplaying the importance of 
international forces. Yet with that being said, it is the argument of this article that while on the 
one hand international forces have been effective in preventing potential genocidal violence, on 
the other hand, they have been less effective, and under certain conditions counterproductive 
in reconciling ethnic tensions. It is therefore precisely in the context of a post-conflict/genocidal 
legacy and an unconsolidated democratic system that ethnic reconciliation in Macedonia has been 
particularly difficult to accomplish. 
The findings of this heuristic case study have shown that not only are democratic consolidation 
and minority rights protection mutually inclusive, but that an effective promotion strategy that 
addresses only one of these issues, would under certain conditions negate the other. The case 
study therefore confirms much of the preexisting literature—European integration is only 
partially effective in promoting domestic change, while under certain conditions there is even 
a possibility of unintended consequences. However, the Macedonian case does add something 
particular, as unlike any of the Eastern Enlargement cases, Macedonia represents a post-conflict 
situation in which minority concerns were more pertinent and delicate than previous cases of 
European integration. It is highly unlikely that the failure of European integration in Macedonia 
and the Western Balkans will lead to another genocidal war among the constitutive nations of 
the region. However, it is up to regional organizations with a normative attraction to provide 
an impetus through which s stagnated political transitions such as the Macedonian one can 
move forward. 
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Abstract: The denial of the Armenian genocide led to devastating effects on both the individual and collective levels 
which in many cases were passed down to their descendants. In BiH, many of the facts are not denied per se but the 
interpretation is such that genocidal intent is denied. While some research has been done on the consequences of 
trauma among BiH survivors, no in-depth studies are found on the effects of denial on the survivors’ psychosocial 
well-being. This article aims to fill in the gaps based on in-depth-interviews carried out since 2011 in BiH, 
investigating the cognitive, affective and behavioral consequences of denial at both the intragroup and intergroup 
levels. This article also seeks to identify which forms of acknowledgement are the most meaningful to the survivors 
for preventing further victimization. Finally, this article examines the interconnection which exists between denial 
and acknowledgement for reconciliation and sustainable peace to occur.
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Introduction
During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), approximately 104,732 individuals 
perished or disappeared,1 350,000 were wounded,2 20,000 to 60,000 women were raped3 and 8,000 
Muslim men and boys died in Srebrenica.4 Former US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
reported that numerous charges were laid against the Serbs, and had expressed “the facts of which 
are indisputable.”5 The information was delivered to the UN War Crimes Commission responsible 
for deciding whether to prosecute or not. Among the charges: the siege of Sarajevo (which, lasted 
44 months, killed more than 11,000 and wounded another 50,000, including children); the attacks 
(bombings, beatings and killings) of Banja Luka’s 30,000 Bosniaks; the concentration camps in Banja 
Luka/Makaca, Brčko/ Luka, Krajina, Prnjavor, Moarska, Prijedor/ Keraterm, Trnopolje/Kozarac; 
the massacres of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men and boys at a brick factory and a pig farm 
near Brčko.6 
A report by Tabeau, Żołtkowski, Bijak and Hetland presented in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shows that extreme changes occurred to the Muslim 
population living in the “Milošević case area.”7 The number of Bosniaks in seven municipalities—
that are now part of the Republic of Srpska—was reduced by approximately 91.4 to 99.9 % between 
1991 and 1997-1998. To illustrate the point, in 1997-1998, ten Muslim individuals were identified in 
1 Jan Zwierzchowski and Ewa Tabeau, “The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple System 
Estimation of Causalities’ Undercount.” Conference Paper for the International Research Workshop on The Global 
Costs of Conflict (Berlin: The Households in Conflict Network and The German Institute for Economic Research, 2010).
2 The Center for Justice and accountability (CJA), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Torture and Ethnic Cleansing in the Bosnian War 
(San Francisco: The Center for Justice and Accountability, 2014), accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.cja.org/article.
php?id=247.
3 Michele Lent Hirsch, “Conflict Profile: Bosnia,” WMC’s Women Under Siege Project (US: The Women’s Media Center, 
2012), accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/bosnia.
4 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Confront Genocide-Cases-Bosnia Herzegovina (Washington DC: 
USHMM, 2015), accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/bosnia-herzegovina. More 
specifically, the Srebrenica – Potocari Memorial and cemetery for the victims of the 1995 genocide indicates that at 
least 8,372 men and boys were killed. See http://www.potocarimc.org/. 
5 Lawrence Eagleburger, “The need to respond to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, ” The path to The Hague, Selected 
documents on the origins of the ICTY, Statement at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (Switzerland: 
December 16 1992), accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.h-net.org/~fisher/bosnia/readings/Eagleburger1.html.
6 Ibid.
7 Ewa Tabeau et al., “Ethnic Composition, Internally Displaced Persons & Refugees from 47 Municipalities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1991 to 1997-8: Expert Report for the Case of Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54), ” in Conflict in Numbers: 
Casualties of the 1990s Wars in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999), ed. Ewa Tabeau (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia, 2009): 661–875. accessed 17 June, 2015, www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/testimonies33.pdf; See 
report for the list of (pre-Dayton) municipalities included in the Milošević case area. 
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Bratunac (formerly 16,284), six in Foča (formerly 14,559), seven in Srebrenica (formerly 21,361) and 
three in Višegrad (formerly 11 178). In Bijeljina, the Muslim population went from 24,314 (1991) 
to 1,429 (1997-1998). In Brčko, the number of Bosniaks declined from 20,309 to 546, as was the 
case in Prijedor where the number of Bosniaks declined from 40,075 to 397 in the same period. 
In Doboj (RS), the number of Bosniaks went from 23,406 to 239, and similarly in Zvornik, from 
29,452 to 129.8 Due to Milošević’s death, no final judgment was reached in Prosecutor v. Slobodan 
Milošević. However, the Trial Chamber rejected Milosevic’s “motion for judgment of acquittal” 
and concluded that genocide had in fact been committed in Bijeljina, Bosanski Novi, Brčko, Ključ, 
Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Srebrenica.9
A vast body of literature indicates that while the Serbs are not the only ones who committed 
crimes of war, they are the primary perpetrators of the 1990’s wars in ex-Yugoslavia, where the 
disproportionate suffering experienced by Bosniaks is indisputable.10 In BiH, many of the facts 
regarding the killings are not denied per se but the interpretation is such that genocidal intent 
is effectively denied. While some research in clinical, social psychology and psychiatry has been 
done on the consequences of trauma among BiH survivors,11 no in-depth studies are found on the 
effects of denial on the survivors’ psychosocial well being. The present article seeks to fill this gap 
in knowledge by investigating the cognitive, affective and behavioral consequences of denial at 
both the intragroup and intergroup levels in the aftermath of genocide. This article is essentially 
based on multiple interviews that were carried out in person during the course of several field 
research trips in BiH, Croatia and Serbia between April 2011 and July 2015. The interviews ranged 
from non-directive to semi-directive and focused predominantly on the accounts of the survivors 
of war from different municipalities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases, 
volunteer translators assisted the researcher / interviewer. At other times, a local translator was 
employed. The respondents were recruited via snowball sampling. This ongoing study makes 
use of phenomenology both as an approach and as a methodology, where the object of study is 
understood via the perspective of the lived experience of the survivors.12 
Following a discussion on the definitions and classifications of denial, this article explores its 
psychosocial effects, as experienced by the survivors interviewed in BiH. This article also seeks to 
identify the most meaningful forms of acknowledgement for the survivors in BiH, as it pertains to 
minimizing or preventing further victimization. Finally, this article examines the interconnection, 
which must exist between denial and acknowledgement for reconciliation and sustainable peace to 
occur. Without a good enough acknowledgement, the healing process is delayed or impeded, and 
retraumatization occurs.
Defining and Classifying Denial
The strategy of genocide denial is usually conceived of and carried out by the perpetrators, their 
successors as well as by individuals who support the perpetrators in their attempts to distort the 
truth and to persecute the victims yet again.13 Many types and classifications of denial are found 
8 See report by Tabeau et al. (2003) for more results and details
9 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević: Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia, Trial Chamber, 
January 16, 2004, IT-02-54-T. 
10 See for instance, Tabeau et al. “Ethnic Composition, Internally Displaced Persons, 661–875; Edina Bećirević, Genocide 
on the Drina River (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Hariz Halilovich, Places of Pain (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2013); Lara J. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar 
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Smail Čekić, Research of Genocide Victims, with a Special Emphasis 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2009); David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, 
Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
11 Johanna Ray Vollhardt and Michal Bilewicz, “After the Genocide: Psychological Perspectives on Victim, Bystander, and 
Perpetrator Groups,” Journal of Social Issues 69, no.1 (2013): 1-15.
12 For more details regarding phenomenology, please consult Frederick J. Wertz et al., Five ways of doing: Qualitative analysis 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 2011); Darren Langdridge, Phenomenological psychology (England: Pearson-Prentice 
Hall, 2007). 
13 Israel Charny, “Classification of denials of the Holocaust and other genocides” in The genocide studies reader, eds. Samuel 
Totten and Paul R. Bartrop (New York: Routledge, 2009), 517-518. 
Genocide Denial: Perpetuating Victimization and Violence in BiH
40
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
in the literature but Stanley Cohen and Israel Charny’s definitions and classifications are the most 
comprehensive to date. Stanley Cohen essentially defines denial as 1) an unconscious process or 
a defense mechanism that blocks off unimaginable and intolerable information to prevent it from 
reaching the conscious awareness and 2) as a conscious and deliberate choice to ignore reality or facts 
deemed counter to one’s comfort or advantage, purposes and/or needs.14 Cohen explains that one’s 
awareness of what is being evaded may be ambiguous.15 He adds that the knowledge of atrocities 
and suffering entails significant “grey areas between consciousness and unconsciousness.”16
Cohen indicates that three forms of denial are possible with respect to what is being denied: 
literal, interpretative and implicatory.17 Literal denial implies that the knowledge or the raw 
facts are blatantly denied: “nothing happened,” “there was no massacre.”18 With interpretative 
denial, the raw facts are not denied but are attributed a different meaning: “it was population 
exchange”19 or “collateral damage” (and not a massacre).20 Implicatory denial refers to the denial 
or the minimization of its significance or of its implications: “these killings have nothing to do with 
me,” “why should I risk my life to intervene” or “it is worse elsewhere.”21 The author also assigns 
a psychological status to each type of denial. Literal denial may be a manifestation of genuine 
ignorance, a deliberate escape from an unbearable reality, or a calculated lie or disinformation. 
Interpretative denial can be linked to the incapacity to understand the meaning of the facts. It 
can also assign a different label in order to avoid social marginalization and legal accountability. 
Implicatory denial involves a degree of sincerity as well as the use of simple techniques to avoid 
psychological or moral demands related to the events in question. Cohen adds that denial entails 
cognition (no acknowledgement of the facts), emotion (not feeling disturbed), morality (no 
recognition of responsibility or of immorality), and action (perpetuating the violence or not acting 
on known facts). The author also allocates different levels (personal, official, cultural), different 
time frames (historical, contemporary), different agents (perpetrator, victim and bystander) and 
space (your own space, elsewhere) to denial.22
Israel Charny’s classification groups forms of denial into six broad groupings. The category 
“malevolent bigotry” is associated with denials by perpetrators, non-perpetrators (fascism 
culture), groups that have been or are victim of genocide, and groups that are vulnerable to 
genocide because they are weaker (power imbalance) or they committed genocide.23 “Self-serving 
opportunism” constitutes another category and comprises denials that indulge individual or 
collective self-interest or power e.g. “careerism, pragmatism, exhibitionism and realpolitik.”24 
The category “‘innocent denials’ and/or ‘innocent disavowals of violence’” consists of innocent 
denials via manipulation and lies to eradicate the knowledge or the credibleness of genocide.25 
“‘Definitionalism’ or insistence on defining cases of mass murder as not genocide” is a category 
where denials are based on the definition of genocide and the cases it may include (or not) or the 
reduction of the significance of a genocide by relativizing, minimizing or rationalizing the events 
of genocide.26 The “nationalistic hubris or self-involvement which justify exclusion of others” 
category encompasses denials of the facts of genocide of others or of specific groups in particular.27 
14 Cohen, States of Denial, 5.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid., 7.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 8.
21 Ibid.
22 See Ibid., 9-29 for further details.
23 Israel Charny, “A classification of denials of the Holocaust and other genocides,” in The genocide studies reader, eds. 
Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop (New York: Routledge, 2009), 519.
24 Ibid., 525.
25 Ibid., 526.
26 Ibid., 529.
27 Ibid., 532.
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The deniers associated to this category may have suffered genocide themselves or share a history 
of past enmity with other people or groups of people. “Human shallowness—the dulling and 
depletion of a genuine sense of tragedy and moral outrage” is a category that involves denials 
based on the desensitization, the trivialization or the routinization of genocide-related events.28 
Instead of classifying different forms of denial, Lemarchand distinguishes between denial 
and revisionism.29 The author defines denial as the contestation that genocide occurred because 
of the absence of demonstrable intent to annihilate. Revisionism implies the creation of new 
circumstances surrounding genocidal violence and the devising of new motivations where victims 
often turn out to be the perpetrators and each can be found on both sides.30 Lemarchand adds 
that denial and revisionism both entail the leaving out of some details and the manipulation 
of historical facts in order to portray the victims as being the aggressors and to exonerate the 
perpetrators.31 Hirsch contends that individuals and collectives tend to use the same strategies 
to block out or to silence an unbearable and horrendous memory or event: denial, the shifting 
of blame, rationalization and relativization.32 The author explains that the denial of facts is not 
so easy to contest and even necessitates counterintelligence efforts as deniers present “details as 
valid information.”33 Hirsh adds that historical evidence does not necessarily prevail over lies and 
oversimplification.34 In the case of blame shifting, the perpetrator becomes a victim by blaming 
others for what happened. Rationalization entails justification for the unacceptable behavior. 
Relativization explains the events and related immoral behavior that took place in comparison to 
others. Adam Jones identifies a number of denial strategies.35 Among them we find: portraying the 
atrocities as self-defense, understating the scope of the massacres, stating the absence of genocidal 
intent, pointing out the absence of clear or direct orders, downplaying the original population’s 
demographic weight, describing oneself and/or group as being pure and thus incapable of mass 
atrocities, or on the other hand, as being the real victims.36 Denial—the last stage of Gregory H. 
Stanton’s ten stages of genocide—occurs throughout each of the different stages and continues 
beyond the genocide.37 It is one of the surest predictors of future genocidal massacres. Stanton 
indicates that denial comprises covering up the evidence (e.g. burning the bodies, digging up the 
mass graves), denying their criminal deeds, blaming the victims and intimidating the witnesses.38 
According to the author, arrests and prosecutions allow for the evidence to be heard and helps to 
combat impunity as punishment contributes to diminishing denial.39
The use of increasingly sophisticated cognitive strategies such as rationalization, 
contextualization, deconstruction and/or justification allows for mass killings to become a legitimate 
governmental response to an attack or the threat of an attack. Accordingly, the most dangerous form 
of denial (i.e. facilitating or reinforcing the committing of further atrocities) is interpretative denial. 
As previously seen, this implies the deliberate weakening of the factual foundation of genocide by 
mixing in elements of acknowledgement of historical facts and/or consideration for the violence 
and deaths suffered with lies and denials. As time passes, the tangible genocide-related facts 
incrementally disappear while the survivors’ memories and experiences are increasingly silenced. 
This kind of denial is dangerous not only because it disseminates uncertainty, ambiguity and even 
contradiction, but also for the reason that it has permeated different spheres of society (political 
28 Ibid., 533.
29 René Lemarchand, Forgotten genocides (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Herbert Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
33 Ibid., 31.
34 Ibid.
35 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2011).
36 Ibid.
37 See Gregory H. Stanton, “Ten Stages of Genocide.” Genocide Watch, 2013, accessed April 11, 2016, http://www.
genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid
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and academia) under the principle of free speech where opposing points of view ought to be heard. 
Interpretative denials of genocide then become tantamount to diversity of opinion and can then 
easily be integrated in the media, publications, public forums (lectures, conferences and so forth). 
A number of academics—such as David Irving—have had much success denying genocide (see 
Smith and al. 1995, for a few examples).40 While a few countries such as Canada and Germany 
have legislated that denial of the Holocaust is subject to legal prosecution, interpretative denials 
are more discrete and difficult to identify. Holocaust deniers have not been criminalized in most 
countries, including the United States, UK and BiH.41 Adam Jones argued against imposing legal 
sanctions against deniers, opting instead for other strategies such as public refutation (proactive 
campaigns and denunciation informed by thorough research,) to minimize further damage from 
unethical denials.42 Other authors such as Smith, Markusen and Lifton stand for legal sanctions 
against genocide deniers.43 
Denial serves to numb, enables avoidance of the unthinkable or protects the psyche by blocking 
out awareness of cruelty and extreme horrors committed by some towards others, especially 
when members of one’s in-group are identified as mass murderers. However, denial also negates 
responsibility, revives painful and harmful memories, and further damages the victims and 
other individuals who are affiliated with them. Such distortions of truth and revisions of history 
aim to demolish the identity of the targeted group and to control people’s mind constructions 
about the events or a number of aspects related to genocide. While no link has been established 
between intentions and the conscious/unconscious processes at play, perpetrators and their allies 
deliberately use highly sophisticated strategies to further their goals. Other than the perpetrators 
and their supporters, ordinary individuals are drawn to denial for different self-serving reasons 
such as protecting one’s own position by accepting the institutional culture or to benefit from funds 
that will support his or her denial. Some authors such as Charny note that denials disseminated 
by non-perpetrators and apparently well-intentioned people (defending human rights and justice 
standards, for instance) are the most widespread form of denials and are especially dangerous as 
they are very damaging to the societal support of historical truth, justice and impartialness.44
Interpretative Denial in BiH (and Beyond)
Everything the victims say is relativized, reduced in courts, denied by the perpetrators. Any 
such strategy used to modify the truth further damages the victim.45 
Interpretative denial, where facts or historical events are given a different meaning, is the view 
which is most prevalent in BiH. This form of denial has many supporters, most notably, among 
political leaders (international community, Serbia, Bosnian Serbs in eastern Bosnia) and academic 
experts. During the 1990’s, while the worst atrocities were taking place in Bosnia, political leaders 
avoided use of the term genocide as such acknowledgement would have required an intervention 
from those who had signed the Genocide Convention.46 As for Serbia, a draft resolution—
recognizing genocide—was introduced in 2005 but the Serbian Parliament did not adopt it.47 
In 2010, it acknowledged that a “crime” and a “tragedy” had occurred in Srebrenica but never 
40 For example, see Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen and Robert Jay Lifton, “Professional ethics and denial of the Armenian 
genocide,” in Holocaust and Genocide Studies 9, no.1 (1995): 1-22.
41 Jaqueline Lechtholtz-Zey, “The Laws Banning Holocaust Denial (revised from GPN Issue 3),” Genocide Prevention 
Now 9 (2012), accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Home/GPNISSUES/
GPNBulletinLAWSAGAINSTDENIALSpecialSection9/tabid/164/ctl/DisplayArticle/mid/971/aid/470/Default.aspx.
42 Adam Jones, The Scourge of Genocide (New York: Routledge, 2013).
43 Smith, Markusen and Lifton, “Professional ethics and denial,” 1-22.
44 Charny, “A classification of denials,” 525.
45 Interview with woman (50-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2012.
46 Thomas Cushman, “Anthropology and genocide in the Balkans,” Anthropological Theory 4, no.1 (2004): 5-28.
47 Michel-André Horelt, “Serbia-Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Different apology packages, different successes,” in 
Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations, ed. Christopher Daase et al. (New York: Routledge, 2016).
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referred to it as genocide.48 Serbian authorities began arresting suspects of Srebrenica-related 
crimes in March 2015.49 In July 2015, Aleksandar Vučić—Serbia’s Prime Minister—attended the 
20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, where he condemned “the crime” but did not use the 
term genocide.50 Vučić—a former ultranationalist politician during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war who 
is currently embracing the region’s efforts for joining the European Union—was attacked at the 
ceremony with water bottles and stones.51 Vučić had mentioned the following in the 1990’s: “for 
every killed Serb we will kill 100 Muslims.”52 Also in July 2015, Russia vetoed a UK and US-drafted 
UN Security Council resolution on the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.53 This resolution—meant 
to mark the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre—would have formally condemned the 
massacre as genocide.54 Russia was the only country to veto the resolution. China, Nigeria, Angola 
and Venezuela abstained, while the other ten members of the Council voted in favor.55 The draft 
resolution failed, as a permanent member of the Security Council issued the veto. This veto only 
further hinders the reconciliation process in BiH.56 In the Serb-dominated Republika Sprska, denial 
remains strong.57 The notion of “equal guilt for equal crimes,” whereby the Serbs’ forces were not 
the only bad guys has been propelled by means of political, academic and journalistic discourses 
by members of the international community, Serbia and Bosnian Serbs in eastern Bosnia.58 
Cushman explains that this relativism, among other factors, has been fuelling both the denial of 
Serbian culpability for the crimes that occurred during the 1990’s as well as the intensification of 
Serbian victimhood.59 Edina Bećirević underlines that “idea linkage distortion and time-sequence 
confusion” is a method of denial often used by individuals who point out genocide against Serbs 
during WWII to justify the atrocities carried out in BiH in the 1990’s.60 The author adds that those 
who disseminate this perspective disregard, among other facts, that both Bosniaks and Croats (and 
others, such as Jews) were “victims of WWII-era genocidal policies” adopted by certain Serbs.61 
In regards to the academic circles, Edward S. Herman—Professor Emeritus at University of 
Pennsylvania, a media analyst and a well-known revisionist—has repeatedly denied the genocide 
in BiH.62 Noam Chomsky—Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
48 Ibid.
49 Jovana Gec, Aida Cerkez and Dusan Stojanovic (The Associated Press), “8 suspects arrested in Srebrenica massacre, 
including commander,” Global News, March 18, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://globalnews.ca/news/1888850/
serbian-police-make-seven-arrests-linked-to-srebrenica-massacre/. 
50 BBC, “Srebrenica massacre anniversary: Crowds chase Serb PM away,” BBC News, July 11, 2015, accessed April 14, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33491540.
51 The Associated Press, “Serbian PM attacked at ceremony marking Srebrenica slaughter,” CBS News, July 11, 2015, 
accessed April 14, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/serbian-pm-aleksandar-vucic-attacked-at-ceremony-marking-
srebrenica-slaughter-in-bosnia/.
52 AFP, “Ties between Serbia and Bosnia remain fragile 20 years after war,” Justice Info.net, July 11, 2015, accessed April 17, 
2016, http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/live-feed/1223-.html.
53 Reuters, “Russia vetoes Srebrenica genocide resolution at UN”, The Guardian, July 8, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/russia-vetoes-srebrenica-genocide-resolution-un.
54 Denis Dzidic, “Russia Vetoes UN Srebrenica Genocide Resolution,” Balkan Transitional Justice, July 8, 2015, accessed 
April 13, 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-vetoes-un-srebrenica-genocide-resolution.
55 Graeme Baker, “Russia criticised for vetoing UN Security Council resolution to condemn 1995 Srebrenica massacre as 
‘genocide’,” Independent, July 8, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
russia-criticised-for-vetoing-un-security-council-resolution-to-condemn-1995-srebrenica-massacre-as-10376244.html.
56 Dzidic, “Russia Vetoes UN Srebrenica Genocide Resolution.”
57Valerie Hopkins, “In the shadow of genocide,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, accessed April 7, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/07/10/in-the-shadow-of-genocide-srebrenica-bosnia/.
58 Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 146 and 173 respectively; See also Marko A. Hoare, “Genocide in the former 
Yugoslavia,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no.4 (2003): 543-563; Campbell, National Deconstruction.
59 Thomas Cushman, “Anthropology and genocide.”
60 Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River,173.
61 For more details see Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 174. 
62 See the following link for instance, Edward S. Herman “The Politics of the Srebrenica Massacre” Покрет за Србију 
(Movement for Serbia), February 23, 2008, accessed April 7, 2016, http://pokretzasrbiju.org/the-politics-of-the-srebrenica-
massacre-by-edward-s-herman/.
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one of the most widely quoted intellectuals—wrote the foreword to Herman’s book The Politics of 
Genocide which denies the genocides of Srebrenica and Rwanda.63 Diane Johnstone—an American 
political essayist and columnist—also wrote a book which denies the genocide of Srebrenica.64 
Robert Hayden—a professor in anthropology of law and politics at the University of Pittsburgh—
portrayed the genocidal massacres that happened in BiH in the 1990’s as “removals.”65 However, a 
number of well-known authors such as Marko Hoare, Samantha Power, Martin Shaw, and Gregory 
Stanton have highlighted the detrimental political effects and consequences of academic denial on 
the prevention of genocide.66 
With respect to the judiciary, both the ICTY and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have 
recognized that genocide did occur in BiH, but each relativized the facts.67 For instance, in 2007, 
the ICJ acknowledged that Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention, by not doing enough to 
prevent it from occurring, and yet still decided to release the Serbian state from full responsibility.68 
As for the ICTY, through its settlements with war criminals offering the latter shorter sentences for 
confessions, it also contributed to the relativization of the mass atrocities committed in the 1990’s.69 
Most of the interviewees who participated in the current study were of the opinion that a significant 
amount of information was revealed through judicial courts such as the ICJ, the ICTY and the 
War Crimes Chamber (of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, they deplored 
the manipulation of information that seeks to minimize, rationalize, justify, deconstruct and/or 
deny the violent deeds perpetrated as well as their consequences. Nettelfield indicates that, despite 
criticism from a number of scholars such as Stover and Weinstein and Subotić, the ICTY led to a 
number of positive developments by enabling the creation of a space for exchanges, questions and 
discussions concerning the mass atrocities committed in the 1990’s.70 Among the positive impacts 
highlighted by Nettlefield, we find initiatives aimed at: informing and educating the population, 
working on decreasing collective guilt, helping in the legitimization of the survivors and family 
associations, locating war criminals and developing local capacity to prosecute war crimes in BiH.71 
Over the years, a few reports have exposed a number of problems linked to interference by the 
executive and legislative bodies (as well as by political leaders), in the workings of the judiciary, 
resulting in lengthy court proceedings and often impunity for the perpetrators.72 
Denial is pervasive throughout Serbia and Serb-dominated Republika Sprska. This denial is 
also supported and reinforced by members of the international community from diverse spheres 
(political, academic, media, law). However, as explained by Charny, personal interests—tangible 
and non-tangible—drive many individuals who were not initially perpetrators nor bigots to deny 
and even participate in massacres and genocide.73 Despite the ambiguity and the grey zones in 
terms of intentions and the purposes for denial of genocide, the latter has a profound negative 
impact on everyone concerned, especially the victims and their children. The denial of genocide 
goes beyond the manipulation, contradiction and/or rebuttal of historical facts, it recreates the 
conditions under which the victims’ extreme suffering is perpetuated and further victimization is 
made possible, yet again. 
63 Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, The Politics of Genocide (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011).
64 Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
65 Robert Hayden, “The tactical uses of passion in Bosnia,” Current Anthropology 38, (1997): 924-926. See also Thomas 
Cushman, “On Bosnia: Response to Hayden,” Current Anthropology 40, no.3 (1999): 365-366.
66 Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
71 Ibid.
72 See for instance, JNBiH, Joint Report of the Justice Network in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2nd Universal Periodic Review on 
Human Rights Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2014), accessed April 11, 2016, http://www.mrezapravde.
ba/mpbh/mpbh_files/file/UPPreportFinalENG.pdf. 
73 Charny, “A classification of denials,” 519.
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The Effects of Denial in BiH at the Individual, Group and Societal Levels
In some cases, certain forms of denial can be considered as being potentially beneficial. The 
avoidance of situations that are reminders of trauma can constitute a practical coping mechanism. 
As explained by Joseph, William and Yule, this avoidance allows for an incremental process where 
facilitation and inhibition processes modulate and maintain the flow of traumatic information at 
tolerable doses.74 A (psychological) space where survivors are able to regulate and handle their 
experiences—cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally—is needed to allow for the development 
of the ability to move on. Overwhelming circumstances, where individuals face ongoing 
psychological invasions, provide few opportunities for (re)connecting with oneself, others and 
life in general. For instance, a person may have difficulties experiencing painful and enjoyable 
thoughts simultaneously, or feelings of distress and love or kindness. Psychological invasions or 
intrusions concern past as well as future-oriented events, especially for those who still live in the 
areas of conflicts. Wondering if oneself and his or her children will be accepted as equal citizens on 
account of his or her background is an example of a future-oriented event. 
The denial referred to by the interviewees is a form that triggers new and/or perpetuates past 
trauma-related responses. As one feels or believes that he or she is in danger—psychologically 
and/or physically—traumatization increases. Repeated or continuous ordeals such as stressors 
inflicted with intent produce varying degrees of detrimental effects on both mental and physical 
health. Effects such as emotional numbness, anxiety, helplessness, frustration, anger, deep 
sadness, fear and somatisation are the most often mentioned by the interviewees. Symptoms 
that seem to fade away over time resurface again in response to other stressful situations. When 
this occurs repeatedly and over prolonged periods of a person’s life, the impacts are felt through 
one’s perceptions of negative stimulus, negative cognitions and negative emotions, which in turn 
influence behavior towards out-group members.75 
Drawing from the interviewees’ statements, denial is interpreted as an intrusion of the past 
into the present in which the individual is confronted to an account of violent events that does not 
correspond to (or contradicts) his or her own experience. Denial triggers repeated recollection of 
past traumatic events, rather than living in the present and contemplating a future. As noted by 
Charny, the survivors’ history, rationality and truth are negated.76 Denial effectively celebrates 
the past devastations experienced by victims as they are submitted to a falsified version of their 
own experience and history.77 Denial reaffirms ongoing indifference, dehumanization, hostility 
and aggression. As we will see, denial also obstructs and/or ends dialogue that ought to take place 
for the healing process to occur and to help prevent further traumatisation at both individual 
and collective levels. Most of the interviewees reported being significantly to severely affected by 
denial. The younger ones—between 18 and 25 years old—reported being more disturbed by their 
parents’ reactions and related daily problems (physical, psychological, economic, social). Four 
themes emerged from the interviews regarding the consequences or outcomes of denial at the 
individual level: 1) irritability, frustration and anger; 2) depressive symptoms; 3) anxiety symptoms; 
4) survivor guilt. According to Hutchison, heed ought to be paid to the consequences experienced 
by the victims as they engender homologous responses i.e. extend beyond and between individual 
persons.78 At the group level, two themes were found: mistrust and fear. 
74 Stephen Joseph, Ruth Willliam and William Yule, Understanding post-traumatic stress (New York: Wiley, 1997).
75 Miles Hewstone et al. “Why neighbours kill: Prior intergroup contact and killing of ethnic outgroup neighbours,” in 
Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbours kill, eds. Victoria M. Esses and Richard A. Vernon (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
76Israel Charny, “The psychology of denial,” Genocide and human rights. A special issue of the journal of Armenian studies IV 
(1&2) (2009): 289-306.
77 Ibid.
78 See Emma Hutchison, Affective communities in world politics: Collective emotions after trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
Genocide Denial: Perpetuating Victimization and Violence in BiH
46
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
Irritability, Frustration and Anger 
Anger is attributed to the feeling that something bad, wrong or unjust, has occurred.79 The denial of 
extreme atrocities such as the ones which were perpetrated in BiH, and the resulting consequences, 
is considered by the interviewees as being deeply immoral and criminal. Different forms and 
levels of anger were expressed by all the interviewees. The survivors’ level of anger was essentially 
influenced by: the perpetrators’ denial of responsibility for what happened and/ or denial of the 
victims’ sufferings; the absence of punishment or negative consequences for the perpetrators; 
the lack of acknowledgement of the perpetrators’ immoral deeds and the reinterpretation of 
past transgressions as being heroic. Also, most interviewees were explicit about feeling anger 
(or another level of anger) towards the perpetrators (versus the ethnic group as a whole). The 
following interviewees expressed anger in response to the perpetrators’ refusal to recognize the 
crimes committed and the losses suffered. 
It is very frustrating to see them perpetually lying like that and not recognizing what they have 
done. This makes me extremely angry, every time I hear their lies. I don’t know what to say.80
Who killed my husband and my two sons? I can’t even go back and live in Srebrenica anymore. 
I am beyond angry that Serbs are denying the genocide they perpetrated in Srebrenica! 81
Similarly, Kalayjian et al’s research indicates that the persistent Turkish denial of the 1915 
Armenian genocide induced feelings of intense anger in many survivors.82 In regards to the current 
study, the lack or the absence of acknowledgement on the part of the perpetrators further fuels the 
interviewees’ feelings of powerlessness and profound sense of injustice regarding their past and 
present daily circumstances. Some internalize their anger while others displace it onto their family 
members, peers, acquaintances or unknown individuals. In this respect, Mira Giberovitch indicates 
that the survivors’ victimization continues when they are allowed to project their anger towards 
other individuals.83 Many interviewees expressed concerns regarding the effects of their anger 
on their own children and families, even those who internalized their anger. Some interviewees 
pointed out that they preferred isolating themselves rather than hurting their loved ones, especially 
their children.  
Depressive and Traumatic Symptoms
Herman highlights that the presence of enduring depressive symptoms is the most common finding 
in studies on traumatized individuals.84 She also adds, “every aspect of the experience of prolonged 
trauma works to aggravate depressive symptoms.”85 Most of the interviewees spontaneously shared 
that they are still afflicted, to varying degrees, by their war-related physical and/or psychological 
sufferings. Little remains from the survivors’ pre-war existence. For too many, their families 
have been partially or completely decimated, friends and peers have been murdered. Moreover, 
many were left with little or no opportunity to bury and mourn their deceased loved ones. Their 
homes have been destroyed or taken, educational institutions and livelihood opportunities have 
been destroyed, and whole communities have been dismantled. Minorities have been strongly 
discouraged from returning to their homes as well. Many interviewees highlighted that their sense 
of loss and their pain was so great that it was difficult for them to express. Denial contributes to 
the survivors’ irrecoverable losses and this is further compounded by the lack of assistance and 
79 Ibid.
80 Interview with woman (20-25 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
81 Interview with woman (55-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
82 Anie S. Kalayjian, Siroon P. Shahinian, Edmund L. Gergerian, “Coping with Ottoman Turkish Genocide,” Journal of 
Traumatic Stress 9, no. 1 (1996): 87-97.
83 Myra Giberovitch, “A drop-in center for holocaust survivors: Inspiring hope, meaning, and purpose,” Journal of Jewish 
Communal Service 75, no. 3-4 (2006): 239-247.
84 Judith Herman, Trauma and recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
85 Ibid.
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support. Drawing from the interviewees’ accounts, the intensity of these symptoms appears to 
be affected by three main factors: the loss of loved ones (children, partner, parents, siblings and 
relatives), the magnitude of the losses endured, the ability of the perpetrators to carry on with their 
lives without experiencing any apparent negative consequences for their violent behavior. Many 
interviewees also emphasized that not being informed of the location of the body of missing loved 
ones considerably increases their pain and suffering. The younger interviewees were saddened 
and troubled by their parents’ grief and misery. The following testimonies reveal that the denial 
of the facts surrounding the genocidal events which resulted in their loved ones being killed was 
equivalent to reliving the ordeal, compounded by the knowledge that the very existence of their 
loved ones was being erased. This form of denial is tremendously damaging to the interviewees 
and prolongs the mourning process as the mourner feels obligated to cling to the person lost.86
Their denials revive the memories of the ones that we loved again... My husband was everything 
to me. It is as if my husband never existed. The mourning process keeps on occurring.87
They killed my son and they live as if they did nothing and nothing happened. Nothing in the 
world can bring me happiness or pleasure. Deep inside, I am unable to be happy.88
The survivors struggle on a daily basis in coping with inestimable hardships. Denial not only 
perpetuates their victimization but also devalues their existence before, during and after the 1990’s 
war. Kellerman observed that severely depressed (Holocaust) survivors were at a high risk for 
suicidal thoughts and attempts.89 Denial even led some of the interviewees to wonder why they 
had survived.
Anxiety Symptoms
The denial of genocide-related events and their consequences provides a clear indication to 
most of the interviewees that if similar circumstances to those leading to genocide were to occur 
again, nothing would be done to stop the process. Most interviewees spontaneously mentioned 
a persistent subjective and/or objective psychological and physical insecurity linked to the threat 
of the reoccurrence of similar events. Such threats may be perceived as being very real for the 
survivor. As the survivors relive a threatening and frightening past, traumatic symptoms are 
triggered and resurface again in response to traumatic stressors. The older interviewees who 
directly experienced war as adolescents or as adults often expressed the most intense feelings of 
insecurity. The younger interviewees shared feeling anxious when their loved ones experienced 
symptoms like anxiety and/or fear. These interviewees underline that the denial of their experience 
puts them back in their painful memories, stimulates traumatic symptoms, and feeds the thought 
that these atrocities could occur again. Indeed, as raised by one of the following interviewees, the 
absence of accountability and the justification for the crimes perpetrated increases the likelihood 
of their reoccurrence.
Their denials and lies make me relive what happened all the time. Everything comes back, the 
jumpiness, the nightmares... but worse... the trauma, everything.90
We were targeted by snipers for four years... always running to avoid being killed. I am still 
traumatized, always nervous. Serbs justify the bombings, deny the snipers... It makes me even 
more nervous to see that there is no accountability from their part.91
86 Brandon Hamber, Transforming societies after political violence (New York: Springer, 2010).
87 Interview with woman (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2014.
88 Interview with woman (55-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
89 Nathan P. E. Kellerman, Holocaust trauma: Psychological effects and treatment (New York: iUniverse, 2009).
90 Interview with man (40-50 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
91 Interview with woman survivor (35-45 years old), Sarajevo’s siege, April 2011.
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Two factors which significantly contribute to the survivors’ symptoms of anxiety are: BiH’s 
ongoing socio-economic problems and the ethno-nationalistic political leaders’ inflammatory 
narratives which serve to revive traumatic memories from the 1990s. Emma Hutchison indicates 
that discourses of fear, anxiety and other similar emotions maintain and reinforce the power of 
a nation-state by promoting inside/outside dichotomies and antagonistic political allegiances as 
responses to keep the perceived dangers at bay.92 Increasing the intergroup distance diminishes 
the likelihood of a very much-needed intergroup dialogue that would diminish individual and 
collective anxiety symptoms. 
Survivor Guilt: Bearing Witness and Remembering Those Who Perished
Survivor guilt does not exclusively refer to feelings often experienced by those who survived life-
threatening events in which many others, especially their loved ones, perished. One’s perception 
that he or she did not do enough to save those who died and one’s feelings of being unworthy 
relative to those who perished are among the most frequent sources of survivor guilt. One may be 
prompted to bear witness and to keep alive the painful memory of those who were killed. All the 
interviewees who participated in this study indicated that they were significantly affected by the 
Serbs’ denial of genocide. They felt a strong obligation, placed upon them directly or indirectly, 
to be the bearers of the hopes of their family and/or of the Bosnian people. It was mentioned by a 
few that the survivor’s children grew up with a sense that because of this past and the sufferings 
of their parents, they ought to be successful (academically or in terms of employment) so as to 
bring about change that will lead to peace. However, the gap between the survivors’ expectations 
and/or hopes, and what their children perceive as being feasible is significant. The current 
challenging socio-political situation within BiH contributes to increasing the next generation’s 
difficulties in fulfilling these aspirations.93 The following testimony underlines the pressure felt 
by the younger generation to succeed in different spheres of their lives in a way that would 
compensate for the absence of acknowledgement for the extreme losses incurred. The younger 
interviewees underscore the pressure to bring about changes that are very much needed at 
both meso and micro levels of BiH. However, as noted by this interviewee, there are little 
to no opportunities, nor perceived possibilities, for the younger generations to satisfy these 
expectations.
I definitely feel that I have to succeed with every aspect of my life in order not to disappoint 
them (parents)... There is no acknowledgement of our losses from their part (Serbs) so I 
feel I ought to compensate to make things better. This is stressful because I cannot find a 
job right now. The situation is bad for all of us. We want to do well, we get diplomas but 
there are no jobs, no opportunities for us. The economic situation is very difficult in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.94
Moreover, most of the younger interviewees often felt that they had to be mindful not to agitate 
their parent(s) for fear of triggering yet another episode of anger, anguish, anxiety or guilt. A vast 
body of literature indicates that a traumatized survivor’s behavior can be significantly impaired by 
his or her posttraumatic symptoms.95 A few interviewees shared their difficulties with emotional 
expression and intimacy, even with their partner and their children. Feelings of detachment, 
the incapacity to express emotions, numbness, irritability and nervousness are among the most 
frequently mentioned problems. Lauterbach et al. point out that the survivors’ traumatic symptoms 
92 Hutchison, Affective communities in world politics.
93 Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F), Voices of youth: Survey on youth in BiH (MDG Achievement 
Fund: Sarajevo, 2012), accessed April 15, 2016, http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/
library/democratic_governance/voices-of-youth.html.
94 Interview with man (20-25 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
95 See for instance Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, “Psychopathological status, behavior problems, and family 
adjustment of Kuwaiti children whose fathers were involved in the first gulf war,” Child and adolescent psychiatry and 
mental health 2, no.1 (2008), 12.
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such as numbness and avoidance affect their children who grow up in an environment lacking in 
intimacy and emotional expression.96
Drawing from the interviewees’ experience, in concurrence with literature in health psychology, 
traumatisation does not exclusively trigger psychological symptoms. A positive correlation is 
found between prior trauma and physical problems such as increased risk of cancer, vulnerability 
to infections and immunologic disorders, susceptibility to hypertension and atherosclerotic heart 
disease, as well as cardiovascular, neurological, pulmonary and gastrointestinal problems.97
At the group level, increased mistrust and fear were among the most prevalent emotions 
associated with denial from the perspective of the interviewees. Both emotions intensify intergroup 
distance and tensions. 
Mistrust
Renewed trauma brought on by denial contributes to the erosion of social ties and the breakdown 
of trust as well as social polarization between individuals, communities and groups. Ultimately 
those belonging to out-groups become the negative other. Agger98 contends that the loss of trust in 
humankind following the betrayal of one’s neighbour or one’s family member constitutes the most 
traumatic and pervasive experience for war survivors to cope with. The following interviewees 
question how the perpetrators can be trusted again and allowed to be reintegrated in society when 
they do not take responsibility for the crimes they committed. How can trust be (re)built in such 
circumstances and/ or when atrocities are celebrated by the other group?
It’s unimaginable! Parents have to live without their children, women without their husbands. 
Raped and tortured women are physically and psychologically damaged. Too many were 
killed, tortured, humiliated, molested and because of that, their future is ruined. How can 
one live a normal life after committing such deeds... and without punishment? How can we 
trust someone like that who does not admit and take responsibility? Someone who feels no 
shame for what he has done and who is even seen as a hero by his people? They were even 
rewarded for it!99 
Trust cannot happen without truth. Criminals need to admit what they did to begin healing. 
It will happen again if they do not heal.100 
Fear
Without exception, the interviewees mentioned that denial of what happened to them intensified 
their perception of being threatened, fuelled their fear of the other and amplified their sense of 
uncertainty regarding what the future holds for them. Stephan, Renfro and Davis indicate that 
threat perception arouses the emotion of fear.101 Fear of certain groups can become chronic and 
well integrated into the in-group’s history; and eventually transforms an ethnic conflict into an 
intractable war. Drawing from the interviews, we found that the effects of threats experienced 
(or perceived) may be psychological or behavioral in nature. The psychological consequences 
comprise cognitive (e.g. stereotypes) and emotional reactions (e.g. fear, anger). An important 
consequence of fear which affects intergroup relations is that fear focuses on threatening stimulus 
96 Dean Lauterbach et al. “Quality of parental relationships among persons with a lifetime history of posttraumatic stress 
disorder,” Journal of traumatic stress 20, no. 2 (2007): 161-172.
97 See for instance Joseph A. Boscarino, “Posttraumatic stress disorder and physical illness: Result from clinical and 
epidemiologic studies,” Annals of the New York Academy of sciences 1032 (2004): 141-153.
98 Inger Agger, “Reducing trauma during ethno-political conflict,” in Peace, Conflict, and Violence, eds. Daniel J. Christie et 
al, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 2001): 240-250.
99 Interview with man (40-50 years old), Sarajevo’s siege, June 2013.
100 Interview with woman (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
101 Walter G. Stephan, Lausanne C. Renfro and Mark Davis, “The role of threat in intergroup relations,” in Improving 
intergroup Relations: Building on the legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew, eds. Ulrich Wagner et al. (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008): 55-73.
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and controls information processing where danger is increased and information (or events) are 
perceived and interpreted as being negative or threatening. Negative events and information 
attract more attention, are more readily memorized and thus more intensely affect perceptions, 
interpretations and behaviors of the antagonistic groups. Then, the fear becomes justified by an 
enhanced perception of danger posed by the out-group. 
Fear impacts intergroup dynamics as well through increased group cohesiveness, increased 
acceptance of centralized leadership, and exclusion of non-conforming/deviant members. 
Intense fear associated with enhanced group cohesiveness breeds hostility toward the out-
group. Avoidance of the out-group is another possible consequence of fear. Furthermore, the 
combination of fear and the negative characteristics of the out-group reinforces avoidance of 
intergroup contact. Among other reasons for this avoidance, we find the expectation that the 
interaction will go poorly or that negative outcomes will be experienced. Examples of such 
possible negative outcomes during intergroup interaction include: condemnation from out-
group and/or in-group as well as being exploited or harmed (physically and/or psychologically). 
Under certain circumstances, fear influences the perceptions of threat from a hostile out-group, 
laying the foundation for defensive aggression. Denial intensifies perceptions of threat. The 
interviewees deplore the lack of recognition on the part of the perpetrators. They fear that, without 
such recognition, nothing will prevent the perpetrators from acting (again) with extreme violence 
in the future. 
We are in need of not being afraid of the other. I do not see this as being possible after what 
they have done to us. They don’t even recognize their responsibility in what they did. What 
will be their next move? 102
Societal Level
At the societal level, the nationalistic discourse and fear of the other are notions, which are promoted 
throughout according to most of the interviewees. The political discourse—fear mongering 
along nationalistic lines—and its influence on the collective memories that reign in BiH pinpoint 
and dictate who the enemy is and what he or she did, meanwhile disregarding how members 
of each group were affected by the war. Given the fact that traumatic memories are emotionally 
overwhelming and involve extreme violence, it is easy to understand why fear-mongering is so 
effective, even more so when considering the enduring harsh living conditions. 
The remembrance of war involves multiple layers of interaction and negotiation between the 
representatives of the state apparatus, the political elites and the non-elites i.e. the ordinary citizens. 
The participating parties do not carry equal weight in the determination of who did what, what 
happened during the war, and what these violent actions led to. Such determination depends on 
who is allowed to have a voice in the public sphere. All too often, a united front of political, military 
and bureaucratic elites devises a unilateral memory of the war that is untouchable. The official 
war narratives are then sustained through the selective referencing of individual testimonies and 
different types of documentation (audio-visual, written). Essentially, this is the extent of individual 
participation in the articulation of the collective memories of war. However, some individuals or 
groups who claim to know the truth are not allowed to have a voice in the public sphere, especially 
when their truth does not coincide with the official accounts of war. Allowance for a certain degree 
of deviation in the accounts related to war depends on numerous variables such as the degree of 
defensiveness and enemy-sensitivity in the dominant political culture. War-related narratives and 
war memories are repeated and reinforced by telling and listening. They are rendered tangible 
by war museums and documentation. Once these are well established, experiences that cannot be 
placed in the interpretative framework of these accounts are usually left out. The more individuals 
with divergent memories of what happened stay silent and conform to the official version, the 
less likely it becomes for these variations to be included in the collective memories of war. This, 
in turn, significantly reduces the possibility of mourning and for an impartial acceptance of the 
102 Interview with man (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
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consequences of the war. Remembrance of war must be made to overcome the selective presentation 
and political sanitization of the memories of war. Otherwise a pseudo-healing takes places and 
prevents society from confronting the underlying problems which contributed to or emerged from 
the war.
Acknowledgement in BiH
The Significance of Acknowledgement
Clark argues that acknowledgement implies: 1) no denial nor minimization of war crimes, 2) an 
absence of competing versions of truth, 3) an agreement on how the past should be dealt with.103 
Čehajić-Clancy et al. indicate that acknowledgement first involves the recognition of the victims’ 
victimization.104 Secondly, it implies the acknowledgement of responsibility for one’s participation. 
This, in turn, implies reparations that range from public apology and memorials to financial 
compensation.105 
The interviewees who participated in this study consider that acknowledgement involves a 
“genuine” recognition of the crimes perpetrated and of the losses incurred. They underlined that a 
genuine acknowledgement must be inclusive and respect the proportionality of suffering as some 
victims (and groups) suffered more than others. They all asserted that the perpetrators ought to 
take responsibility for their misdeeds. Many insisted that punishment was necessary, as impunity 
would lay the groundwork for the reoccurrence of mass atrocities. 
Crimes happened on all sides but these are not equal. One side suffered the most and this 
ought to be recognized.106
Based on the survivors’ accounts, acknowledgement serves a number of beneficial functions. First, 
acknowledgement lays the groundwork for a coherent narrative regarding the causes, actions and 
consequences of war i.e. the why, the how and the then what of war. Acknowledgement of the 
suffering and deprivation experienced is especially significant for the victims (to help facilitate the 
locating of their deceased loved ones and to obtain the relevant services for their own healing). 
Secondly, acknowledgement qualifies and/or justifies who is the victim and who is the perpetrator 
and/or labels the opposing sides. Acknowledgement of responsibility is especially meaningful for 
victims (as a way to ensure that those responsible will not commit similar crimes again). Overall, 
acknowledgement constitutes one of the main pillars of a sustainable and long-term peace in cases 
where severe human rights violations have occurred. However, despite the widely recognized 
importance of acknowledgement, there is currently a lack of empirical evidence indicating which 
processes and conditions best facilitate the psychological readiness to publicly and sincerely 
acknowledge in-group responsibility for violent past actions in intergroup conflict settings. 
Finding Different Forms of Acknowledgement in BiH
As pointed out by this interviewee, whatever the form of acknowledgement, it should exclude 
cognitive strategies such as rationalization, contextualization, deconstruction and/or justification. 
Acknowledgement should not further harm the victims; rather it should allow the survivors to 
recover—to the extent possible—a certain level of normalcy.
Based on the interviews, the possible opportunities for acknowledgement are numerous 
but are seldom actually encountered in BiH. Among those opportunities we find: the criminal 
trials, the commemorations and memorials on each side and against each other, and an education 
system that disseminates different “truths” to each group. Very few of the interviewees 
benefited from the monetary compensation (for raped women or other victims) but many 
more reported the need to address more significant and urgent problems such as the lack of 
103 Janine N. Clark, “From negative to positive peace,” Journal of Human Rights 8, no.4 (2009): 360-384.
104 Sabina Čehajić et al. “Affirmation, Acknowledgment of Ingroup Responsibility, Group-based Guilt, and Support for 
Reparative Measures,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101, no.2 (2011): 256-270. 
105 Ibid.
106 Interview with man (30-40 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2012.
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health care and social services. The perpetrators’ acknowledgement was identified as being of 
utmost importance. Most also specified that making amends for one’s crimes or misdeeds was 
equally important. This could take many forms, ranging from a simple but genuine apology 
to tangible actions aimed at alleviating the victims’ losses. Such an acknowledgement would 
presuppose the disqualification of those leaders who were implicated in the 1990’s killings 
and who are still in government and continue to be involved in the decision-making process. 
More importantly, the interviewees felt that the victims’ suffering and losses ought to be 
acknowledged. As previously mentioned, the interviewees were of the view that such an 
acknowledgement should also help make possible the introduction of much needed healthcare and 
social support services. It is hoped that such assistance would ultimately facilitate the survivors’ 
efforts at progressively reintegrating a functional life (to the extent possible). According to those 
interviewed, a more substantial compensation would further improve the victims’ quality of life, 
especially for those unable to find and/or keep a job due to their posttraumatic symptoms. 
Acknowledgement of what happened and the prevention of future occurrences of genocide 
was indicated by all the interviewees as being critical to the long term healing process. This 
acknowledgment was described in two forms: 1) inclusive memorials (acknowledging the 
disproportionate level and nature of suffering experienced); 2) education / dissemination of an 
inclusive and common “truth.” The parallel differentiated education of each ethnic group under 
one roof, a practice which still exists today (despite a number of initiatives to curb such a system), 
was deplored by all. Finally, the interviewees added that preventing future occurrences of violence 
has become imperative and urgent.
Considering the Threshold Between Acknowledgement and Denial
We just want to live a normal life but I do not see how this can happen without the perpetrators 
acknowledging what they did. It can only mean that they think what they did is moral and 
they will not hesitate to do it again. A criminal cannot change.107 
Living in pain, misery and fear does not help lay the foundation for positive contacts between 
former enemies. Fear of the other needs to decrease and a basic trust needs to be (re)built in order 
to move beyond the “no war no peace situation.”108 The survivors interviewed in this study also 
pointed out that for reconciliation to occur, the victim ought to be satisfied and reassured that the 
perpetrator and his accomplices acknowledge their misdeeds, the sufferings they have caused and 
that measures will be adopted to prevent the reoccurrence of such behavior. However, the belief in 
the notion that one’s in-group suffering is much more important than that of the out-group’s serves 
to minimize the in-group’s sense of responsibility in the conflict. The interviewees noted that the 
perpetrators’ admissions of guilt and/or the expression of feelings of remorse are unlikely to occur. 
It has been widely recognized in the literature that acknowledgement—of what happened and 
of one’s suffering—is a crucial part of the reconciliation process.109 The different interpretations 
regarding what happened and the resulting consequences of war, who are to be labelled as the 
victims and who as the perpetrators, constitutes one of the most significant obstacles against any 
successful efforts of reconciliation and long-term peace. The interviewees also echoed the notion 
advanced by Fletcher and Weinstein, in which acknowledgement of the “truth” is not as significant 
as each party’s interpretation and subsequent actions.110 Survivors often give more importance 
to the confirmation of their experience as victims and that of their loved ones—deceased or 
disappeared—than for learning the truth, per se. 
107 Interview with man (35-45 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
108 An expression often use by many of the interviewees.
109 For instance, see Paula Green, “Reconciliation and forgiveness in divided societies: A path of courage, compassion, 
commitment,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation, eds. Anie Kalayjian and Raymond F. Paloutzian (Santa Barbara: 
Springer, 2009).
110 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the contribution of justice to reconciliation, 
Human Right Quaterly 24, no. 3 (2002), 589.                                                      
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Most of the interviewees felt that a balanced approach, where a certain amount of denial (or 
the suppression of a certain amount of information), seemed necessary for positive intergroup 
contacts to occur. More specifically, reconciliation required integrating an undetermined degree 
of denial: in terms of what happened (notably the perpetrators’ violence), the losses encountered 
and the suffering endured. A threshold between acknowledgement and denial—a good enough 
amount of acknowledgement—is required before a certain degree of denial could be tolerated. 
When asked, a few interviewees explained that a good enough amount of acknowledgement 
implied: accountability of the perpetrator for his or her misdeeds, acknowledgement of the 
magnitude of suffering and losses, and the making of amends. However, a level of tolerable denial 
was more difficult to define for the victims. Most urged that at the very least, a tolerable denial 
must encompass: the acknowledgement of the victims’ status i.e. their suffering and losses, and the 
accountability of the perpetrator for his or her harmful actions. The interviewees were of the view 
that the victims’ survival needs ought to be met and that the perpetrators must be held accountable 
for their crimes as leniency may lead to a recurrence of the violence under similar circumstances. 
A vast body of literature in criminology indicates that the perpetrator’s accountability is crucial 
for his or her own healing.111 The lower the level of denial perceived by the victims, the higher the 
chances a reconciliation process might occur. Drawing from the interviewees’ experiences and 
in concurrence with the needs-based model of reconciliation, the reintegration of both the victim 
(taking control of their lives) and the perpetrator (being viewed as being morally and socially 
acceptable) is imperative.112
The healing, of all parties implicated, ought to be promoted in order to minimize objective 
and subjective victimization. Without the healing of each former adversary, the balance between 
a tolerable denial and a good enough acknowledgement cannot happen. Healing will not only 
decrease the tendency to interpret facts exclusively from one’s point of view and dehumanize 
the other, it will also reduce the need to benefit from denial which, as previously mentioned, has 
numerous conscious and/or unconscious purposes. Herman contends that healing is a process 
that involves the reconstruction of the traumatic memory in order to reintegrate it into day-to-day 
life.113 As explained by the author, the traumatic memory is static and wordless and the survivor’s 
endeavor in confronting and uncovering problematic questions such as what happened and why 
is key. Indeed, for the healing process to occur, the survivor’s memory needs to be transformed 
into dynamic words through an individual and social reconstruction of the traumatic event.114 
As discussed elsewhere, a better understanding of events entails multiple interpretations that 
connect the individual experience to a larger context while avoiding one-sided interpretations 
that emphasize the negative dispositions of the individuals belonging to the other group.115 The 
reconstruction of events leads to an understanding that brings forward factors that are changeable 
and which suggest possibilities of transformation and peace, rather than determining fixed factors 
such as the nature of the other that suggests the impossibility of reconciliation and peace. However, 
heed must be paid to prevent the manipulative insertion of justifications, rationalizations and 
minimizations as this would harm the victims and further slow down or impede the healing and 
reconciliation processes. In the context of such harmful practices, severe trauma may worsen and 
become entrenched. This may breed future violence and conflict. 
Positive contacts allow for flexibility in looking at things from different points of view and 
helps in reducing the tendency to interpret events or facts exclusively from one’s own perspective. 
Čehajić and Brown argue that a shift toward acknowledgement is more significantly correlated 
to the establishment of positive contacts than: the ability to adopt the perspective of the other, or 
111 See James Bonta, Suzanne Wallace-Capretta and Jennifer Rooney, Restorative justice: An evaluation of the restorative 
resolutions project (Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1998). 
112 Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel, “Instrumental and socioemotional paths to intergroup reconciliation and the needs-
based model of socioemotional reconciliation,” in Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation: From Violent Conflict to 
Peaceful Co-Existence, eds. Arie Nadler et al., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 37-57.  
113 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
114 Ibid.
115 Anonymous.
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beliefs in in-group victimhood, or a form of relationship with the adversary group where neither 
time nor trust has been invested.116 The authors explain that meaningful cross-group relationships 
with members of the victims’ group contributes to increased exposure to victims’ perspectives 
and experiences, and facilitates acknowledgement of responsibility for in-group wrongdoings. In 
BiH, there must be vigilance against the political leaders’ nationalistic narratives, which not only 
retraumatize the survivors, but also contribute significantly to an absence of the much-needed 
communication between stakeholders at the micro, meso and macro levels. Opening up the 
possibilities of dialogue as well as the space necessary for positive contacts to occur between (ex) 
antagonist parties has become imperative.
 
Conclusion
Denial is a concept which is fluid. It implies conscious and unconscious processes for both well-
intentioned and non well-intentioned individuals. This fluidity also complicates its detection as 
well as its effects on micro, meso and macro levels. No fixed links have been established between 
conscious/ unconscious processes and intentions. The ambiguity and the grey areas in terms of the 
intentions and purposes for the denial of genocide represent a significant challenge for those who 
seek to counter it. Indeed, a deep understanding of the diverse incarnations of denial is necessary 
if one is to counter its effects by offering more effective initiatives that can be crafted and deployed 
against the deniers. 
A meaningful and sustainable peace process implies an impartial and unbiased view of the 
past, the present and the future. The past has to be dealt with before one can benefit from the 
present to its fullest extent and (re)build in preparation of a more peaceful future. When one’s 
suffering intensifies under the influence of “old” and “new” stressors, one is left with precious 
little resources to deal with his or her own daily battles and even less to (re)construct or transform 
one’s environment and society. Denial prevents the survivors from moving on as he or she is 
repeatedly thrown back into the past where they relive and attempt to sort out what happened, 
why, how, and the then what. Having been repeatedly subjected to a falsified version of one’s own 
experience and history, he or she is retraumatized and this incrementally shapes one’s perception 
of negative stimulus, negative cognitions and negative emotions as well as influences the behavior 
towards out-group members. In the long run, each victimization event, be it objective or subjective 
is magnified and serves to further fuel the narratives which justify and rationalize mass death of the 
other. Denial has a profound negative impact on everyone concerned, especially the victims and 
their children. Furthermore, the denial of genocide goes beyond the manipulation, contradiction 
and/or re-interpretation of historical facts, it recreates the conditions under which new atrocities 
could occur. 
While most of the interviewees felt that reconciliation required integrating an undetermined 
degree of denial on their part, they all insisted that acknowledgement by the perpetrator was 
imperative. Such acknowledgement, to a good enough level, must encompass the acknowledgement 
of the survivors’ suffering and losses as well as making amends. More difficult to achieve, a good 
enough acknowledgement also implies the perpetrators’ accountability for his or her misdeeds. 
However, the perpetrators’ feelings of remorse and admission of guilt may not be guaranteed. 
Healing, imperative for both victims and perpetrators, could help lay the foundation for reducing 
the benefits linked to supporting denial; benefits such as political, economic and/or social gains. The 
necessary space and flexibility to counter denial cannot take place without top-down support as the 
socio-political context can impede such processes. A partnership between all levels of society must 
be developed to not only address the survivors’ material and symbolic needs but also the structural 
and the material inequalities underlying the conflict. Only once the healing process begins,117 a 
good enough acknowledgement becomes possible. To facilitate a good enough acknowledgement, 
peacebuilding initiatives and measures ought to look beyond the “good victim”/“bad perpetrator” 
dichotomy and be receptive to more than just the one exclusionary and silencing truth. 
116 Čehajić and Brown, “Silencing the Past.”
117 As argued previously (anonymous), the healing process is interlinked to the reconciliation process.
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Acknowledgement implies verbal and/or behavioral action, which goes beyond practical 
needs; it seeks to restore post-conflict relations as well. Acknowledgement is based on a 
fundamental transformation in one’s perception of events where there is a shift from knowledge to 
acknowledgement, from exposure to events to understanding. It also reflects a shift in responsibility, 
not only for the perpetrator but also for the potential bystander as well. Indeed, one may not be morally 
responsible for failing to act when he or she lacks information about what is actually happening. 
It is only when a threshold of knowledge is met that we can begin to speak of a moral component: 
it is at this point that a person can no longer deny the evidence presented. Action then becomes 
possible, even when such actions do not directly or indirectly coincide with one’s interests. 
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Abstract: Based on 46 interviews conducted in a 2-month period, this article explored the identity narrative of 
three generations of the Hutu Diaspora community living in Belgium. Through a analysis of the Rwanda’s National 
Identity policy and political categories, the research aimed to explore important themes such as sense of self and 
other, victimhood, and homeland through the lenses of the perpetrator group. Moreover, it was essential to investigate 
the trans-generational impact the perpetrator label has on the next generations. By looking at the Hutu population, 
the study was opening the door to the exploration of contested memories of survival for the perpetrator group. The 
complexity of the Hutu identity and their contested and competing narratives offered a fascinating approach to the 
study of mass atrocity as well as the field of conflict Resolution. This new generation of well educated, young Hutu 
has the power to shape the future of Rwanda in a very important way.
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Introduction
Today, we are the Palestinians; the only problem is that we don’t have intifada and don’t 
have terrorists. Who knows, maybe we are creating the terrorists of tomorrow. 
– Participant #17
In this article, I intend to explore the stories the Hutu Diaspora in Belgium tell about themselves and 
how they position themselves vis-à-vis Rwanda. As Diaspora, they have an important connection 
to their homeland. Their actions and understanding of who they are strongly impacts the 
sociopolitical decisions the Rwandan government’s Foreign Ministry make. In this article, I explore 
the creation of the official Rwandan narrative crafted by the Rwandan government and how this 
narratives has influenced its Rwandan citizens, through an analysis of the National Identity Policy, 
Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 
of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination 
and Sectarianism.1 After analyzing the construction of this official narrative about what Rwandan 
identity is, I connect Rwanda with its Diaspora through a historical understanding of the diasporic 
waves of Rwandans moving in and out of Rwanda. Finally, through in-depth interviews, I connect 
Rwanda and its policies to the Hutu in Belgium. It is important to understand the connections 
Rwanda has with its Diaspora. The way the official narratives and laws are portraying the Diaspora 
has a great influence on the different, sometimes competing, narratives that are created in the 
diasporic communities.
The Rwandan Diaspora, as the Rwandan government refers to it, is a “negative Diaspora”—
that is, a hostile Diaspora that stands against current Rwandan politics, Moreover, the Rwandan 
government mostly associates the “negative Diaspora” with Hutu communities. These communities 
are believed by the current Rwandan government to still support, or to be associated with, the 
government calls the previous “Hutu government” (including the “Hutu” regimes that committed 
the 1994 genocide). This negative Diaspora, therefore, is largely seen as a Diaspora that is primary 
composed of Hutus who are seen as enemies of the state. As such, this Diaspora has shaped a 
competing narrative to the official Rwandan narrative and highlighted the impact diasporic 
communities have on their homeland. As Lily Cho presents, the diasporic identity is not only a 
brand, it is an reminder of the past, a recollection of times when things were different, and most of 
all, it is an unsettling feeling of being caught in a time and place that are not necessarily right.2 In 
1 Amnesty International, Justice in Jeopardy: The First Instance Trial of Victory Ingabire (2013), accessed October 27, 2014, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR47/001/2013/en/. 
2 Lily Cho, “The Turn to Diaspora,” Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, no. 17 (2007), 19.
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the mix of this diasporic status, the Hutu communities represent this complexity of being caught 
in a narrative that is a daily reflection of the darkest time in their history, yet being not totally part 
of the new vision of the state of Rwanda and experiencing an uncanny, unsettling feeling of not 
being home.
Identity in this article is taken to mean the process by which “people understand their 
relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space and how 
people understand their possibilities for the future.”3 This multidimensional definition suggests 
that there is more than one identity within a person. People’s identities can be categorized into two 
different groups, a personal individual identity and a group identity. The individual identity is 
created in the “process of self-reflection or the understanding of the ‘self.’”4 Our individual identity 
exists in connection to the world, to understand what or who we are by understanding what or who 
we are not. Therefore, identity can be seen as a collection of different features from an “individual’s 
culture of origin.”5 Those features allow one to create relationships with people who share the 
same features.6 By creating a group of people sharing many of the same features, we identify 
ourselves, not only as an individual with a self-identity, but also as a member of a group possessing 
a collective or social identity. In the context of Rwanda where forms of identity based violence 
(genocide) were the primary reasons why so many people were forced into Diaspora between 
1960 and 2000, studying identity formation and Diaspora consciousness is a crucial component to 
understand the trans-generational narratives created within the last couple decades. It is also an 
important competent to understanding and promoting justice and reconciliation among Rwandan 
communities in Rwanda and abroad.
The Construction of the New Rwandan Official Narrative
In a span of three months, Rwanda experienced one of the darkest and bloodiest times in its 
history. The 1994 genocide did not only traumatize Rwandans within, but it also affected Rwandans 
who were abroad, as well as the international community. Over two decades later, its aftermath is 
still very present in the minds, actions, and hearts of many. The genocide is usually described as an 
ethnic conflict, where Hutus decided to kill their Tutsi neighbors. Almost one million were killed 
and about two million became refugees. 
In the wake of this tragedy, a new Tutsi government took over the destroyed country and 
intended to rebuild it. With time, the narrative of the events of 1994 changed. While the case 
started off being referred to as the Rwandan Genocide—implying that the genocide happened to 
all of Rwanda as a country and society—the narrative shifted to calling the events the Genocide 
Against Tutsi and Moderate Hutus. Finally, the narrative crystalized and was officially named 
by the Rwandan government, the Genocide Against Tutsi. This change of narrative was not only 
promoted by the government, but adopted legally through the enactment of a National Identity 
policy under law N. 14/2008 on 04/06/2008, and Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism.7 
The Rwandan government’s stated reason for implementing a national identity policy was 
to fight against “the radicalized mentality of the past.”8 The new government emphasized a 
national Rwandan “identity, hoping that [citizens could] replace ethnicity as a basis for identity.”9 
3 Judy Dyer, “Language and Identity,” in The Routledge Companion to Sociolinguistics, ed. Carmen Llamas et al. (New York: 
Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006), 103.
4 Karina V. Korostelina, Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 36.
5 Judy Dyer, “Language and Identity,” 101. 
6 Michel Laroche, Frank Pons, and Marie-Odile Richard, “The Role of Language in Ethnic Identity Measurement: A 
Multitrait-Multimethod Approach to Construct Validation.” Journal of Social Psychology 149, No. 4 (August 2009), 514.
7 Amnesty International, Justice in Jeopardy: The First Instance Trial of Victory Ingabire.
8 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities 8, (March 1, 2008), 6.
9 Hilary Power, “Unresolved Identity Conflicts as a Barrier to Reconciliation in Rwanda,” International Public Policy Review 
7, no. 2 (2013), 5.
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Talking about ethnic identities became illegal because it was presumed that Belgian colonizers had 
installed them. Consequently, in order to enlighten and help the country progress and free itself 
from old mentalities, the Rwandan Patriotic Front attempted to erase the initial, ethnic identities 
of Rwandan citizens.10 Yet, though ethnic identification was prohibited, it remained an important 
part of the cultural and social fabric of the Rwandan society, continued to be expressed in private 
spheres, and continues to structure people’s lives. Unfortunately, “it can be said that the act of 
genocide and its memory have strengthened the boundaries and the self-identification on either 
side of the divide even as ethnic categories have disappeared from identity cards and official social 
and political engineering.”11 Due to the government’s imposition of a collective identity, the ethnic 
identities have become increasingly important, even more so than before the 1994 genocide.12  This 
government attempt to impose unity on the population by outlawing ethnicity and deploying 
a de-ethnicized discourse, Andrea Purdeková argues, stands paradoxically in contrast to the 
“silent engineering” of the Rwandan government to make ethnicity a de facto cornerstone of the 
practice of politics.13 One advantage of this de-ethnicized discourse is that to outside observers—
especially observers in the West who associate African identities and conflicts with backwardness 
and violence—outlawing ethnicity makes Rwanda seem like a developed, progressive, and 
modern African country.14 Within the context of Rwandan politics inside and outside of Rwanda, 
furthermore, the discourse of removing ethnicity to create “unity” is important for creating the 
legitimacy of the current government.15 Through this construct, tacitly or explicitly asserting one›s 
ethnicity in public life is seen as promoting «disunity,» which marks individuals as targets of 
government or social suspicion because of their ethnic identity. The state policy of attempting to 
eliminate ethnicity as a dividing line between Rwandans—either by accident or by design—has 
therefore resulted in reifying ethnic identity and concretizing social and political lines between 
Hutus and Tutsis. 
Hillary Power has argued that “such deep-seated identities and attitudes cannot be expected 
simply to disappear; though they may be publicly silenced, they may remain intact. Failing to 
address them negates the possibility of dismantling and neutralizing them.”16 The imposed, 
unified Rwandan national identity thereby silences people and attempts to erase their former 
identities through a one-dimensional narrative created by the government. Yet, as other narratives 
are dismissed and seen as illegal, people are still discriminated against and even persecuted based 
on the Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa identities. Ethnic identities were thereby transformed into newly created 
political identities that reflected the new policies the Rwandan government was implementing.17 
Because these political identities are so closely attached to the official memory of the 1994 genocide, 
Rwandan citizens were essentially divided into categories of victimhood and perpetration. 
Mahmood Mamdini and with Eugenia Zorbas, have explored this categorization of Rwandans 
not only socially, but also in the legal system of the new Tutsi regime. As Mamdini has stated, 
the state language and official and popular discourse in Rwanda divides the population into five 
categories:18
1. The returnees are mainly Tutsi exiles who returned to Rwandan after the RPF came to 
power in July 1994. They have not experienced civil war or genocide and their English (or 
Swahili) is frequently better than their Kinyarwanda.  
10 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 10.
11 Andrea Purdeková, “Beyond De-Ethnicisation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Unpublished Working Paper. Department of 
International Development, Oxford University. (2009), 2.
12 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 8.
13 Andrea Purdeková, Making Ubumwe: Power, State and Camps in Rwanda’s Unity-Building Project (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2015), 84-85.
14 Ibid., 85.
15 Ibid., 86.
16 Power, “Unresolved Identity Conflicts,” 6-7.
17 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 13-14.
18 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 266-267.
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2. The refugees can be either Old Caseload (OCL) refugees, pre-1994 mostly Tutsi refugees, 
or New Caseload (NCL), post-1994 mostly Hutu refugees.  
3. The victims are both Tutsi and moderate Hutu. However, surviving victims are only Tutsi 
(see below), who either survived the genocide or who had survived previous anti-Tutsi 
massacres (OCL refugees). NCL refugees are not considered victims, or survivors.  
4. The survivors are only Tutsi. The logic here is that the genocide was aimed only at Tutsi. 
It follows that any Tutsi who was in Rwanda at the time of the genocide and who is alive 
today is a survivor. The word is not used for any Hutu who was in the country during that 
same period.  
5. The perpetrators category is perhaps the clearest evidence of the endurance of the Hutu/
Tutsi dialectic, despite the official national unity ideology. “The assumption is that every 
Hutu who opposed the genocide was killed. The flip side of this assumption is that every 
living Hutu was either an active participant or a passive onlooker in the genocide. Morally, 
if not legally, both are culpable. The dilemma is that to be a Hutu in contemporary Rwanda 
is to be presumed a perpetrator.”19 
The Rwandan government generally avoids using Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as political identities. But it 
has adopted what can be called a “genocide framework,” from which it categorizes the population 
politically.20 As Mamdini has argued, “the 1994 genocide is singled out as an event producing the 
only political correct categories for identification and guidelines’ for state policy.”21 By dividing the 
Rwandan population into victims, survivors, and perpetrators the government limited the process 
of overcoming the trauma of the genocide and any past suffering the country has experienced. 
The controlled, single-sided narratives and the suppression of the ethnic identities has created 
obstacles to the reconciliation process. It also deepens the societal and identity-based separations 
among the ethnic groups, and creates new understandings of the trauma experienced during and 
after the genocide by forcing people into categories. 
Therefore, the one-sided narrative created by the government, that only the Tutsi were victims 
of the genocide, not the Hutu, dismissed other narratives that could have potentially evolved. The 
official narrative does not deny that Hutus also died, but rather that only Tutsi deaths represent 
deaths due to genocide. Thus, only Tutsi can be recognized as victims of genocide. To say that a 
Hutu is a victim of genocide is thereby an act of denying the Tutsi genocide—a criminal offense in 
Rwanda. This national identity policy, and the way the government has decided to implement it, has 
helped to deepen divisions, not promote reconciliation. Those seen as the victims, survivors, and 
returnees are principally Tutsis, while the perpetrators are almost exclusively Hutus. Rwandans 
are now divided into ethnic and political lines, paradoxically, through the government’s claim that 
it is removing ethnicity from politics. 
This distinction of manufacturing a Tutsi identity as an identity of victim, survivor, or returnee, 
and a Hutu identity as an identity of perpetrators, can be observed in the political arena and justice 
system. A 2002 survey illustrated the extent to which the Tutsis, mainly the RPF members, held 
power in Rwanda: 
• Of Rwanda’s twelve prefects, seven are Tutsi, five are returnees, and 11 of the 12 prefects 
are members of the RPF;
• Of the twelve commissioners on the National Unit and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC), nine are Tutsi and four are returnees (no political affiliation is cited); 
• Of the twenty-two Supreme Court Judges, fourteen are Tutsi and fifteen are returnees (no 
political affiliation is cited);
• Of the twenty-eight heads of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), twenty-three are Tutsi 
and twenty-four are members of the RPF (no figure available for returnee proportion); 
 
19 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 267; Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Journal 
of Legal Studies 1, no. 1 (2004), 47.
20 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 266.
21 Ibid., 266.
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• Of Rwandan’s fifteen ambassadors, thirteen are RPF members, and twelve are Tutsi (no 
figure cited for returnees)22 
In addition to control the narrative of the genocide and its population, since the RPF took power in 
Rwanda, private citizens, political opponents, journalists, human rights activists, and others have 
been persecuted, harassed, imprisoned, and tortured by the Rwandan authorities.23 
Finally, what crystalized the official Rwandan narrative was Law N. 18/2008 relating to the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, which regulates freedom of expression, and Law N. 
47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination 
and Sectarianism. According to Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Ideology, genocide ideology “is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, 
documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people based 
on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or 
political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.”24 Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the 
Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism, defines 
discrimination as “any speech, writing, or actions based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the 
color of skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or ideas aimed at depriving a person or group 
of persons of their rights as provided by Rwandan law and by International Conventions to which 
Rwanda is a party.” The law furthermore defines sectarianism as “the use of any speech, written 
statement or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes 
an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination mentioned 
in article one.” The law then proceeds to state that the “deprivation of a person of his/her rights 
is the denial of rights provided by Rwanda [sic] Law and by International Conventions to which 
Rwanda is a party.”25 Both laws were created to restrict the freedom of speech, to prevent Rwandans 
from openly expressing their disagreements with Rwandan policies, and one might say, to prevent 
reconciliation after the 1994 genocide in the name of promoting reconciliation. Due to the unclear 
language in the laws, the incumbent government in Rwanda has been using the laws to suppress 
opposition and censure human rights defenders and journalists.26 The selective narrative put forth 
by the government has left no room for discussion. 
Through these laws, the Rwandan government has created legal means that ensure the 
promotion of one, single narrative, which holds that the Tutsi were the victims and the Hutus 
were the perpetrators. This has had several consequences. First, it has closed the door to anyone 
who could offer a counter narrative—even a modest narrative, such as one that did not deny the 
actuality of the violence and killing that happened in 1994, but merely suggested that moderate 
Hutus were also victims of genocide, would be illegal under these two laws. Second, the laws 
have shaped the political sphere, sidelining parties that are in disagreement of the governments’ 
policies. Third—and this may be the most important consequence—the laws have left room for the 
government to interpret its own legal framework and apply it in the way it wants. This creates the 
arbitrary rule of law and allows the government to silence, repress, arrest, and kill citizens along 
de facto ethnic lines, in the name of preventing ethnic divisions. 
Rwanda and its Diaspora
How do the dynamics in the politics of identity in Rwandan affect the Rwandan negative Diaspora 
that attempted to maintain a connection to their homeland? As Lily Cho has written, “no one is born 
22 Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 44–45.
23 Joseph, Umuvugizi – The Voice of Rwanda “Amnesty International Report Puts Rwandan Among Top Human Rights 
Abusers.” (March 2016), accessed December 12, 2015, http://www.umuvugizi.com/?p=5423&lang=en&PageSpeed=n
oscript. One very good example among many for control the Rwandan government is exercising over its narratives 
is the blockage of the Umuvugizi website that was a controversial satire news outlet. The Umuvugizi website is not 
longer accessible.
24 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism,’ 
2010, accessed November 2, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR47/005/2010/en/.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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diasporic. Rather, one becomes diasporic through a complex process of memory and emergence [and 
resettlement].”27 The idea of a diasporic status and the Rwandan state has had a long connection. 
It first wave of Diaspora were Tutsi escaping the 1959 and 1960’s instabilities, which were created 
by the Rwandan struggle for independence and the establishment of a new Hutu state.28 In the 
immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide, Hutus fled the country fearing that the RPF government 
was erecting a Tutsi protection government. This Hutu emigration constituted the second wave 
of the Rwandan Diaspora.29 Later, in the early 2000s, both Hutus and Tutsi fled an increasingly 
oppressive Rwandan government. In the immediate post-genocide years, those who returned to 
Rwanda are estimated to be 25-40% of the Rwandan population. These returnees are people who 
lived abroad in Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, and Tanzania among other places, and trekked back 
to Rwanda for the first time since 1994.30 Even the current government is believed to be composed 
of Ugandan returnees. This first wave of Tutsi Diaspora has been described as a “victim Diaspora,” 
or as heroes since the RPF, the political party that stopped the genocide and took over the country, 
was largely composed of Tutsis returning to the country.31 Consequently, the second wave of Hutu 
Diaspora who left Rwanda after the RPF seized power has been seen as problematic, framed as 
the villains, and almost by definition anti-government because they are Hutu. Believed by the 
Rwandan government to be sympathizers of the former President Habyarimana’s regimes, many 
are seen as threat to the current Republic of Rwandan. Yet, in the face this attempt to forcibly define 
them politically accord to their ethnicity, many in this second wave Diaspora have questioned or 
rejected the official narratives of the genocide and attempted to create a counter-narrative that 
would incorporate a different side of the story. 
As a Diaspora that exists because of conflict, the second wave Diaspora is similar to conflict-
based Diasporas, which “frequently have a prominent role in framing conflict issues and defining 
what is politically acceptable.”32 As Lyons argues, such “Diaspora groups created by conflict and 
sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate 
the protracted nature of conflicts.”33 The current government is aware of the complex dynamic that 
constitutes the antagonized and isolate Diaspora communities. After all, many who are currently 
in the government were actively playing a role in Diaspora politics before the 1994 genocide, when 
they were in the Diaspora. Therefore, the current Rwandan government has created initiatives to 
reconnect with its Diasporas, by dividing the Diaspora into three categories: a positive Diaspora 
that supports the state, and a skeptical Diaspora whose members may be converted, and finally 
a hostile Diaspora beyond reach.34 With the creation of the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD), 
the Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation embarked on a program to unify 
the Diaspora community who were willing to adhere to the new vision of Rwanda. The DGD 
created initiatives to carry out this policy objective, such as the One Dollar Campaign, which 
encourages people in the Diaspora to donate and support “vulnerable genocide survivors.”35 
The most skeptical members of the Diaspora were invited to come and witness the process the 
country had gone through. Those who remained critical of the direction of the country, politically 
and socially, were interpreted as being part of the negative Diaspora, and perceived to still be 
sympathizers of the previous Hutu governments. This distinction cast them as enemies of the 
27 Cho, “The Turn to Diaspora,” 21
28 Peter Uvin, “Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda,” African Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1997), 96.
29 Simon Turner, “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance,” African Studies 72, no. 2 (August 2013), 
269.
30 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 13-14.
31 Robin Cohen and Nicholas Van Hear, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008); Turner, 
“Staging the Rwandan Diaspora,” 269.
32 Terrence Lyons, “Conflict-Generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia: Analysis,” Conflict, Security & 
Development 7, no. 4 (December 2007), 530.
33 Lyons, “Conflict-Generated,” 530. 
34 Turner, “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora,” 274.
35 Republic of Rwanda, “Rwanda Diaspora Global Network,” Diaspora General Directorate, 2010, accessed June 13, 2016, 
http://www.rwandandiaspora.gov.rw/index.php?id=64.
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state of Rwanda, because they were believed to represent a potential danger to the well being 
of the state.36 
These Hutu diasporic communities who are seen as potential dangers to the Rwandan state 
are the subjects of this research. Those who are still in exile, and still considered dangerous by the 
current Rwandan government, have been affected by the single-sided narratives and are even more 
marginalized because official narratives position them as genocide sympathizers, not genocide 
victims. This genocide labeling continues to have a great impact on the Hutu community, more 
than twenty years after the 1994 genocide. Many Hutus who lost loved ones cannot overcome the 
indignity of not being recognized as victims of the genocide by the Rwandan government. Hutus 
who had no role to play in the genocide have to live with the label of perpetrator, while Tutsis are 
recognized as the victims. If Hutus in Rwanda try to uncover objective truth or seek to complicate 
this simplistic narrative—either through scholarship or journalism, by simply asking around, or 
even expressing an opinion that might not be popular—they will most likely be incarcerated for 
violating law against genocide ideology. Those outside the country are confronted with strict 
censorship when trying to advocate for their loved ones. Like other Diaspora communities, 
the Rwandan Diaspora has created means to creating knowledge about their situation, and the 
situation of their networks of friends and family living in Rwanda. Some have taken to establishing 
watchdog groups, while others fight to have their victimhood recognized against an increasingly 
oppressive Rwandan state.37 
In this article, I explored how Hutus have understood their own identity and what types of 
narratives that have used to cope with the 1994 Genocide as well as the Rwandan official narrative 
of the genocide. Going even further, I investigated how these narratives have shaped their trans-
generational community dynamics and how the new generations have understood their place and 
roles vis-à-vis the current political tensions between Rwanda and its Diaspora. In order words, 
the official narrative of the genocide promoted by the Rwandan government has had an impact 
on the identity transformation of Hutus, as a whole, as well as on the individual level of identity 
transformation. 
Narrative Analysis is a methodology used in the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
(CAR) to explore the stories, or narratives, people tell about conflict. This approach recognizes—
when it comes to how people respond to and act in conflict contexts—that it is the narratives 
people construct about their experiences that matter more than the actual historical events that 
happened to them or the things they actually did. It is through the exploration of people’s stories 
that we understand the interpersonal and intergroup dynamics and the context of events that 
led to people in conflict to make certain decisions, and respond in certain ways. Likewise, it is 
by exploring and understanding the constantly evolving and changing stories people tell about 
themselves that we can understand the dynamic and constantly changing context in which they 
are living. Consequently, the narratives are at the base of their understanding of who they are 
and are reflections of the processes where by people make and remake meaning of their past 
experiences. CAR scholars study these narratives in order to understanding how and why particular 
communities tell stories about themselves, in order to understand how conflict has shaped the 
dynamics with the community, especially when the stories are transmitted though generations. 
The goal is, therefore, through the analysis of people’s narratives of the past, to understand how 
people currently understand their own subject positions and see themselves as social actors.38
Through Narrative Analysis, I used different approaches to explore the stories that were 
constructed and told by my interview subjects. The first approach I used is what narrative scholars 
36 Turner, “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora,” 274.
37 Simon Turner, “Cyberwars of Words: Expressing the Unspeakable in Burundi’s Diaspora,” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 34, no. 7 (September 2008), 1165.
38 For more, see Donald E. Polkinghorne, “Explorations of Narrative Identity,” Psychological Inquiry: An International 
Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory, Vol. 7 No, 4, (1996), 365; Jefferson S. Singer, “Narrative Identity and 
Meaning Making Across the Adult Lifespan: An Introduction,” Journal of Personality, Vol. 72, No. 2 (June 2004), 447; 
William H. Sewell Jr., “Introduction: Narratives and Social Identities,” Social Science History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 
1992), 483; and Sara Cobb. Speaking Violence: The politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) 22.
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in CAR call “Thematic Analysis.”39 Thematic Analysis emphasizes the “content of a text, ‘what’ 
is said more than ‘how’ it is said, the ‘told’ rather than the ‘telling.’”40 The second approach is a 
Structural Analysis, to focus on “the way a story is told. Although thematic content does not slip 
away, focus is equally on form—how a teller by selecting particular narrative devices makes a story 
persuasive.”41 Finally, an Interactional Analysis was used to highlight the dialogue or conversation 
taken place between the participant and the interviewer.42
The Survey
This paper is based on 46 interviews conducted between July 2014 and September 2014. In-depth 
one-on-one interviews were intended to explore the diasporic Hutu identity formation through 
the stories and narratives that the participants provided. The interviews were divided using a 
thematic approach. Eight principle questions complementing the surveys’ information centered on 
narrative identity, conception of homeland, and sense of victimhood guided this study. I used both 
purposive and random sampling. Pre-determined characteristics such as ethnicity, age groups and 
gender helped determine my population sample. After doing so, I used snowball sampling by 
asking participants to refer me to the next person they thought I should meet and interview. 
Interviews
The participants were divided into three age groups: from 18 to 30 years old, from 31 to 45 years 
old, and 46 years old and older. The first age group was composed of young adults who were either 
very young at the time of the 1994 genocide, or born in host countries. They are mostly influenced 
by their parents’ narratives and the media since they either did not experience the atrocities or were 
too young to understand what was happening. The second group was a little bit older. They were 
teenagers or young adults at the time of the genocide. They have a personal understanding of the 
narratives of the genocide, but still have been influenced by their host countries’ narratives and 
cultures. Their narratives are based on their own understanding of the conflict, and the narratives 
told by their elders and the external world. The third group was the generation of parents and 
grandparents. At the time of the genocide, they were active members of Rwandan society. 
Politically, socially, and economically, they were citizens. This was the group that lost the most, 
and developed deep chosen traumas that they could transmit to younger generations. This older 
group tended to be nostalgic for their lives before the civil war and genocide. Their narratives, their 
understanding of the conflict, and their roles in the Rwandan community are still influential. 
Among the forty-six participants, eighteen (39%) were part of the group between 18 and 30 
years old. Sixteen (34%) of the participants were part of the group between 31 and 45 years old. 
The last group, which was composed of the parents and grandparents who were 46 years old and 
older, represented 27% of all the participants. With all three groups combined, there were a total of 
forty-six participants, with twenty-three women and twenty-three men. 
Privacy and anonymity was insured to the participants, which allowed them to fully express 
their opinion and potential criticisms. For this reason, I did not use the interviewees’ names, but 
rather numbered them. Safety was a major concern for many of them. This led to conducting 
interviews in different venues, times, and dates. Given that the subject group of these interviews are 
seen as, and treated by the Rwandan Government as, a negative diaspora, most of them expressed 
during our initial contact that they were willing to help and openly answer questions as long as 
they could not be identified. They feared that the Rwandan government might go after their family 
in Rwandan or abroad. 
Results
Forty-six people were interviewed, both in French and Kinyarwanda, for this qualitative data 
39 Catherine K. Riessman, “Narrative Analysis,” in Narrative, Memory and Everyday Life, ed. Nancy Kelly et al. 
(Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield Press, 2019), 2.
40 Ibid., 2.
41 Ibid., 3.
42 Ibid., 4.
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Table 1. Participant Data Collection.
      Group I: 18-30       Group II: 31-45    Group III: 46+
Group I Participants (18) Group II Participants (16) Group III Participants (12)
2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 
23, 24, 32, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41
1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 
22, 25, 26, 33, 34, 36, 45
16, 17, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 
42, 43, 44, 46
23 Women, 23 Men
collection. Three important themes based on the research question led the discussions. They were: 
identity, narrative, homeland. Within each group (group I – 18-30, group II –18-45, group III – 46+), 
nuanced responses were observed. In terms of the theme of identity, the participants used very 
determined identities; some identities were more salient that others. Additionally, negative terms 
or terms related to otherness or unwantedness were used to describe how they felt, who they 
have become, and the perceived labels society has imposed upon them such as perpetrators and 
outsiders. The dominant themes that emerged in their stories of themselves—what can be called 
their narrative identity—were trauma and victimhood. Many recognized that they have not yet 
overcome their own traumas, and signaled that these traumas have increased in recent years with 
the competing narratives they have been facing. The politics of identity labeling, and the stigmas 
that come with them, have shaped their understanding of themselves and consequently have 
transformed and reshaped their own stories. Thus, the single-sided narrative of the genocide that 
presents Tutsis as a group as good, and Hutus as a group as bad, has transformed their narratives 
of their own identities into counter-narratives—a narrative of others, or outsiders external to 
Rwandan society. 
In terms of how the interview subjects felt about their Diaspora and homeland, they feel 
closely attached to Rwanda and its politics. Very few, of course, contested the genocide itself. Most 
saw themselves as playing the role of watchdogs, and have assumed a responsibility to report and 
denounce the current Rwandan government and what they see as government crimes. Others have 
expressed the desire to just be left alone and be allowed to move on. 
Discussion
The Transformation of Identities
The Hutu identity in diaspora has been shaped and transformed by the official narrative of the 
genocide as well as by the social labels and stigmas that came with it. Some have ignored or rejected 
their ethnic identity as Hutu, or even their national Rwandan identity, while others have embraced 
these identities, adopted them, and have strongly held onto them. Among all the participants, the 
youngest had created the most radical responses to their socially constructed understating of what 
their Hutu and Rwandan identities were supposed to be. Yet, it is clear that identity or the lack of a 
chosen identity has affected the entire diaspora community. A very interesting example of identity 
transformation within the younger group was given by Participant #4, when she stated, “I don’t 
see myself as more Rwandan than Dutch or Belgian. I know I am because of my parents, but it 
does not define me.” In reaction to the different narratives that dictate her identity, she has chosen 
to accept or reject all identities. Others, like Participant #5, have not even tried to be immersed in 
their parents’ cultural identity. He stated, “I did not even know that I was Hutu. I knew that I was 
Rwandan and that my father was Hutu, but never really made the connection.” Both Participants 
#4 and #5 emphasized the saliency of their Belgian identity by stating things like, “I created myself 
here, I can’t see my plans coming true in Africa,” said Participant #4 and “I live here, grew up here, 
that’s all that mattered, expressed Participant #5.” Adopting or not the Hutu or Rwandan identity 
does not always seem to be a matter of choice. Growing up in diaspora has an impact on what type 
of information this young generation is exposed to, and how they relate it to who they are and their 
homeland, Rwanda. 
This idea of not belonging to a single identity or nation is not specific to the younger group. In 
the words of Participant #34, “I stopped asking questions about my ‘Hutuness’ and embraced the 
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life and blessings I have now. I try to avoid conversations on identity and Rwanda.” Similar to both 
Participants #4 and #34, Participant #46 stated, “We should stop talking about Hutu, Tutsi, or even 
Rwandans. It does not help us to rebuild ourselves.” However, this idea of moving away from the 
identity debates was not very common. Of all the 46 participants, very few disassociated themselves 
from their identity—ethnic, national or other. Yet, very much like the Rwandan government’s 
position, Participant #46 stated that the concept of ethnic identity did not matter much but, unlike 
the Rwandan government’s position, the participants believed that the imposition of a national 
identity did not make much sense either. The discussion surrounding identity, and which identity 
should be promoted, in Participant #46’s view, detracts from the reconstruction and reconciliation 
of the Rwandan people.
Rather than rejecting or reshaping their identities to fit society’s expectations or their new 
lives built in the aftermath of the genocide, a large number of the participants have embraced 
both national and ethnic identities as way of reconstructing themselves. Some have taken on their 
Hutu identity and made it salient in reaction to their lack of acknowledged victimhood. Others 
have primary adopted their national identity. Participant #10 reflected on his identities by stating, 
“Among my numerous identities, the Rwandan is the strongest; sadly, I cannot embrace it… yet 
my Hutu identity has influenced my life in particular ways.” Participant #11 explained that first of 
all, he is Hutu because that’s what has shaped him, then he is Rwandan, then a refugee, and, last 
of all, a Belgian. Participant #33 supported the argument that part of her identity was formed and 
shaped by social pressures and stigmas. She stated, “I am the soul of my loved ones. Don’t ask me 
to change who I am because someone blames them for the worst. I am proud to be a part of them.” 
For many being Hutu is a reality. They see themselves as Rwandan, but as Rwandans who were 
born Hutu and had to take on this identity. As Participant #38 explained, being a Hutu Rwandan 
has affected the way people have treated and seen him. “I am Hutu because people don’t allow me 
to choose. It was an action reaction. I don’t deny or reject my parents’ identities. I am who I am and 
who my parents wanted me to be.”
Despite the fact that their Rwandan identity is the one used to describe them in most settings, 
their Hutu identity is still part of who they are and influences their environment. Socially, Hutus 
are called Rwandans, but their Hutuness is still influencing the ways they live and understand 
their roles within their given society. Participant #2, who was born and raised in Belgium, emphasis 
this idea of socially, forced dual identities, by stating: 
Because I am black, people always ask me where I am from. I usually just say Rwanda, but 
then the famous questions are always asked. ‘Are you Hutu or Tutsi?’ And ‘Aren’t the Hutus 
the bad people who one day decided to kill their neighbors?’ Without even wanting it, I am 
labeled and classified by ‘other.’ 
Thus, many participants struggled with their identity. Participant #9 explained that despite her 
new Belgian identity, she was still not completely Belgian. She felt the same about her Rwandan 
identity; but, because it had been so long since she lived there, Rwanda did not really seem like 
home either. She said, “here you are a stranger because of your skin color; there you are stranger 
because you are not from there anymore.” This idea of belonging nowhere is a continuous factor 
in the interview subjects’ identity formation and sense of self, and Participant #9 used the terms 
“damaged or troubled identities” to define who they have become and how they see themselves. 
Participant #21 emphasized a similar idea of belonging nowhere when she said, “despite the fact 
that I’ve lived here for three-fourths of my life, I am not Belgian. If I go back to Rwanda, I will not 
be Rwandan either.” She used the terms “damaged or troubled identities” to define who she has 
become and how she sees herself. As Participant #32 explained her struggle by saying, “I traveled 
the world looking for myself, until I realized that I had lost my identity 20 years ago. Now, I am an 
empty vessel, a product of others’ mistakes.”
The interview subjects, by-in-large, expresses a sense of being caught between two competing 
social forces of exclusion and othering. On the one hand, they were living in a society that defined 
them as others because they had dark skin. On the other hand, they were being defined as others 
by the Rwandan government in its attempt to direct Rwandan society towards defining Hutus in 
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the diaspora as either genocidaires, genocide sympathizers, or at the least a socially and politically 
dangerous element. Give this double exclusion, “the question of identity is very complex, especially 
for Rwandans … the society will always define you as an outsider … which makes me seek that 
outside land, which is Rwanda,” stated Participant #15. He continued by saying, “for people like 
me, we would like to define ourselves as Rwandans, but we don’t know that country (Rwanda) we 
would like to define ourselves as Belgians, but the society does not define us as such; it is like we 
are stateless.” Being stateless, an outsider, or even unwanted are themes that prevailed in many 
interviews. Many of the participants expressed an emptiness that was created by the fact that the 
official narrative of the current Rwandan government presents them as this negative diaspora, as a 
danger to their own homeland. Yet, they do not have the sense that Belgium is their country either, 
but rather simply a host land. Being from nowhere and belonging nowhere is a traumatic fact that 
is affecting the younger generations, and has shaped their stories and narratives. Participant #11 
expressed this theme when he stated, “I identify myself as a Belgian, originally from Rwanda; as a 
refugee because I am not home.” Participant #15 said, “I see myself as a Belgo-Rwandan, a refugee, 
as a young activist who loves his country…but when I was young, I couldn’t say I was Hutu.” 
In conclusion, there is no single, well-drafted idea or definition of the Hutu diasporic identity 
formation. This study shows that there is no single framework that can incorporate all members of 
this diaspora into a single rubric. Some individuals have decided that they wanted, and needed, 
to move on and forget the past, which also meant getting away from the debates over ethnic 
and national identity. Others said they could not escape stereotypical understandings of what 
Rwandans and Hutus are, but rather had to learn how to live with them. Finally, others decided to 
embrace their Hutu identity because it was imposed on them by ways of promoted stereotypes and 
developed stigmas, which have been affecting them for years. This last group expressed a constant 
struggle within themselves over their sense of belonging and homeness. This was the group that 
largely saw themselves as stateless, caught somewhere in between Belgian and Rwandan society, 
in between a Belgian and Rwandan homeland. 
Nothing is Better than Home
When someone thinks about diaspora and homeland, what comes to mind is well described by 
Participant #19. She said, “20 years ago, I lost my home. Now, I have a normal life here in Belgium, 
a family and a good job, but yet, I still feel empty inside because there is nothing better than home.” 
The idea of home, this magical place where one felt safe, has a challenging, paradoxical connotation 
when it comes to Hutus and Rwanda. As explained above, their narratives and recent identities 
have been formed by, and in response to, the labels and stories their homeland has promoted about 
and against them. Participant #45 explained the dilemma he has constantly faced. He said,
Home, where is home? Rwanda has taken away our pride, our heritage, and our loved ones. 
President Kagame has rebuilt the country on the blood of innocent Hutus, so how can I 
call Rwanda my home? Yet, it seems like I am [a] thorn. It is in my heart; it is who I am. My 
Rwanda might be not the same as before, but Rwanda is still the place [where] my parents 
taught me my values, and principles. Rwanda is the heritage I want to leave for my children. 
For the Hutu Diaspora, their homeland is source of pain, but it still is their homeland. Participant 
#28 reaffirmed this idea of homeland as a special place when she stated, “I am my country; I am 
my ethnic group. It is on my mind, my language, my dreams, and blood.” She went on by saying 
“what saddens me is that I will probably die here, away from my country.” The oldest generation 
does not see any hope to ever go back home. The land they left behind has changed and is not the 
same as they remember.
Even the younger people who were born in Belgium or were brought there at a young age 
have an interesting connection to Rwanda. Participant #23 elaborated on Rwanda by saying, “I am 
a Rwandan, who was born in Belgium, grew up in Belgium, but Rwanda is my heart, my blood, 
and it is my heritage.” The country they know was created through their parents’ memories and 
stories. The land they cherish is challenged by the current Rwanda. Perhaps accepting that Rwanda 
would most likely never be the same is part of the daily struggle they have to deal with. Participant 
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#16 said, “Rwanda is not the Rwanda we knew back then. The only thing we can pass on to our 
children is their brain.”
Sadly, according to the participants, Rwanda has become a faraway, almost unreachable 
homeland for Hutus. Its president and politics have limited critical thinking and open dialogue. 
The few that had gone back said that Rwanda is not what they once knew or what they had hoped. 
Participant #4 explained that there is “still pain in the air, even on the surface, we can feel unease.” 
Participant #12 said, “Rwandan politics is a lost cause. Look at those who go back and try to change 
things, they end up in prison.” This sense of unease is mostly based on the facts that Rwanda is not 
a democratic country, its laws are discriminatory, and its president is believed to have committed 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide, according to many participants.43 
Rwanda and its narrative have become a very heavy burden for the new generations. Participant #15 
described the dominant and oppressive environment that has been imposed onto them. He stated, 
When we hear “Rwandan,” we hear genocide. I don’t think that there is a Rwandan on the 
earth who is proud to hear the word genocide, which made them deny their identity. When 
we hear ‘Hutu’ it is even worse. People see genocidaire; if you did not commit the genocide, 
your parents did.
Although they are in diaspora, Rwanda’s politics still affect them. One important point of 
agreement for all the participants is the role of President Kagame in the atrocities committed prior, 
during, and post-1994 genocide. Participant #3 raised several questions in which President Kagame 
is portrayed as the source of all conflict. He said, “What did Rwandans do, what did we do to 
God to give us a criminal like Kagame … Kagame is not only a criminal, he is a genocidaire … 
how can the international community support a genocidal regime?” Participant #14 continued by 
saying, “President Kagame committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide. 
He does not hide it in his speeches. Those who believe that he did not are mistaken.” Participant #7 
stated, “Justice in Rwanda needs to be based on democracy and there is no justice in Rwanda, it is 
only partial. Because the current government was involved in the genocide, justice can’t happen.” 
This idea that President Kagame is source of all problem in Rwanda and abroad undermines or 
questions the sincerity behind the different initiatives undertaken by the Rwanda government 
to reach out to all its diaspora community. It also reinforces the idea that the Hutu diaspora is 
dangerous to the ideology President Kagame has imposed on Rwanda. The participants see no real 
common peace, reconciliation, or sense of justice in their current homeland.
Therefore, according to the participants, a new regime needs to be established, and Kagame and 
the RPF should not be part of it. Rwanda needs to become democratic and most of all needs to have 
real justice, the participants tended to believe, not the justice created and implemented by Kagame. 
Participant #40 believes that “as long as Kagame is in power or protected by the international 
community, we [Hutus] are doomed to be the villains.” Participant #17 went on by saying “Today, 
we are the Palestinians; the only problem is that we don’t have intifada and don’t have terrorists. 
Who knows, maybe we are creating the terrorists of tomorrow?” This distinction between Hutus 
43 Much scholarship has sought to demonstrate that the over-simplified narrative of the Rwandan genocide has 
limited the justice and reconciliation processes. By focusing on the crimes committed by extremists Hutu and not 
investigating all the crimes, even those committed by the RPA and RPF government, the international community 
has allowed President Kagame to be seen as a model of peace while ignoring or pushing aside many of the atrocities 
for which he is responsible. As early as 1995, Alison Des Forges wrote a Human Rights report detailing all the 
crimes committed by the RPF and the decisions taken to either explain or ignore some of their implications. She 
argued, “The RPF massacred groups of unarmed civilians at a number of locations in eastern, central, and southern 
Rwanda after combat was finished and the government forces were gone from the area. These deliberate slaughters 
of noncombatants were clear violations of international humanitarian law” (Des Forges 1995, 401). Helen Hintjens 
expressed concerns about the not so peaceful future of Rwanda when she talked about the “renewed threats of 
civil war and genocide” that are often explored in the academic spheres (Hintjens 2008, 8). Filip Reyntjens detailed 
the body of literature and Human Rights organization reports that demonstrate the systematic violence the RPF is 
responsible for, especially in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. Finally, international organizations such as 
Amnesty International, African Watch, Organization of African Unity have reported that the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
committed crimes against humanity as early as 1990 and continued in the 2000s. 
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and Tutsis goes against the Rwandan government’s national identity policy. The policy might seem 
like a step toward to reconciliation but it is very widely criticized by all the participants. Policies 
such as the national identity have increased the criticism of the government and cast shadows over 
the justice system. Most participants thought it was contradictory for the government to use Tutsi 
narratives to present or portray the genocide and then illegalize the use of ethnicity, since Hutus 
are not seen as victims of the atrocities. According to Participant #7, this has made the reconciliation 
process unsuccessful. Participant #10 stated, “in the case of Rwanda, many feel that there was not 
justice. The Hutu, as a victim, he was never been heard in the local, regional, or international 
court.” He said of the term genocide, “The problem is its application. The discussion is that the 
amount of death responds to the criteria, but the circumstances were so mysterious that it does 
not always fit all the criteria.” Very critical of the different laws and initiatives the international 
community and President Kagame have established, the participants emphasized the importance 
of mutual dialogues among both Hutus and Tutsi as groups, and not under the umbrella of the 
imposed national identity policy. Many stressed that the recognition of their ethnic victimhood is 
essential for the reconciliation process and the creation of a new homeland. 
Homeland and Victimhood Narratives
Before exploring the idea of homeland and victimhood, it is essential to mention that not everybody 
associates these two ideas (homeland and victimhood) with each other. Many did distance 
themselves from these concepts, trying to move on and begin a new life in Belgium. Yet, the idea 
of the only so-called real victims of genocide were the Tutsi victims, not Hutus, was a significant 
theme in the interviews. Participant #10 shared his opinion on this, saying, “I just want the world 
to know that I am innocent. I shouldn’t apologize for other’s mistakes… my family lost loved 
ones, where is the justice there?” Participant #32 also shared her pain by saying, “What about 
my loved ones who were murdered? Because I am not Tutsi, I cannot be called a victim.” This 
normative narrative that was created along the lines of victim and perpetrator, hero and villain, 
portray the dilemma many express. The single narrative of Hutu perpetrator and Tutsi victim has 
reinforced the pain and trauma the participants expressed when they talked about their personal 
suffering and their family lost. Many have lost family members, and struggle to reconcile their lack 
of recognition. Participant #41 expressed his dilemma by stating,
I have a hole in my heart. I grew up without my parents, so what kind of man am I supposed 
to become? If I am my father’s son and my grandfather’s grandson, then I am nothing more 
than a memory. My identity was shaped by my lost ones and the lies people tell about my 
people. I am a victim.
Hintjens echoed their concerns and pain by arguing “Hutu killed or injured because they refused to 
kill Tutsi, refused to use a gun, sought not to inform or tried to protect Tutsis [or simply refused to 
participate to the atrocities], should be considered victims of genocide, or survivors.”44 Participant 
#18 explained the level of trauma and victimization that most Hutu have to live with when she 
says, “Now people called what happened to them a ‘Hidden Pain.’ We are only surviving. There is 
not justice for Rwandans, only Tutsi justice. We show a good image but what is in our heart is not 
that, we are hurt, we have hatred.” Because of that she believes that people cannot forget. “How 
can I forget that my parents were killed, that my brother disappeared, that my loved one were 
killed that same day? I cannot forget.” This lack of the recognition of the Hutu victimhood seems to 
have affected interview subjects’ narratives of the events. The idea of forgive and forget has shaped 
their understanding of the reconciliation process. Not allowing them to mourn for their loved ones 
has pushed them to ask questions regarding the meaning of the justice process so highly spoken 
about in Rwanda. 
In addition to feeling a lack of victimhood and believing that Kagame and his regime need to 
change, most participants struggle with the term genocide. They have a hard time agreeing on using 
44 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 23.
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the term and its meaning in the case of Rwanda. Some denied it and others talked about a double 
genocide. For some, even the definition of genocide is problematic. Participant #10 explained, “We 
still need to work on the definition of genocide in Rwanda, because many people’s stories don’t fit 
the narrative.” Many of the participants reject the idea that what happened between April and July 
of 1994 was premeditated or deliberate, which is essential in the definition of genocide. Participant 
#18 elaborated this idea by saying, “based on my experience, there was not premeditation. Before 
the war, we used to live together. We were fine. When the RPF attacked Rwanda that is when the 
ethnicity became salient. Before then, we were fine.” Participant #11 expressed the same concerns 
when stating, “the word genocide is not properly used, but that is because of [the] media and 
propaganda. The RPF [was] the one that premeditated the genocide and helped it take place.” 
Many interview subjects disagreed with the genocide being depicted as one single event, with out 
any background context in most cases. For them, the civil wars that preceded the genocide, and 
the years that followed it, are as significant as the notorious 100 days in 1994 because this historical 
context helps portray a larger and more complicated picture, and helps redefine the understanding 
and symbolism behind narratives of perpetration and victimhood. Consequently, in order to really 
understand the civil war and genocide that took place, we should not limit the discussion to 1994, 
Participant #45 said. Participant #11 added, “Too often, people limit themselves at the 1994 period, 
and there forget the 1990 civil war and after July 1994. There have been other atrocities, so it is 
difficult to forget.” A large number of the participants follow the same reasoning as Participant #11, 
and blame the Rwandan government for focusing on one particular series of events in 1994 and 
dismissing the rest of the violence before and after as less severe because it was not genocide, and 
thereby institutionalizing the genocide narrative in Rwanda and abroad that Hutus were uniformly 
perpetrators and Tutsis were uniformly victims. It is believed that the general understanding on 
the genocide and the world’s attitude toward the victim and perpetrator labels have helped shape 
the dominant categorization created in the post-Rwandan genocide. By not linking the Rwandan 
civil war and the atrocities that took place after July 1994, the separation between the victims (Tutsi) 
and perpetrators (Hutu) is reinforced. 
In addition to that, the term double genocide was mentioned several times regarding the 
1994 genocide and the years that followed. Participant #16 stated, “In Rwanda, [there] was a Tutsi 
genocide, but there was also another genocide that started in 1990 that continued until 1999, 
against Hutu. Using the term double genocide is not denial [of] the Tutsi genocide. One genocide 
plus one genocide equal two not zero.” The same participant, Participant #11, continued, “the term 
Rwandan Genocide does not make sense, because we will need to know who and against who. It 
is more appropriate to say genocide against Hutu and a genocide against Tutsi.” Participant #14 
stated “there was a Tutsi genocide in 1994, and a genocide of Hutu in the refugee camps and DRC 
[Democratic Republic of Congo], post-1994.” As noted in many cases, there is an irony behind using 
the term “genocide against Tutsi.” The participants agreed that if there is legally no ethnic groups 
in Rwanda, but only Rwandans, it is a paradox to create a narrative that would be so forcefully 
promoting the use of ethnicity as a way to understand the genocide, to rebuild the country, and 
promote reconciliation. 
Interestingly, even the initial date of the genocide is contested.45 Participant #3 stated that 
“April 7th [the day the genocide started according to the Rwandan government] does not represent 
anything; it is only a political move made by the RPF and Kagame.” Participant 7 elaborated by 
saying that “April 6th is a dangerous date for the RPF because two Hutu presidents were assassinated. 
On this date, it is implied that justice is needed, which scares Kagame.” Both participants point out 
that Rwanda is very politicized. The dates that are supposed to be representing the beginning of 
the genocide are contested among the groups. According to Participant #3, the date that should be 
considerate is April 6 not April 7. Participant #7 states that April 7 was chosen in order to hide the 
shooting down of the presidential plane, which was according to him, executed by the RPF. The 
official state narrative, Participant #7 made clear, benefits from forgetting that the 1994 genocide 
45 Out of the 46 interviews conducted, 28 specially talked about the fact that within a larger Rwandan community around 
the world, the narrative of when the genocide began is contested and highly political. Additionally, 21 participants 
said it began on April 6th, at the assassination of President Habyarimana. Seven said it began on April 7th. 
Kuradusenge
73
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
started with the killing of a Hutu president. In their interviews, both participants stressed that the 
date selected as the beginning of the 1994 genocide was a political move the RPF made in order to 
hide their actions in instigating the cycle of violence that ultimately resulted in the genocide, and 
to suppress the Hutu victimhood of that same cycle of violence. 
Finally, the participants feel that even their status as a Diaspora community is controversial 
and contested by the Rwandan government. Participant #17 explained this point by saying that 
“according to the Rwandan government, Diaspora is only for Tutsi. You and I [Hutus] are not 
recognized as Diaspora.” Participant #11 added,
Here [in Belgium] the Diaspora is composed of the embassy representatives or RPF allies. It 
is like we are not allowed to be called Diaspora. For example, if there is a celebration, you 
cannot go because you don’t belong or are [not] recognized as Diaspora. If you go, you can 
be physically harmed.
Participant #13 stressed the issue of diaspora by stating “Diaspora, which Diaspora are we 
talking about? Last time I check[ed], Diaspora is only for Tutsi. Here, I am a Rwandan who is 
not allowed to be himself and enjoy his heritage.” Yet, they used the word Diaspora to describe 
Hutu communities of Rwandans. Participant #17 said, “as Diaspora, the first responsibility is to 
understand why we left home, the second is to accept his or her Rwandan identity in exile, and the 
third is to understand why we are Hutu in exile.” Not being accepted as part of the Diaspora, or 
part of the victim Diaspora, the participants are part of a group the Rwandan government contests, 
or at least questions, and attempts to delegitimize by saying that if they really wanted to go back to 
Rwanda, they could do it. To move from being part of the negative diaspora to the more accepted 
victim diaspora, the individuals would need to publically affirm and recognize the progress of the 
current Rwanda government and promote its narratives and sociopolitical evolution. 
 
Conclusion
Exploring the Belgian Hutu Diaspora allows scholars to look past the label of negative Diaspora 
imposed by the Rwandan government, to examine the different narratives that were created 
in after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Shaped by the labels created in the post 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, the people who live in these communities have experienced identity transformations 
that are not only influenced by the geographic location that defines their Diasporic status, but 
also by narratives created in Rwanda. The idea that only Hutus were perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide has influenced the participants’ narratives and their understanding of their position vis-
a-vis these narratives. These double or damaged identities helped mold their sense of otherness in 
relation to Rwanda, but also in the host-country Belgium. As many participants pointed to, their 
identities and stories were formed partially in response to the narrative established by the RPF, 
the party that emerged victorious from the Rwandan civil war in 1994, which was concretized 
through the National Identity policy under law N. 14/2008 on 04/06/2008, and Law N. 18/2008 
relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 
18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and S 
ectarianism. 
Transmitted from generation to generation, this narrative of trauma and otherness has become 
part of the daily struggle of the communities of the interview participants. The current Belgium 
Hutu Diaspora community is trying to made sense of its own struggle, with many fighting against 
what they see as unjust stigmatizations imposed on them by President Kagame’s regime. Some have 
returned to Rwanda to witness the changes and reconnect with their homeland, yet participants 
expressed an uncanny feeling regarding the culture of silence imposed by the law, and the self-
silencing the population of Rwanda has imposed on itself to avoid reparations and prosecution. 
The interview subjects expressed a sense that Rwanda has become an authoritarian country willing 
to scare individuals in the Diaspora and intimidate them into silence. This fear that their own 
narratives could endanger family members who remained in Rwanda, and the sense of alienation 
imposed upon Hutus living in Belgium, has shaped the way this Diaspora has responded to and 
coped with its stigmatizations. Seen and treated as the wrong kind of diaspora, they have formed 
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themselves as in opposing to the current government and, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, created 
counter-narratives that are, for many of them, rightly founded. 
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Abstract: During the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Hutu extremists who launched a propaganda campaign to 
demonize Rwandan Tutsis, accusing them of planning to exterminate Hutus. Embracing the propaganda, gangs of 
Hutus went on a killing rampage, rooming the streets and ravaging Tutsis who fell prey to their assaults. Yet, the 
framing of Hutus as perpetrators cannot capture the work of those Hutus who actively offered assistance to Tutsis. 
These Hutus provided safe haven, essential material goods and emotional support to an unknown number of Tutsis. 
Why did these Hutus risk their lives to save Tutsis? In addressing this question, we provide the results of a study 
in which a small number of Hutu explained their actions. In a clear case of altruism, their efforts arose from their 
moral obligation to others, an obligation that centers on their good heart. A good heart is a physical embodiment 
of their wisdom to discover the righteous path, compassion for the suffering of others, and courage to overcome the 
fear in of their own suffering in carrying out the commands of their faith.
Keywords: genocide, Rwanda, Hutus, Tutsis, assistance
Introduction1
In 1994 a wave of mass killings swept through the small country of Rwanda—Hutu extremists 
orchestrating a campaign of extermination against Tutsis. Under the control of these extremists, 
government forces joined two large militias groups—the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi—
in torrents of genocidal violence. A watershed moment that sparked the outbreak of the genocide 
was the death of the Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana, when his plane was shot down on 
April 6, 1994. The Hutu government accused the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of 
orchestrating the president’s assassination, accusing the RPF of state treason. As the anti-Tutsi 
rhetoric escalated, collective fears of Tutsi conquest spread like wildfire. 
The violence that followed was not merely a spontaneous eruption of rage. Meticulous 
plans for Tutsi extermination were fine-tuned by strategists. The state-run military made lists of 
important Tutsis to be killed first, followed by their families and neighbors.2 The militants, who 
were predominantly young men, set up roadblocks and scoured communities where Tutsis could 
be hiding. Most attacks occurred in public places—schools, churches, marketplaces, roads and 
open fields. Militia groups also attacked Tutsis in their homes. Many Hutus were slaughtered in the 
process because they were perceived to have physical characteristics that are commonly associated 
with Tutsis, such as high cheekbones, or because of their economic status, such as owning cattle. 
The number of people who directly participated in the slaughter ranged from 175,000 to 210,000.3 
The genocide ended only after the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the genocidal Hutu 
forces. By the end of the genocide, 800,000 Rwandans were murdered—one sixth of the country’s 
population. At least 500,000 were Tutsis.4 Yet, memorials in Rwanda to the genocidal violence have 
prompted considerable controversy, as Elisabeth King has shown.5
1 We wish to thank the anonymous readers for providing valuable observations and recommendations for changes to 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
2 Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 179.
3 Scott Straus, “How Many Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004), 94. 
4 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 105.
5 Elisabeth King, “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peacebuilding,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 5, no. 3 (December 2010), 293-309.
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But an unknown number of Hutu civilians resisted demands by the state military and local 
militias to deliver Tutsis over for the slaughter. These Hutus secretly offered Tutsis safe haven, 
material assistance, and emotional comfort. In some cases sympathetic Hutus directly confronted 
the militia groups, imploring them to stop killing Tutsis. While some would-be rescuers did 
succeed in saving Tutsis, an unknown number of them failed—and were themselves murdered in 
the process. 
And herein lies the question: Why did some Hutus find the anti-Tutsi propaganda spurious, 
while a majority of Hutus accepted the messages of hatred and fear as truth? Why did some Hutus 
put their own lives on the line to save Tutsis? Addressing these questions, we examined the motives 
and conscious reasons for a select group of Hutus who sought to rescue Tutsis. For this research we 
drew upon the testimony of thirty-three self-identifying rescuers who were interviewed in Rwanda 
between July and August of 2010. At the time of this research approximately forty Rwandans were 
officially recognized as rescuers, with time and resources allowing for thirty-three interviews 
to be obtained for this study. The interviewees were selected by two Rwandan NGOs—Memos 
and IBUKA. Beginning in 2007, these two NGOs were responsible for identifying and officially 
recognizing Rwandan rescuers through a three-step process in order to assure the integrity of the 
rescuer title and prevent any fraudulent claims. First, the staff members would gather testimony 
of those survivors who claimed that they were rescued by a Hutu during the genocide. Second, 
an official from one of the NGOs would engage in an in-depth investigation of the claims for their 
accuracy. The investigator interviewed the potential rescuer without identifying their intention to 
identify rescuers, but just asking more general questions about the potential rescuer’s experience 
during the genocide. If the potential rescuer claims to have helped Tutsis during the genocide, the 
investigator would then interview any witnesses (i.e. neighbors, family members) to corroborate 
the rescuer testimony. The investigation process was designed to ensure that potential rescuers 
were not motivated by the lure of personal gain, and were simply acting in accord with a genuine 
intention to help. Third, staff members of the investigating NGO would render a judgment about 
the authenticity of the rescue itself. Currently, this is the only method of rescuer validation. For 
the purpose of this paper we rely on this methodology for officially recognizing rescuers, which 
depends heavily on the narrative and interpretative accounts of the rescuers’ memory of such 
events. Moreover, we do not claim to extend our findings to all rescuers.  
Regarding the identification of rescuers in Rwanda, Lee Ann Fujii argues that the strict duality 
between perpetrators of genocidal violence and rescuers is quite misleading, since some people 
who acted to persecute Tutsis sometimes also acted to offer them aid.6 However, in Rwanda the 
official title of rescuer was granted by these two NGOs only to those for whom there was no 
evidence of any act of persecuting or harming Tutsis. Individuals who both participated in violence 
against certain Tutsis but then helped others were not declared to be rescuers.
Among the thirty-three interviewees, twenty-six were male and seven were female. Twenty-
nine self-identified as Christians—Protestants, Catholics or Seventh-Day Adventists—one was 
Muslim, and three held the traditional beliefs of ancient Rwandans before Christianity came to the 
country. Five identified as poor, twenty as being well off and eight as rich. The SES classification 
used by the Rwandan rescuers interviewed differs from western SES categories. According to these 
rescuers, “well off” was quantified as owning land and cows and being able to afford school fees, 
with “rich” referring to having a lot of cows, land, and possibly cars. Regarding educational status, 
three held a university degree, three attended vocational or secondary school, seventeen attended 
or completed primary school, nine had no formal education and one was unknown. 
Most of the interviews took place in a Kagali hotel or in the rescuers’ homes, which were often 
in close proximity to the rescue efforts. All the interviews were conducted in the local language, 
Kinyarwandan, with subsequent translation to English. Each interview took two to three hours, 
with audio and video recordings for all but two of them. A semi-structured interview format was 
utilized, which included questions meant to obtain demographic information about the rescuers’ 
6 Lee Ann Fujii, “Rescuers and Killer-Rescuers during the Rwanda Genocide: Rethinking Standard Categories of 
Analysis,” in Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue, ed. Jacques Semelin et al. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 145-157.
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lives before the genocide, their experiences and actions during the genocide, their reasons for 
rescuing and what rescuing meant to them, as well as how their lives had been impacted since 
the genocide. (See Appendix for interview questions.) All these questions were posed to each 
interviewee in the order given below in the Appendix. Thematic analysis was deployed to all of 
the testimony for this research. The key points of the testimony were coded using the speaker’s 
language, followed by the construction of categories that captured the interviewees’ primary 
themes. 
We believe that the investigation of rescuers during the Rwandan genocide is under-examined 
by academic studies of the Rwandan genocide, most of which focus primarily on the Tutsis’ 
suffering and Hutu killers’ motives, means, and mindset. Elisabeth King provides an excellent 
analysis of the memorials in Rwanda to the genocidal violence and the politics of creating public 
spaces for the victims. Two studies of rescuers acting during the Rwandan genocide are from 
Charles Kabwete Mulinda and Fujii.7 In 2004, the Kigali Genocide Memorial opened, using exhibits 
and documentation as a form of education and genocide prevention. Initially focusing mostly on 
survivors’ experiences, the memorial currently houses twenty-eight rescuer testimonies on their 
website. 
We provide a broader historical context for rescuing under conditions of genocidal violence with 
a summary in section 1 of the rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. Then in section 2 we examine 
the Hutus’ rescue efforts in Rwanda, defining such efforts in three distinct stages. In section 3 we 
present our findings about the motivations of the Hutu rescuers, with special emphasis on the role 
models that influenced their sense of self in relation to others. These motivations are then examined 
in section 4, specifically in relation to how the lessons the rescuers learned from their role models 
motivated their efforts to save Tutsis. We found that each Hutu interviewed purported to act out of 
compassion by offering Tutsis safe haven while knowingly placing themselves in mortal danger. 
We conclude in section 5 with summary observations about the rescuers’ sense of moral conviction 
drawn from the lessons they learned from their experiences during the genocidal violence. 
We recognize that the term “rescuer” implies a savior, one who frees someone from confinement, 
or delivers from bondage. In recent years, some analysts have raised questions about the merits 
of using this term as a primary category of study. They argue that the term “rescuer” does not 
adequately capture the fact that, during the Holocaust, some Germans sought to offer assistance, 
comfort or support to Jews escaping the Nazi terror without actually saving them outright. A wide 
range of activities have been documented about individual acts of assistance to Jews. The term 
“helpers” is now widely used in place of “rescuers” to represent those people who sought to offer 
aid of any form to those targeted by perpetrators of genocidal violence.8 While finding merit in this 
use of “helpers,” we recognize that the interviewees gathered for this research on the Rwandan 
genocide were identified as rescuers by the NGOs with whom we worked. We defer to their usage 
of this term.
Rescuers of the Holocaust 
To provide historical context to the rescuer efforts in Rwanda, we turn to the similar efforts of 
civilians living under Nazi occupation during World War II. The number of active rescuers during 
the Nazi occupation of Europe is low, comprising only one half of one percent of the total civilian 
population.9 
In the earlier writings on rescuers of World War II, many researchers advanced the notion that 
rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust represent a clear case of altruism, with the understanding 
7 Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “Crossing a Border to Escape: Examples from the Gishamvu and Kigembe Communities 
of Rwanda,” in Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue, ed. Jacque Semelin, et al. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 345-361; Fujii, “Rescuers and Killer,” 145-157.
8 Christian Gudehus, “Helping the Persecuted. Heuristics and Perspectives (exemplified by the Holocaust),” Online 
Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (2016), accessed August 17, 2016, http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/helping-persecuted-heuristics-and-perspectives-exemplified-holocaust.
9 Pearl M. Oliner and Samuel P. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: Free Press, 
1988), 8.
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that altruism is exhibited by some people for certain reasons under certain situations. What exactly 
is the meaning of altruism when referring to people who offer assistance to persecuted group 
members in the context of genocidal violence? Many researchers addressing this question endorse 
the presence of an altruistic personality, which is characterized by behavior that is perceived to 
be more kind, compassionate and helpful in comparison to others.10 Even the advocates for the 
presence of an altruistic personality—or some form of pro-social personality—recognize the critical 
importance of situational factors, that the character and kind of altruistic personality exhibit rests 
on situational factors.11
One definition of altruism given by Oliner and Oliner rests on four defining factors.12 First, 
the rescuers intentionally aided Jews who were clearly in peril, offering them safe haven, material 
assistance, or psychological comfort. Second, the rescuers acted of their own free will—they were 
not compelled, commanded, or coerced to take such actions by outside forces, such as a militant 
group of partisans. According to one study, ninety-nine percent of the Holocaust rescuers were 
aware at the time of their efforts of the Nazi campaign to exterminate the Jews. Interestingly, this 
awareness of the Nazis’ regime was not limited to the Holocaust rescuers. Most non-rescuing 
civilians also knew about the extermination campaign during the war. But unlike the rescuers, these 
civilians acted from the standpoint of self-survival, fearing more the consequences they might face 
for helping the Jews, if discovered by German military forces—as if declaring, “They should take 
care of themselves; we have our own problems.”13 Third, rescuers recognized the mortal dangers 
that such deeds posed; they understood that, if caught, the authorities would execute them and 
their loved ones. Fourth, rescuers did not expect material or tangible reward for their efforts from 
anyone, including those seeking safe haven. Explanations for the rescuer’s deeds—why they risked 
their lives to save Jews during the war—have been elusive. These rescuers do not fit easily into a 
single sociopolitical category. In one study, many rescuers drew upon their moral conscience as a 
powerful psychic drive. For example, some rescues were driven by their ethical beliefs that made it 
imperative to help those in need. Other rescuers grounded their actions in socialist or communist 
doctrine, which called for resistance against the Nazi invaders.14 Still others were driven by a strong 
emotional attachment to individual Jews for whom the rescuers had special feelings or love, or to 
the Jewish people as a whole. The famous case of Oscar Schindler to save Jews illustrates how 
many Polish rescuers had some special affinity toward Jews.15
But these rescuers did not limit their efforts merely to friends. In fact, approximately half 
of the people that the rescuers sought to save were total strangers to them. The relationship 
between rescuers and those rescued as reported by Jewish survivors is as follows: Strangers, 51%; 
Acquaintances, 21%; Friends, 19%; and Work with commercial ties, 9% (out of total number of 
412).16
In one study, the explanation for their rescue efforts is moralistic, with most rescuers coming 
from families with strongly held humanitarian values. When asked about their motivation, most 
rescuers (87%) invoked their deep ethical commitment to care for those in danger, grounded in a 
10 Hans W. Bierhoff, Renate Klein, and Peter Kamp, “Evidence for the Altruistic Personality from Data on Accident 
Research,” Journal of Personality 59, (1991), 263-280; William A. Galston, “Cosmopolitan Altruism,” Social Philosophy 
and Social Policy 10, (1993), 118-134; Dennis L. Krebs and Frank Van Hesteren, “The Development of Altruistic 
Personality,” in Embracing the Other: Philosophical, Psychological, and Historical Perspectives on Altruism, ed. Pearl 
M. Oliner, et al. (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 1142-69; Oliner and Oliner, “Promoting Extensive 
Altruistic Bonds: A Conceptual Elaboration and Some Pragmatic Implications,” in Embracing the Other, 369-389; Van 
Hesteren, “The Self in Moral Agency: Toward a Theoretical Model of the Ideal Altruistic Personality,” in Embracing the 
Other, 170-193. 
11 Frederico Varese and Meir Yaish, “Resolute Heroes: The Rescue of Jews During the Nazi Occupation of Europe,” 
European Journal of Sociology 46 (2005), 153-168.
12 Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 173, 249, 299.
13 Ibid., 289.
14 Eva Fogelman, Conscience and Courage: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 162-164. 
15 Ibid., 182-185.
16 Nechama Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 227.
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strong belief in universal humanism, in particular, the belief in the inherent worth of each person.17 
For a majority of these rescuers, this belief was not driven by their religious convictions, and the 
rescuers’ religious affiliations were not significantly different from those of non-rescuers—the 
range of participation in religious traditions was approximately identical for both groups.18 Yet the 
moral imperative to care for those in peril motivated them in their efforts to save Jews, particularly 
after witnessing Nazi brutality against Jews in their community.19 
During their efforts to save Jews, the moral bonds between rescuers and Jews intensified 
through the shared experience of the rescue acts themselves.20 Each episode of saving Jews brought 
personal satisfaction, a deep sense of pleasure in knowing that their deeds had such a profound 
moral impact.21 This self-satisfaction should not be confused with selfishness. The rescuers also 
experienced significant psychological distress from the intense fears that accompanied their 
courageous but dangerous actions. In Poland, for example, the hatred of Germans at that time 
contributed directly to rescuers’ empathy for the Jews, in part because Polish non-Jews experienced 
mass executions on a scale comparable to that of Polish Jews. Stunned by the Nazi brutality against 
the Jews, the Polish rescuers were driven by three primary motivations: political convictions, 
religious teaching, or moralistic lessons from family members such as parental figures.22 For 
example, a minority of Polish rescuers found inspiration in the humanist themes of Christianity. 
Some of these rescuers were priests motivated by the Christian values to show compassion, charity 
and generosity to those in need.23 In like manner, some Catholic bishops in France, Belgium, 
Holland and Italy openly denounced Nazi policies against the Jews.24 But religious conviction does 
not always correlate to efforts to save Jews.25 Many other priests, and parishioners with strong 
religious convictions, retained strong anti-Semitic sentiments stemming from a long tradition of 
bigotry against Jews by the Catholic Church in Poland. Some priests in Poland implored their 
congregants to denounce the Jews and report their presence to local officials; such priests declared 
that good Catholics should obey local authorities about political matters such as the treatment of 
Jews.26 In a later article Tec qualifies significantly her earlier claims about the altruistic action of 
rescuers, acknowledging those cases where the rescuing behavior of Gentiles was motivated by a 
desire for profit from the persecuted Jews.27 
Many of the early studies cited above of rescuers of Jews offer empirically rich examination 
of the rescuers’ motives for saving Jews, their character traits and their assumptions before and 
during the Holocaust about Jews. Most of the primary source data gathered for these studies came 
from interviews and questionnaires of the rescuers years after the war ended. But some analysts 
have questioned the veracity of such data since it rests on memory and memory can be fallible for 
a variety of reasons. Many psychologists have shown that memory is not a passive receptacle of 
pure “content” that presumably represents a true picture of the past and that memory of the past is 
never “carried down in pure form.” Memory is always subject to reinterpretation.28 Memory alters 
during one’s life, impacted by one’s emotions, moralistic commitments regarding notions of right 
or wrong, and one’s self-image in relation to others.29 Recognizing such fallibility, for purposes 
17 Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 163-164.
18 Ibid., 156, 289.
19 Peter Suedfeld and Stefanie de Best, “Value Hierarchies of Holocaust Rescuers and Resistance Fighters,” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 3, no. 1 (2008), 38-40. 
20 Ibid., 38-39.
21 Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 249.
22 Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, 189. 
23 Ibid., 137.
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of this study we adopt a narrative perspective on memory, according to which narratives of the 
past have their own history, and they are subject to reshaping, fine-tuning, revising, and ignoring 
elements of one’s memory over time. In memory we take on multiple roles of a drama, becoming 
the drama’s author, primary character and outside critic. 
More recent studies of rescuing behavior in the context of the Holocaust have produced an 
extensive body of findings from a variety of research perspectives. Each perspective offers an 
analytical lens that rests on a model for understanding the breadth and depth of such behavior 
and related social processes. Of course, for each perspective the salience given to certain kinds 
of categories and processes has its limitations, blocking access to other sorts of categories and 
processes. We mention briefly four examples of such perspectives, with the understanding that a 
detailed summary of all of these perspectives surpasses the scope of this article. 
1. One perspective privileges situational factors as motivating certain people to offer aid 
to those persecuted. For example, in one study German Gentiles were confronted by 
persecuted Jews who were pleading for their assistance, offering Gentiles a situation 
in which the opportunity for helping them arose. In others cases the pleas to would-be 
helpers did not come from the Jews directly but were conveyed by third party surrogates 
who sought assistance on behalf of the Jews.30 To be sure, the expressed motivation to offer 
assistance did not always conform to the “helpers” action. Abusive behavior by Gentiles 
was not uncommon, such as demands for payment or for sexual favors from Jews. 
2. In another perspective researchers give primacy to character traits of so-called “doers” 
that are evidence in their tendency to take responsibility for the course of events, to make 
independent interpretations of the situation before them and to render judgments that 
may deviate from those of others.31
3. The network perspective focuses on the influence of social groups that offer aid and/or 
support to those persecuted, reflecting networks of social relations. During World War II, 
some networks of relations were created before the genocidal violence erupted while other 
networks were formed during the violence. In one study a socialist group that flourished in 
Germany before the war—the Bund—offers sanctuary to Jews in Nazi Europe. In another 
study of a Holocaust survivor, the researcher categorizes the kind of help received as food, 
accommodations, money, and assistance in brokering connections with others.32 
4. Some researchers adopt an historical-societal perspective in arguing that the chances of 
European Jews surviving Nazi occupation depended upon certain historical and social 
conditions. For example, one study shows that the probability of survival is correlated to a 
relatively high number of Catholics in the area where Jews sought help.33 Other researchers 
deploy a broader analytical lens by probing the social-political-historical conditions 
that existed during and prior to efforts to assist Jews. One researcher explains the acts 
of rescuing Jews during World War II by examining the social contexts in which such 
acts occurred, such as cohesiveness of the prewar Jewish communities, the integration 
of these communities to larger non-Jewish society; and the prewar history of defying, or 
not, the authorities. In conjunction to these contextual factors, individual motivations for 
rescuing Jews were identified, such as religious conviction, humanitarian commitments, 
friendship, rejection of Nazi policies, and financial gain.34 We should not interpret such 
of Mass Violence (2014), accessed February 19. 2016, http://www.massviolence.org/Aid-Offered-Jews-in-Nazi-Germany.
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perspectives as mutually exclusive; elements from multiple perspectives can be combined 
to account for the evidence on a case-by-case basis. We agree with those analysts who 
argue that a comprehensive study of helping requires attention to multiple perspectives 
that draw attention to some combination of behavior, motivations, situational factors, 
social networks and character traits.35
In our study of rescuers of Rwanda, we find relevance to factors from the above four 
perspectives, that is, to the situation of being confronted by persecuted Tutsis, the self-sense of 
taking responsibility for aiding Tutsis in clear defiance of the Hutu extremists orchestrating the 
propaganda campaign against Tutsis, a network of social relations to influential figures in their 
lives, and, to a lesser degree, the historical-social context.  
Rescuing in Rwanda: As a Complex Interaction 
Based on narrative analysis of the interviewees’ testimony, we focus on the rescuers’ interactions with 
Tutsis seeking sanctuary and their confrontation with the killers themselves. Probing their stated 
reasons for offering aid to Tutsis, we explore their beliefs before the genocide, their perceptions of 
the killers, and their apparent motives, rationale, and reasons for taking such risks. We give special 
attention to role of influential figures in their lives, those individuals who presumably gave them 
a moral education, instilling in them normative notions about what is morally right and wrong in 
relations with others. We begin with an account of the act—or, more accurately, acts—comprised 
by the rescue. 
The process of rescuing Tutsis in Rwanda was neither momentary nor limited to a single 
action. Many rescue efforts began incrementally, hiding a few individuals for a short period of 
time. As word of the rescue efforts spread throughout the community, more Tutsis would appear 
at the rescuers’ homes, pleading for a safe haven. Before long, the act of sheltering a small number 
of Tutsis burgeoned to many, and their length of stay increased from a few days to many weeks. 
As the murderous gangs began to catch wind of the growing rescuing efforts, some rescuers took 
precautionary action by transporting Tutsis to Burundi or Zaire, using forged IDs or pretending 
that the rescuers were the parents of transported children. 
Based on a distillation of testimony of interviewees, their rescue efforts involve three distinct 
stages: (1) witnessing the brutal treatment that Tutsis faced, either through direct observation or 
word-of-mouth, (2) finding and offering assistance to at least one Tutsi who faced mortal danger, 
and (3) interacting directly with the killers who were searching for Tutsis. 
(1) 
In the prelude to the 1994 genocide, Hutu extremists launched an intense media campaign prior 
to the genocidal violence, spreading tales of Tutsi plans to conquer Rwanda and brutalize Hutus. 
After Hutu extremists established the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in 1993, they 
dominated the airwaves with horrific tales of Tutsis committing atrocities against the oppressed 
Hutus. Stoking the flames of aggression, the broadcasters reiterated the accusation that the Tutsi 
people planned to conquer the nation by infiltrating major institutions and claimed that Tutsis 
disguised their real intention of ultimate domination by lulling innocent Hutus into complacency.36 
Broadcasters implored listeners to vent their anger by calling into the radio station and sharing 
their stories of power-hungry and domineering Tutsis. With such broadcasts, Tutsi evil deeds 
became a topic of social fascination, bordering on obsession, for the callers. 
In like fashion, the newspaper Kangura ran story after story about Tutsi defects and offenses—
wickedness, obsession with power, and insatiable thirst for domination. One article recounted the 
alleged nefarious practice of Tutsi women seducing innocent and unsuspecting Hutu men, thereby 
producing hybrid descendants, within a larger political plot of total Rwandan conquest.37 Other 
storytellers invoked the genocide of World War II, portraying Hutus as the “Jews of Rwanda,” 
35 Gudehus, “Helping the Persecuted. Heuristics and Perspectives (exemplified by the Holocaust).”
36 Daniel Rothbart and Tom Bartlett, “Rwandan Radio and Hutu/Tutsi Positioning,” in Global Conflict Resolution through 
Positioning Theory, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam et al. (New York: Springer, 2008), 227-229. 
37 Josias Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), 196-97.
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on the brink of their own holocaust at the hands of the “Nazi” Tutsis. In stunning irony to this 
metaphor, the propagandists also depicted Tutsis as insects or snakes who slither through the dark, 
spreading their venom to innocent Rwandans—a chilling reminder of the insect images that Nazi 
propagandists used to dehumanize Jews. In one story published in Kangura, March 17–18, 1993, 
Tutsis were demonized as Inyenzi, or cockroaches: 
We are not mistaken in saying that a cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. All these 
attacks have as their objective to restore the monarchy and feudalism. The unimaginable 
crimes that the Inyenzi of today commit against the citizens remind one of those made by 
their ancestors: killing, plundering, raping girls, and women, and so on. If in our language 
someone calls something a snake, that by itself is enough.38 
Such propaganda, with its vile characterizations of Tutsis, constitutes a form of psychological violence. 
It had its intended effect on many Hutus, but not all. The Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who 
comprise the murderous gangs carrying out the genocidal violence, fully accepted the disseminated 
“truths” about Tutsi evils. For example, one such perpetrator of violence, in recounting his earlier 
belief that Tutsis were inherently subhuman, admitted, “We called them “cockroaches,” an insect 
that chews up clothing and nests in it, so you have to squash them hard to get rid of them. We 
didn’t want any more Tutsis on the land.”39 Another perpetrator, who served twelve years in prison 
for crimes committed during the genocide, recounts, “We no longer saw a human being when we 
turned up a Tutsi in the swamps.”40 Another perpetrator serving his twelve-year sentence in prison 
for murdering Tutsis recounts the days before and after the president’s death:
The radios were yammering at us since 1992 to kill all the Tutsis; there as anger after the 
president’s death and a fear of falling under the rule of the inkotanyi... The Hutu always 
suspects that some plans are cooking deep in the Tutsi character... He sees a threat lurking 
in even the feeblest or kindest Tutsi. But this is suspicion, not hatred. The hatred came over 
us suddenly after our president’s plan crashed. The intimidators shouted, “Just look at these 
cockroaches—we told you so!” And we yelled, “Right, let’s go hunting!”41 
The outset of the violence in April of 1994 was terrifying; the rescuers experienced intense fear at 
the sight of dead bodies in the streets, the sudden appearance of the Interahamwe prowling about, 
and the murmured stories of mass executions. A sense of dread washed over them, along with the 
feeling of impotence in the face of the overwhelming violence. Most of the interviewees claimed to 
have ignored the propaganda. One interviewee reported to have listened to the songs of the Hutu 
radio stations, but was disturbed by the hate-filled lyrics of music being blared in the streets: “I saw 
that there was a war behind these songs that would kill people.”42 
Rejecting the propaganda orchestrated by Hutu extremists, all the rescuers interviewed for 
this study resisted—and in some cases, actively obstructed—the killers’ extermination efforts. 
Their decision to protect Tutsis arose from the jarring experiences of witnessing or hearing about 
the violence in their midst. Prior to their rescue efforts, most interviewees directly observed 
government soldiers or Interahamwe killing local residents. One interviewee reported to have 
seen neighbors being killed, following by looting material items in the neighbors’ home.43 Another 
rescuer witnessed harassment of a Tutsi family living next door.44 Another rescuer reported that 
her father was killed because of his efforts to save Tutsis. He was targeted because his neighbors 
38 Chrétien, Jean-Paul and Reporters sans Frontières. Rwanda: Les médias du génocide (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1995), 275-276.
39 Hatzfeld, Machete Season, 231.
40 Ibid., 231.
41 Ibid., 219.
42 Participant #3. Identifying information such as names, professions, dates, and areas of residence is being withheld to 
protect the anonymity of the interviewees. Interviews are cited, herewith, according to the participant number.
43 Participant #1.
44 Participant #3.
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denounced him for listening to the pro-RPF radio broadcasts, which were cast as the “radio of the 
enemy.”45 
(2) 
For most interviewees, their rescuing efforts began with the desperate pleas of a few Tutsis. In one 
case a close friend came to the interviewee’s home, lamenting that “this is our last day and then you 
will escort us” referring to her burial.46 The rescuer invited her to her home and offered anything 
that she wanted. Many of the interviewed took it upon themselves to save children. In another case 
an interviewee witnessed people being killed while walking on the road. This rescuer picked up a 
young girl, who cried, “Please don’t kill me!” Comforting the girl, the rescuer, brought her to the 
rescuer’s home.47 Another interviewee reported how her husband sought to rescue three children, 
but he was discovered and killed.48 One rescuer took care of Tutsi children whose parents were 
killed.49 Another rescuer hid children—her own and others—in her home. When she heard a knock 
on the door, fearing the worst, this rescuer recounted how she told the children, “It is now our time 
to die; let’s be killed together.”50 But the knock came from a man seeking refuge for himself and his 
family, all of whom were strangers to this rescuer.51 
Some rescuers knew those whom they sought to save before the genocide. For example, a 
rescuer, who was known as a midwife, was approached by her patients. Bringing some to the 
hospital and others to her church, she claims to have saved thirty people.52 Other rescuers sought 
to protect both acquaintances and strangers. Five Tutsis stayed in one rescuer’s home and others 
(no numbers were specified) hid in the bush behind the home.53 Another rescuer, who was a 
pastor, was approached by many people—some members of his church and others strangers to 
him, seeking refuge. The pastor did not know each person prior to the genocide, but he was known 
for his kindness by local residents. One would-be victim pleaded, “Pastor, please hide me. They 
have killed my parents.”54 This pastor took in hundreds more, moving them from his home to 
his church. When killers demanded entry, he declared, “You cannot enter this church. You must 
kill me first before you kill them.” The killers left the church, vowing to return. The pastor then 
scattered the Tutsis in various locations. When the killers returned, the church was empty. The 
pastor claims to have saved 320 people.55 
Most of the interviewees recalled how they began hiding people in their own homes. Tutsis 
often used simple measures to avoid detection, such as hiding in the rescuers’ bedrooms, behind 
furniture, or in attics. In cases where the rescuers’ homes became overcrowded, the Tutsis were 
sent to the bush to hide. Fearing detection, the rescuers sought alternative locations, often based 
on momentary decisions. Some rescuers moved people from one hiding place to another as they 
witnessed more killing in their neighborhoods and feared detection by the murderous gangs. In 
another case, a rescuer produced a new ID card for a Tutsi woman, identifying her as a Hutu. This 
woman was saved as a result, escaping to Butare.56 
One rescuer reported, “We were worried that we would now be targeted, since this man [a 
Tutsi] was taking refuge in our home. People started being killed around the neighborhood. Fidel 
45 Participant #11. 
46 Participant #1. 
47 Participant #6. 
48 Participant #7. 
49 Participant #1.
50 Participant #5.
51 Participant #5.
52 Participant #3.
53 Participant #4.
54 Participant#2.
55 Participant #2.
56 Participant #1.
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was killed the next day.”57 As the murderous gangs roamed the streets, this rescuer felt that the 
only way to avoid detection was to hide in the ground—literally: 
...We were really worried and we thought that we were going to die too. Then, I decided to 
dig a hole where everyone can go and hide. We made a big hole so that we had another place 
for hiding. Whenever we would dig, we would take the soil to be dumped about 200 meters 
away so that it wouldn’t be obvious that we just made a hole. It wasn’t easy, but then we 
covered it with grass. We hid everyone in the hole and almost right after we hid them, we 
had an attack come to our house... But by the help of God they did not find anyone who was 
hiding. Then another attack came. The second attack really gave us real trouble. We could 
hear [the killers] saying, “We must not leave any stone unturned because we must leave this 
place with some dead Tutsis because we know that they are hiding here.”... This specific 
attack has left me traumatized because of the way they came in, how many of them there 
were and how they behaved towards us.58 
This rescuer claims to have saved about thirty-five people through his efforts. 
(3) 
Most of the interviewees recounted their terrifying encounters with the killers, which in some cases 
led to beatings. One interviewee described her husband’s efforts to hide children. Confronting the 
killers in their home, he refused their demands to turn over Tutsis, saying, “No, no, no, no.” He 
then insulted the killers’ intelligence. “You Hutus, you don’t look far from your nose,” which means 
they are not thinkers.59 Another interviewee recounted how her father reprimanded the killers: 
During the planning meetings, the killers were openly telling us that “today we will kill 
you even though you did well to us. If we find you hiding Tutsis, because you have been 
suspected, we will kill you too.” They were telling us this without knowing that we were 
already hiding them...60
Another interviewee recalled how his uncle participated in the slaughter and demanded to know 
where the Tutsis were hiding: 
The killers were my relatives. I knew them. They were family! They would come and demand 
the children. They even killed my cousin’s wife because she was a Tutsi. And after killing 
her, I really begged them to give me her corpse, so that I could go and bury her. So, we went 
to bury my cousin’s wife, and my uncle came—who was a big Interahamwe—and he asked 
me for the Tutsi children I was hiding… I told my sister’s husband… “I will not give you 
those children. I cannot let you kill them. I will kill them myself first.”61
This rescuer was willing to sacrifice the lives of these children, and probably himself in the process, 
rather than relinquishing the children to the killers. With this daring gamble, the rescuer was tacitly 
accusing the killers of depravity. Through his efforts, the rescuer claims to have saved five people. 
Some rescuers had the courage to bargain with the killers. Bribery was effective in some cases. 
One rescuer bribed the killers with food; when the food ran out, they stole all of the rescuer’s 
possessions. Another rescuer recounted how he offered his cow to the killers in exchange for 
leaving the children in peace. He claims that these children survived the war. Another rescuer was 
prepared to sacrifice himself if that would save those whom he was hiding. “I decided that when 
the killers came to my place, before killing these people, they must kill me.”62 
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Two interviewees recounted how they resisted the militia groups with force of arms. In one 
case, the interviewee joined community members who mobilized to protect about 150 people, 
brandishing guns and makeshift weapons, such as sticks, spears and arrows, to ward off the attackers. 
He reported, “We kept fighting the different raids that came and eventually [the Interahamwe] 
stopped coming back. The next day the RPF came and we became a protected zone.”63 
In another case a rescuer apparently witnessed the slaughter of Tutsis immediately after 
the president’s plane was shot down. He immediately called a meeting of people in his sector, 
requesting that everyone assist Tutsis who were engulfed in the campaign of violence. Not aware 
of his effort to undermine this campaign, the Interahamwe offered him money to join them in 
exposing Tutsis. After refusing their request, he took up arms against the killers. Preparing for one 
such attack by the Interahamwe, he joined a large group of resisters—about 120 Hutus in total—in 
armed resistance, positioning about fifteen people with guns around his house.64 He remembered 
well one such skirmish with the killers: 
On April 8 [the Interahamwe] wanted to come to my sector to kill the Tutsis here. I went to 
the Tutsi families and told them not to worry. I told them that no one would be against them, 
and that if they die we will all die together. I asked them to come to my home, so that I could 
protect them. Five families came totaling 30 people… I had many of my trusted people who had 
guns, and we defended against the killers. I went fifty meters above my home where I could 
see [the killers] coming. And when they came around 8:00 pm, I started to shoot them. And 
they started to curse at me saying that I will run out of bullets. I said that if I do, then all of us  
will die together. I shot at them again and they ran away. They started to loot, eat cows and 
destroying houses. But we continued to protect everyone at my house and they all survived.65 
This armed counter-attack allegedly succeeded in saving many people, although he does not know 
the exact number. 
Why Rescue? 
What motivated a small number of Hutus to risk their lives to save Tutsis? After listening to the 
life histories of the rescuers and hearing about their experiences during the genocide, we chose 
to address this question by directly asking the interviewees why they rescued. Their testimony 
revealed consistent patterns; most interviewees repeatedly stated that their decision to rescue was 
directly connected to their sense of self and sense of interconnectedness with Tutsis. The interviewees 
unanimously expressed a clear identification with being a good person or a good Christian, which 
in turn meant having a good heart. As one interviewee explained, “It was my heart that made me 
do it. I could not let people die like that and then call myself a good Christian.”66 For this rescuer, 
identifying herself as a good Christian made rescuing a necessary action. When asking another 
interviewee why she risked her life to help her neighbors, she stated:
Rescuer: I feel that my heart convinced me to do so. I saw innocent people dying and I 
thought that it was better to die with a friend or relative than to live and let them die. Not 
helping was never an option.67
Interviewer: Why do you think your heart convinced you to do this?
Rescuer: Because my heart knows that we are all the same. 
63 Participant #20. 
64 Participant #18.
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For this rescuer, having a good heart implied their equal moral and social status with Tutsis. 
Again, this theme of equality was repeated by interviewees as a primary justification for helping. 
As another rescuer describes: 
Even though the leadership was sensitizing people to kill, I did this because I love people. 
I love all humans. I can tell you that a person is not supposed to die from another human 
in that way. They [the killers] had changed into animals when they were killing. I saw 
them change and they were no longer humans. On the outside they looked human, but on 
the inside they were not. To be able to kill young children, while they cry out for mercy is 
inhuman. I couldn’t be an animal like the others. As a human, I have to do the things that a 
human must do.
This testimony illustrates their claim that the act of killing nullifies the agent’s own humanity, 
reducing the individual to the status of an animal. For these interviewees, their choice to help was 
not conceived of as an option—where they could decide to help or not—and instead was more of 
an irrefutable characteristic or expression of their sense of self and their relationship to Tutsis. 
Such replies then led us to inquire about social underpinnings of their notions of identity and 
difference. We sought to understand how such notions became pivotal to their decisions to offer 
aid to Tutsis, decisions that deviated markedly from the vast majority of Rwandan Hutus who 
acted as either participants or bystanders to the violence. All but two of the interviewees connected 
their equal positioning of the Tutsi and their identification as a good human or Christian to their 
experiences with significant role models. In their own words, they informed us that their concepts 
of themselves and the Tutsis were developed from their moral education that they had received 
early in life from influential adults. For example, after being asked how she came to develop the 
good heart to which she attributed her rescuing, one interviewee stated: 
What I can tell you is that I got this heart from my parents. I saw it from my parents. As I 
grew up, I saw that everyone, Hutu and Tutsi, were coming to my parents’ house. Everyone 
was welcome. My parents had good hearts and I got it from them.68
Similarly, another rescuer explains:
It was the personality that I got from my parents. I am a Christian, a born again. I was saved. 
My parents taught me about being a good person and then when I became a pastor I was a 
pastor for everyone. I had to help them because I was a servant of God and it was the heart 
I inherited from my parents.69
For most of the rescuers interviewed, these significant role models were parents. There were 
also cases of auxiliary family members or community members taking on that role—uncles, 
grandparents, and in a few cases, neighbors or older friends. Regarding the rescue of Tutsis during 
the Rwandan genocide, a kind of grass roots network was created in the town of Mabare, leading 
to armed resistance against Hutu militia.70 These significant figures delivered an ethical education 
through their direct verbal teachings and their embodiment of ethical social practices. In the 
rescuers’ personal narratives, their attempts to save Tutsis were driven in part by what they learned 
as children through ethical instruction, moralistic stories, and inspiring actions of role models. 
The rescuers were explicitly taught to live at peace with all people, Hutu and Tutsi alike, 
and they witnessed their role models demonstrate generosity, service, advocacy, and tolerance. 
The moral education that rescuers received from role models took three forms: (1) direct verbal 
instruction concerning the proper treatment of others, (2) stories told by role models about past 
68 Participant #1. 
69 Participant #6. 
70 Frederico Varese and Meir Yaish, “Resolute Heroes: The Rescue of Jews During the Nazi Occupation of Europe,” 
European Journal of Sociology 46 (2005), 153-168.
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deeds of compassion, typically including rescue efforts, and (3) the ethical deeds of these influential 
figures in their interactions with others, including Tutsis, that the rescuers themselves witnessed. 
Each of the three key elements of lessons, stories of past deeds, and demonstrated social practices 
has played an indelible role in the development of the rescuers’ present sense of self. In the process 
of ascribing their own behavior to the influence of their role models, the rescuers emphasized how 
those elements directly contributed to their decisions to rescue. 
First, most of them expressed gratitude to a father, mother, uncle, or grandparent for providing 
them the foundational moral clarity needed to respond to the genocidal violence of 1994. They 
cited the direct verbal instructions given by their role models about how to live well with others. 
When asked why he rescued, one rescuer invoked the lessons he learned from his parents: “We 
talked about it and were not valuing it. When I got home I would ask my parents about it, and they 
told me that people are the same, and that no one has different blood.”71 This passage illustrates a 
pattern in which many rescuers invoked the same imagery used by their role models (in this case, 
the idea that humans share the same blood) when expressing their personal views as adults. This 
direct repetition of themes and metaphors was prominent throughout the rescuers’ testimonies. 
Clearly, one of the key principles of the rescuers’ moral education was to avoid ethnic division. 
Another rescuer also described his parents’ influence:
My mother (who was a Hutu) told me never to get involved in the hatred of the Tutsi. Our 
parents told us about the past wars and violence. My father was always saying, “Please my 
children, never, never get involved in burning someone’s home. I never want to hear that 
one of my children burned someone’s home.” So, if you teach this to children then they will 
not get involved in violence.72
This rescuer’s parents were quite explicit about the importance of renouncing violence and ethnic 
divisions, and in the last sentence, we clearly see this rescuer making a causal link between one’s 
parenting and personal involvement in violence. 
For those rescuers who were inspired by their faith tradition, their moral education came from 
the Christian Bible. One rescuer recalled that her family was basically uneducated and illiterate, 
except for the fact that her mother was able to read the Bible. This rescuer received most of her 
moral lessons from her mother’s repetition of biblical themes. Another rescuer recalled his father’s 
relationship to the Bible: 
My father modeled himself on the Holy Bible, and he taught us how to live using God’s word. 
My father was a person who liked to pray all the time, and he would even gather our neighbors 
together in our home to pray. I remember that he liked to teach people around his community, 
sharing God’s word through the Bible. Many people trusted him because of his commitment 
to God. We still try to live according to his example and the lessons he taught us.73 
Second, the rescuers’ moral education drew upon stories of their role models’ responses to 
incidences of anti-Tutsi behavior in the years prior to the 1994 genocide. These stories focused 
on the suffering that Tutsis experienced in the past, such as having their homes burned and their 
property seized, facing systematic exclusion from education and employment opportunities, and 
being directly targeted for acts of violence. For many rescuers, the first salient memory of witnessing 
discrimination against the Tutsis or even hearing about distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis 
occurred during the first years of school. After seeing Hutu and Tutsi children being separated 
in school, they returned home confused and asked their parents about this. Their parents would 
respond by telling them that these ethnic distinctions did not matter and that they (the rescuers) 
should never participate in that kind of discrimination. In response to witnessing a violent raid 
71 Participant #15. 
72 Participant #3. 
73 Participant #21. 
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that initiated the fleeing of the Tutsis in his community in 1959, one rescuer recalls the impact of 
his father’s words: 
Our father was saying and pointing out how the people in the raid were not good. He 
believed it was the government that put these bad ideas in their heads, and he told us 
that there would be a time when we would be asked to join them. He told us not to be 
changed by these people, not to allow them to overturn us, and that we need to stand 
on our own position, as well as learn to be disciplined and maintain the culture of  
no division.74
The experience of seeing firsthand the injustices committed against people with whom the rescuer 
was quite familiar was reinforced by the prior lessons from his father, imploring him not to accept 
the government propaganda.
One interviewee told of how her husband—a rescuer—hid people in the earlier wars of 1959, 
1962 and 1973. He would “tell [their] children about how people came to [their] house to kill the 
Tutsis, and he said to the people, ‘Are these Tutsis not human like us? Were we not all created 
equally?’… He had no separations between people. He was very compassionate and people 
really appreciated him.”75 Another rescuer’s father exhibited generosity during a previous era of 
bloodshed by saving people who faced moral dangers from predators. 
[My father] used to tell me stories as to how he helped people who were being hunted in 
1959, 1960 and 1962. As conflicts were prevalent during those times, there was a family who 
was on a list of Tutsis to be targeted. When my dad saw this person’s name on this list, he 
decided to go and tell his friend not to stay in his house anymore because he was on the list.76
Another rescuer found inspiration from his father’s outspoken rebuke of killers during past 
conflicts. “When my father was still alive, he would always tell the killers that what they are doing 
is not good. ‘It is not good to shed someone’s blood,’ he would say.”77
The third component of the rescuers’ moral education centered on witnessing the ethical 
behavior of their role models. Such behavior included acts of kindness by offering shelter to 
strangers, feeding the hungry, or caring for the sick. Most rescuers interviewed conveyed stories 
of inspiring rescue efforts by their role models: a mother offering shelter to the homeless, a father 
providing food to the hungry, an uncle giving clothes to the poor.78. The rescuers emulated these 
influential people for their compassion, inspiring them—the rescuers—to care for those in need 
around them—the homeless, hungry, impoverished, and destitute. The rescuers internalized such 
stories, which had a strong influence on their relations with others. When asked why he risked his 
life, one rescuer responded:
It was the heart I inherited from my parents. What I am, I learned from them. My parents 
loved their neighbors and were living well with them. They had no conflicts or problems 
with anyone. They would tell me to forgive mistakes, to never seek revenge, and to never 
create enemies. I tried to follow their steps by adapting their behaviors. The education I 
received from them, this is what helped me. I have no division in me and I never will.79
He made it very clear that his own behavior is the result of the way that his parents lived, illustrating 
a direct connection between this rescuer’s sense of self and his parents’ behavior. He internalized 
74 Participant #22. 
75 Participant #16.
76 Participant #9. 
77 Participant #8. 
78 Participant #1, #2, #4, #6, #9, #10, #14, #15, #16, #19, and #20.
79 Participant #16. 
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their conscientious approach to social relationships and attributed his own acts of rescuing to this 
internalization. 
The neighbor of one rescuer taught her how to care for others and to live as a family: “All 
people [in the neighborhood] were considered as family members, they are not just close friends.” 
In another case the friends of the interviewee’s parents were kind and loving, creating a culture 
of generosity and sharing with each other. These friends “would… give crops to those that didn’t 
have crops. They would also advise us to give to others.”80 Another rescuer praised a Tutsi woman 
for exhibiting a good heart in offering sanctuary for the homeless and providing resources to meet 
their tangible needs. This woman even showed kindness to aggressive individuals, which included 
her own husband. “All people loved her family,” said one rescuer.81 Tragically, she was killed by a 
grown child that she had raised, who claimed that as a Tutsi, she was conspiring with other Tutsis 
to enslave Hutus. 
One interviewee recalled how his parents taught him compassion for others in need. “The 
charity I got from my parents gave me the heart of growing up and loving others and wanting 
to take care of others who are in need.”82 Another rescuer—a successful businessman—credits 
his father with showing him the immorality of his earlier, materialistic lifestyle. Because of this 
admonition from his father, the son later found true happiness in acts of selfless generosity, 
transcending regard for his own life. 
One rescuer’s mother demonstrated selfless love to others: “I followed the way that she loved 
people. I learned from her to have love and to love people because I would see how she would 
talk to people, even welcoming strangers and giving them shelter.”83 Another rescuer recalled how 
her mother taught her to promote peace with others and avoid division since “all Rwandans are 
the same, brothers and sisters… She would tell us to love each other, help each other.”84 Another 
interviewee tried to emulate her grandmother, who “taught us to never to eat all of our food, 
but to always leave some for a visitor that may come. If a visitor comes when they are hungry, 
you want to have food for them. So we were always seeing her keeping extra sorghum flour and 
milk and porridge for potential visitors.”85 In another case, the rescuer’s grandfather “taught 
us how to live well with others… he was a person of peace and he wished that others would 
also be at peace.”86 Another rescuer identified the impact her neighbor’s example had on her: 
[My neighbor] and I were very close, and I could share all my secrets with her. She lived 
a good life and she had a good heart. Her family was rich but they were not arrogant. 
My family was very poor, but we were still welcome in their home. She taught me many 
important lessons. Cecilia would advise me that no one could live without saving money or 
food. Whenever I would go into the market to buy things, and there was some balance left 
over, she would tell me to join my money with the people that needed help. She taught us to 
pool our extra money together so that there would be money available when one of us was 
going through a hard time. 
I learned a lot from her. She was always advising me to be familiar with farming. Even 
though she was rich, [my neighbor] still loved to farm. This motivated me to love working 
as well. She was willing to do the work of the poor. When there were no seeds to cultivate, 
[she] would give us seeds. And she always taught us to give to others and to be human. [She] 
was a good lady with no separation and everyone could go to her house whether they were 
Hutu or Tutsi. Everybody in my community loved her family.87 
80 Participant #3. 
81 Participant #1. 
82 Participant #19. 
83 Participant #6. 
84 Participant #2. 
85 Participant #4. 
86 Participant #20. 
87 Participant #1. 
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This rescuer was inspired by her neighbor’s virtues of generosity, tolerance and compassion, all of 
which exemplified her good heart. Another rescuer proclaimed his intention to adopt his mother’s 
social practices as his own:
I saw that my mother loved people very much. I followed the way that she loved people. 
I learned from the ways that she would talk to and act with people. She would welcome 
strangers and give them shelter. She was not very religious, and she was not involved in 
political issues. She would always tell me to live well with people and to love others. If 
someone would come by our home and ask for something, she always gave to them and she 
expected that we helped them as well. She would tell us to always help people even when 
she wasn’t around. She was advising us to be human.88
Not only did his mother exhibit helping behavior, she was also explicit about her expectation that 
her children follow her example. This is a clear expression of both the role model’s deliberate 
efforts to instill her values on her children, and the rescuer’s personal reflections about his mother’s 
normative social practices. Through this rescuer’s testimony, we see another repetition of two 
familiar themes. The first is the association between division and politics. Highlighting the fact 
that his mother was not involved in political issues reflects the belief held by several rescuers that 
politics were an instrument of division—and therefore to be mistrusted. The second is the idea of 
being human, of having a good heart. The social practices performed and encouraged by this role 
model were interpreted by the rescuer simply as the normative behaviors of a human: “she was 
advising us to be human.” From this example, we see how role model ideology and behavior were 
internalized into the rescuers’ personal meaning matrix. 
One rescuer, whose grandmother agreed to look after several cows belonging to Tutsi neighbors 
who were forced to flee to Burundi, described the elaborate means by which the grandmother 
altered the cows’ appearance in order to pass them off as her own.
When the Tutsi families were fleeing to Burundi, they would bring some of their things 
to my grandmother, and she would keep their stuff for them. It was hard for them to flee 
with cows, so my grandmother would keep the cows for her, but my grandparents could 
be targeted if anyone recognized the cows they were hiding. So my grandparents would get 
the dry banana leaves and they would burn the hair of the cows to make them a different 
color. After two weeks of doing this every day, a white cow would become brown, and then 
they could let that cow roam freely with the other cows without there being suspicion. They 
would also use a hot iron to change the direction of the cow’s horns. They would keep the 
cow inside their one room house for a short period and then they would just mix them in 
with the rest of their cows.89
This story illustrates how the willingness to endure inconvenience, hardship and suffering for the 
sake of other community members was cast as an expected quality of a good person. Neither the 
role model nor the rescuer considered this kind of behavior extraordinary. Such endurance was 
seen simply as the logical application of ethical norms. 
Lessons Learned
Most of the interviewees embraced the moralistic principle that each person attains full authenticity 
in right relations with others. Some rescuers invoked this principle by declaring that “my” life is 
connected to “yours,” that “I” am enriched by close bonds with “you,” and that “I” become fully 
realized in right relations with “you.” One sees oneself—one’s humanity—reflected in the character 
of others. This principle includes the exhortation to live as one, as a family, “as friends and brothers 
and sisters.” One rescuer said, “A human being is a human being and a child is a child. You have to 
get together and never separate or segregate people.” 
88 Participant #6. 
89 Participant #4. 
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Many rescuers invoked the metaphor of a family to characterized Rwandans, often referring 
to everyone as brothers and sisters. Traditionally, families stick together, help each other, live 
together, and defend each other. Rescuers often used the phrase “living together” to refer to their 
way of being in general—whether in a literal sense, as in an actual home environment where all were 
welcome, or in a more theoretical sense, in that they avoided conflict, respected others, or lived 
in peace with their neighbors. Because they viewed the Tutsis as family members, the rescuers’ 
sense of obligation toward them became personal and immediate. From the rescuers’ point of view, 
when family members are threatened or in danger, one instinctively and unquestionably acts to 
protect them. One rescuer took in a Tutsi child and hid her among his own children. He recounted 
an episode during which a massacre was taking place in front of his house:
Many killers would come to my house to try and kill her. So when I heard them coming, I 
would lock the house with my family inside, and I’d stand outside. I would tell them, “If you 
are going to kill her, then go ahead and burn the entire house, throw a grenade and kill all of 
them! They are all my children! If you are going to kill her, then kill me too!”90
For this rescuer, his love for the human family prompted him to rescue. He proudly recalled how 
the girl whom he saved was still registered as his own child—he had taken her in as his own 
regardless of the fact that she was a complete stranger. For the rescuers who saved the lives of 
children, adopting them as their own was not uncommon. 
Another rescuer considered the very idea of racial distinction a moral perversion. As he 
explained it, 
The genuine “brotherhood of man” supersedes the fabricated notions of racial division. 
[The Interahamwe] kept saying, “If we found out you are hiding someone, you will die 
with him.” But I had the conviction in my heart. No one chooses where he [comes] from. 
Others were also born like that in another group they didn’t choose. So my purpose was 
whoever came to me I would welcome him. I think every human is like any other human, 
and I think when a human suffers I suffer too. I think God created every man in his own 
image. He never created races… My purpose in life was to live with everyone like a  
brother.91
Since God did not make ethnicities, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi are invalid, as illustrated in the 
following statements: “I didn’t give things related to ethnicity much importance, I saw everyone as 
God’s creation,” “We are all God’s children,” and “God created us as one.”92
Charles Kabwete Mulinda reports that some Tutsis credit their survival to the work of God 
rather than to their own efforts or even the efforts of the helpers.93 When analyzing the rescuer 
interviews, we see that their identities orbit around the character of the good human, the good 
Christian, or both. For the rescuers, being a good human or a good Christian is qualified through 
what it means to have a “good heart.” With a good heart, one is driven—as if by an inner voice—
to speak kindly of others, eschewing expressions of hatred based on race, nationality or tribal 
affiliation. A person with a good heart would intentionally share resources with neighbors, 
would live in peace with everyone, and would avoid divisive things, such as politics and ethnic 
distinctions. A person’s good heart provides the wisdom to discern between the righteous path and 
the road to hell, to distinguish between good and evil. Guided by this wisdom, the rescuers found 
it impossible to tolerate the racist propaganda of Hutu extremists, finding these ideologies utterly 
abhorrent. In conversation with others, one speaks directly from the heart and is compelled to do 
90 Participant #6.
91 Participant #2. 
92 Participant #2.
93 Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “Crossing a border to Escape: Examples from the Gishamvu and Kigembe Communities 
of Rwanda,” in Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue, ed. Jacques Semelin, Claire Andrieu, and Sarah 
Gensburger (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 357.
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good deeds. A man who loses his heart is susceptible to evil, and so is inclined to say and do evil. 
“It is from the fullness of the heart that the mouth speaks.”94 
While a substantial number of rescuers ascribed their actions to their Christian faith, the 
notion of a good heart was also invoked by non-Christian rescuers. One non-Christian rescuer 
explained his actions to save Tutsis as simply being human. Notice the articulation of the qualities 
of generosity and universal love, and then the consummation of this self-description with the 
familiar reference to having a good heart:
I have love in me, and I’d like to see people living peacefully whether I know them or not. 
Another thing is that I always help people who need to be helped. For example, for the 
people who are sick or in prison, if I see that they need something, I feel that I should share 
with them what I have. This is why I saved that girl—I was just being human and having a 
good heart.95
But most interviewees who invoked the notion of a good heart as a basis for the rescue efforts 
understood this notion from a Christian perspective. Most of the rescuers interviewed repeatedly 
referenced this concept as a basis for their obligations to Tutsis. One Christian rescuer expressed 
how the possession of a good heart is the most important ingredient for producing moral behavior: 
To me, I love people equally. I am this way because I am Christian. All people are the same 
and created the same by God. I rescued because of having a good heart. I never had a problem 
with people. I decide to live in peace with everyone. I don’t refuse anyone who asks for my 
help. Those who are really serving God, they have love. There are some Christians who are 
hypocrites, maybe seeking food or better life conditions. We don’t see things the same, we 
don’t necessarily believe the same way, and we don’t all have the same heart.96
Not only does this statement express the first two qualities of a person with a good heart, that 
is, generosity and unconditional love for all people, but it also demonstrates how the Christian 
identity alone was no guarantee of moral behavior and that having a good heart was the critical 
determinant of ethical conduct. The rescuers also believed that the killers themselves could be 
transformed if given proper instruction. The same kind of moral education could be used as a 
potential catalyst to reform the killers. The killers could be saved if introduced to a morally infused 
linguistic environment that the rescuers themselves acquired. 
Before the genocide of 1994, about 80% of Rwandans adopted Catholicism in combination 
with the traditional religious practices of Nyabingi. As Catholics, they would attend church in the 
morning and then worship in the afternoon, relying on the New Testament for guidance to live a 
virtuous life.97 According to the sacred text, one’s good deeds come directly from the heart. “Good 
people produce good from the store of good within themselves: and evil people produce evil 
from the evil within them. For the words that the mouth utters come from the overflowing of 
the heart.”98 
In the same way that the rescuers’ secular positioning of “shared humanity” and the “one 
family” focused on oneness and equality, the Christian positioning also emphasized commonalities 
over differences. Often this religious positioning qualified oneness through shared bodily features, 
particularly with statements that highlighted that we all bleed the same blood. This emphasis 
echoes throughout a number of rescuer statements:
People are the same; no one has different blood. There is no difference between the Hutu 
and the Tutsi—we all have the same blood. No one has milk in his or her veins. Some people 
94 Matt. 12:34 Revised English Version.
95 Participant #6. 
96 Participant #23. 
97 I thank Gedeon Patrick Hakiziman for providing this information during a personal conversation. 
98 Luke 6:45, Revised English Bible.
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betray others saying that they have tails, or that the Tutsis come from a different place, but 
I say God created one humanity, and all people bleed blood. No one bleeds milk. I have to 
love humans as I love myself.
Facilitated by their unequivocal faith in the righteousness of their positions, proper servants of God 
respond to genocide by rescuing. One rescuer recounted how one of his parents expressed doubt 
about God’s mercy and justice. The parent said, “If the killers come here and kill someone, then I 
will know that the God I am serving is not the real God.” While the rescuer’s parents questioned 
God’s moral authority, the rescuer himself never did. After the genocide, the rescuer became a 
pastor. 
Most rescuers interviewed were motivated by a kind of fear that superseded any fear they had 
at the hands of fellow humans—that of God’s wrath on Judgment Day. The fear of losing oneself, 
of losing one’s good heart, became a source of energy for their rescuing efforts. Another rescuer 
found comfort in the promise of a better life in Heaven: “If you die while trying to save another’s 
life, then you are on the right path of the life to come. That’s what motivated me. Whether I died or 
not, God would be happy with what I was doing.” 
Some rescuers expressed their gratitude to God for answering their prayers, proclaiming that 
he intervened directly to save Tutsis. For example, God is credited with “pushing the killers away” 
from the house where Tutsis were hiding, or causing rescuers to leave an area where Tutsis were 
vulnerable to fatal attacks. One rescuer reports, “I saw one attack coming from behind my house. 
I prayed to God, ‘Look—they have attacked me. I need you to do some miracle.’”99 She credits 
her survival to God, who somehow enticed the attackers to suddenly depart from the area where 
the Tutsis were hiding. The prayers of some rescuers were answered in what they described as a 
miracle from God. Other rescuers cited specific directives from God about the most effective tactics 
for confronting the Interahamwe. 
The rescuers claimed that, because of their good heart, they could not turn away those 
seeking safety in the face of mortal danger, risking the same fate as those they sought to save. This 
expectation established an existential bond between them and the Tutsis they harbored in their 
homes, a bond sealed by the knowledge that the rescuers would live or die alongside those seeking 
sanctuary. For some rescuers this bond was actually a source of comfort; as one rescuer explained, 
“Even if I die, I’ll die happy because I have seen people who I secured that are still alive.”100 And 
to the rescuers, this bond reflected their good heart and their covenant with God. On this view, the 
eyes of one’s good heart are opened to the suffering and needs of others. 
Most rescuers acknowledged the intense fear they experienced at the outset of the extermination 
campaign. The anti-Tutsi propaganda was an existential threat to peace-loving Hutus.
What happened to others can happen to us as well, and we were not happy with what was 
happening to them... We couldn’t sleep. We stayed up with fear filling us, thinking that the 
[Interahamwe] are coming and they will kill us. But we could see that there was nothing to 
do since God is the one who knows if we are meant to die.101
But the rescuers were not paralyzed by their fears. Some rescuers recounted how their faith only 
strengthened their resolve to take the right path no matter the consequences. One rescuer claimed 
that his faith gave him the strength to endure frequent beatings and threats to his life—and even on 
one occasion being ordered to dig his own grave. Yet even as he and the other rescuers described 
their experiences and actions, they refused to characterize themselves as heroes, preferring instead 
to depict their rescuing efforts as ordinary—even obligatory—for anyone with a sense of moral 
integrity.
99 Participant #5. 
100 Participant #2. 
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Conclusion 
The rescuers interviewed for this research resisted the propaganda disseminated by Hutu 
extremists that Tutsis are a separate race, committed to conquering Rwanda and enslaving all 
Hutus. Instead, these rescuers held fast to their humanitarian values, recognizing everyone’s 
inherent moral worth and potential vulnerability to suffering. A majority of the interviewees 
found inspiration in their Christian faith, which they claim gave them strength during the darkest 
days of the slaughter. These interviewees repeatedly invoked their bond with God, driven by their 
good heart to follow his law. For all the rescuers interviewed, the moral education they received 
from role models took the form of direct verbal instruction on the proper treatment of others, 
stories the role models recounted about past deeds, and accounts of general ethical practices. 
The rescuers’ moral education took place within a localized narrative environment that operated 
simultaneously within the context of the larger, societal narrative, and contributed to their sense 
of moral bond with Tutsis—one they could not in good conscience ignore. Undergirded by 
their sense of a common humanity and motivated by their Christian faith, the rescuers clung to 
their conviction all Rwandans were part of the same “family,” and they heralded the amalgam 
of these two positions, rooted in a Christian perspective: that all people are created equally in 
God’s image and that we are all God’s children. These alternative positions intertwined the 
rescuers’ self-image with compassion for those in need, spurring them to act with courage on 
behalf of the Tutsis. 
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Appendix
Interview Questions
Pre-Genocide
• Childhood
• Where and when were you born?
• What was the economic status of your family?
• What was the religious status of your family?
• What was you family’s relationship to the community and neighbors?
• Did you attend school? If so, how much schooling did you attend?
• Adulthood
• Did you marry? When?
• Did you have children? How many?
• What did you do for work?
• What was your religious status?
• What was your financial status?
• What was your relationship with the community like?
• Did you have Tutsi friends or relatives?
• Where you involved in politics?
• Right before the genocide
• Where you aware of what was going on?
• Did you listen to the radio? If so, what was your impression of what was 
being broadcasted?
• Did anyone try to recruit you into joining the killings?
During the Genocide
• Where were you when you first heard that the genocide started?
• What was your experience during the genocide?
• When did you start to help people?
• Where they friends, strangers, neighbors, etc?
• How many people did you help?
• How did you help them?
• Was anyone harmed? Property damaged?
• What were your interactions with the people participating in the killings?
• Why did you do this?
• What is your understanding of your actions?
Post Genocide
• Has your life changed since the genocide? If yes, how so?
• How have others responded to your actions? Have you received any praise or hardship 
because of rescuing?
• Are you still in contact with any of the survivors you helped?
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Abstract: By exploring how the Assyrian and Romani genocides came to be forgotten in official history and collective 
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Introduction
Seventy years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Romani peoples are still struggling to have their 
tragic experiences during the Second World War acknowledged. Only a few survivors are still 
alive. Hermann Höllenreiner is one such survivor, and remains deeply troubled by the unlearned 
lessons of what he calls the “forgotten genocide”—the systematic liquidation of Europe’s Romani 
population.1 Likewise, descendants of victims of the Assyrian Genocide experience the hidden 
nature of their history as an added insult; as compounding the trauma of the genocide itself. This 
experience is encapsulated in the words of Joseph Zaya, born in the Hakkari region of south-east 
Anatolia, who shortly before he passed away at the age of one hundred stated that this genocide 
“is something that we Assyrians should never forget, and the world should not forget it, either.”2
The factors contributing to the hiddenness of a particular genocide are often made up of an 
interrelated web of political, economic, religious and geostrategic interests; and are the result of 
a combination of actions by various parties. This paper will examine why some genocides are 
ignored or fade into oblivion, by looking at the cases of the Assyrian Genocide, which occurred 
alongside the Armenian Genocide during the First World War, and the Romani Genocide during 
the Nazi-Fascist era in Europe. These emblematic examples illustrate how and why some genocides 
are studied, reported, and officially commemorated, while others are ignored and their victims 
forgotten. As René Lemarchand writes in his edited volume, Forgotten Genocides, “the systematic 
eradication of tens if not hundreds of thousands of Assyrians receives little or no attention. Again, 
consider the marginal attention paid to the martyrdom of the Gypsy victims of the Holocaust.”3  
The phenomenon of hidden or forgotten genocides has received some attention in recent 
years, and two texts in particular have informed the analysis in this paper–Lemarchand’s 
abovementioned Forgotten Genocides; and Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory, edited by 
1 Anthony Faiola, Ruth Eglash and Michelle Boorstein, “The Voices of Auschwitz,” The Washington Post, January 23, 
2015, accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2015/01/23/with-fewer-voices-auschwitz-
survivors-speak/; Laura Shepard Townsend, “The Holocaust’s Forgotten Roma Victims,” MJCIMAGEWORKS, 
September 14, 2014, accessed March 1, 2016, http://mjcimageworks.com/blog/the-holocausts-forgotten-roma-victims/. 
2 Assyrian International News Agency, “99 Years of Turkish Genocide,” AINA, April 23, 2014, accessed March 13, 2016, 
http://www.aina.org/releases/20140423134125.htm.
3 René Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), 11.
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Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas La Pointe and Douglas Irvin-Erickson. Both collections present 
a range of case studies and analyses, and the latter identifies a canon of genocide cases which 
“remain exemplary, first and foremost the Holocaust.”4 The core of recognized genocides includes 
those in Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia and Darfur, those of Indigenous peoples broadly, and the 
Armenian Genocide, which has gained attention in recent years and which is now also included 
in the triad of core genocides along with the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide. Those genocides 
which have engendered less recognition, constitute what has been referred to as the “second circle”, 
“periphery”, and finally “forgotten” genocides,5 encompassing cases ranging from Bangladesh, 
Kosovo and the Ukrainian famine, to East Timor, Burundi and the Assyrian and Greek genocides. 
It is unclear where in this structure sit the many non-Jewish victims of the Nazis and their Axis 
allies, primarily Romani peoples but also Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and other categories 
of people considered asocial.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the Romani and Assyrian experiences, addressing 
the roles played by scholars and nations, and the effect of international law and government policy, 
in either blocking out or including particular events in collective memories and official history. A 
comparative analysis between the Romani and Assyrian cases can help to highlight the interplay 
between causes, and identify patterns that can lead to both unintentional forgetting and deliberate 
concealment.
This paper also notes the influence of issues internal to the victim communities, such as a 
cultural disinclination to record events in writing, resulting in a lack of survivor testimony,6 and 
in both cases, internal divisions which have prevented a unified voice to advocate the cause of 
recognition. Indeed, in consultations with Assyrian community representatives, the absence of a 
self-governed, autonomous nation-state is sometimes cited as a reason for the lack of power to 
drive recognition efforts, and this factor in itself would be worthy of a more detailed study.7
The most significant factors have been located outside the control of the communities 
themselves. Political motivations and the desire to consolidate national identities lie behind how 
history is written and how genocides are remembered. It may be a cliché that history is written 
by the victors, however the collective memory of a population is very often intentionally built by 
removing certain aspects and emphasizing others, creating a narrative that benefits that particular 
group.8 In the construction of historical narratives after both world wars, nations strove to create 
clear dichotomies between perpetrators and rescuers, or perpetrators and victims, with no room 
for complex analysis or acknowledgement of those countries which may have played simultaneous 
and often paradoxical roles (for instance, simplistic postwar narratives allowed especially non-Axis 
countries to conceal their own persecution of Romanies before, during and indeed after the war.)
4 Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas LaPointe, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, eds., Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, 
Memory (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 5.
5 Ibid, 6. 
6 Ian Hancock, “Responses to the Porrajmos: The Romani Holocaust,” in Is the Holocaust Unique?, ed. Alan Rosenbaum 
(Boulder: The Westview Press, 2009), 138; Andrea Boscoboinik, “Challenging Borders and Constructing Boundaries: 
An Analysis of Roma Political Processes,” in Identity Politics: Histories, Regions and Borderlands, eds. Vytis Ciubrinskas 
and Rimanta Sliuzinskas (Klaipeda: Klaipeda University Press, 2009), 187; Panayiotis Diamadis, “Controversies 
Around Governmental and Parliamentary Recognition of the Armenian, Hellenic, and Assyrian Genocides,” 
The AHIF Policy Journal 7 (Spring 2016), accessed August 3, 2016, http://ahiworld.org/AHIFpolicyjournal/pdfs/
Volume7Spring/03diamadis.pdf; Hannibal Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide: A Tale of Oblivion and Denial” 
in Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory, ed. René Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011). 
7 Many Assyrians advocate the establishment of a national homeland in the Nineveh region of Iraq, to which they are 
indigenous. In the Romani case, the idea of a nation-state is complicated by the fact that Romanies are not a land-
based group, and opinions differ within Romani communities as to how their rights should be acknowledged and 
enshrined in policy or legislation; see Mirga, Andrzej, and Nicolae Gheorghe, “The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: 
A Policy,” Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997, accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.per-usa.org/1997-2007/21st_c.htm.
8 For detailed theoretical analyses of social and collective memory, see e.g., Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 
trans. F.J. Didder Jr. and V. Yazdi Ditter (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” in   Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: New Left Books, 1973), 257-258; Helmut 
König, “Paradoxes of Memory,” Eurozine, April 8, 2011, accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/
article_2011-08-04-koenig-en.html.
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The inaccessibility of documentation–records officially withheld by authorities or information 
presenting in wide range of languages–has also hindered academic research.9 Other issues relate 
to methods of implementation of the genocides, exacerbated by narrow academic and legal 
interpretations of the concept of genocide. For example, an intentionalist view of genocide in 
early historiography (that is, a view that genocide is the result of a central policy or decision by 
government, and recorded in writing) excluded the massacres of Romani peoples, which were 
often haphazard and locally-initiated, from mainstream definitions of genocide. Much official 
Ottoman documentation refers explicitly to the Armenian community,10 and although Assyrians 
were often directly targeted, or swept up in massacres of Armenians, clear proof is sometimes 
concealed behind the wording of Turkish documents.
Further, continuing prejudice against the victims in the immediate and longer-term post-genocide 
environment, suppression of information and national mythmaking, and conscious government efforts 
to muddy the identity of victims, can have profound effects on how genocides are written into, or 
omitted from, official histories. For example, as modern nation-states were created in the aftermath 
of the First World War, their new governments embedded the denial of Assyrian history by 
denying even the identity of Assyrians as a group. Forced to officially identify as members of other 
communities, the very existence of a group known as Assyrians was officially extinguished.11
Finally, ongoing discrimination meant that the survivors of genocide were not only deprived of 
acknowledgement of their suffering, but even blamed for bringing it on themselves. Since Romani 
peoples were imprisoned in camps based on their categorization as a social group with “criminal 
tendencies,” their treatment during the war was considered to have been justified, and they were 
subsequently excluded from commemorations, memorialization and reparations processes. In fact, 
because they were believed to have been targeted as a social group, they have been excluded from 
legal recognition under the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, which specifies that genocide can be committed solely against national, ethnic, racial 
or religious groups.12 For these and other reasons to be explored further in this paper, certain 
genocides of the twentieth century have been relegated to the footnotes of history.
Germany’s wholehearted admission of guilt for the Jewish Holocaust has contributed to 
widespread memorialization and compensation, but this admission has only recently extended to 
other groups of victims. The Nazi genocide of Europe’s Jews during the Second World War remains 
the most studied and publicly known genocide; in contrast, the attacks on Romani communities, 
and the ideologies that triggered them, remain relatively forgotten in academic literature and public 
consciousness. Today, the Assyrian and Armenian communities recognize and commemorate 
each other’s history of genocide by the Ottoman and Republican Turkish authorities,13 but broader 
awareness of the Assyrian experience pales in comparison. Official Turkish denial of both genocides 
continues to this day, though global recognition of the Armenian experience has increased over 
recent years. For the Assyrian community, however, the hiddenness of its history represents an 
additional layer of denial. 
The analysis in this paper is based on existing research by leading scholars of the Romani 
and Assyrian genocides, including Racho Donef, Hannibal Travis, David Gaunt, Nicholas Al-
Jeloo, Ian Hancock and Michael Stewart,14 while also referring to the authors’ own research. 
9 Hannibal Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World War I,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006), 135.
10 Official documentation often refers to the “Ermeni milliyet”, which has been mistranslated as referring only to the 
Armenian community. It also referred to the non-Canonical Orthodox Christian community.
11 Hannibal Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide: A Tale of Oblivion and Denial,” in Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and 
Memory, ed. Rene Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 133.
12 Michael Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem: An Invisible Genocide,” in Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory, ed. 
Rene Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 140.
13 Assyrian Universal Alliance, “100 Years of Genocide, The Assyrian Nation reflects,” Assyrian Universal Alliance, August 
5, 2015, accessed March 5, 2016, http://aua.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Media-Release-for-Centennial-
Commemoration.pdf.
14 Particularly, see e.g. Racho Donef, Massacres and Deportation of Assyrians in Northern Mesopotamia: Ethnic Cleansing by 
Turkey 1924-1925 (Stockholm: Nsibin, 2009); Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide”; Hannibal Travis, “Constructing the 
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The authors carried out fieldwork in Italy and Australia on the history of the Romanies, and the 
views of both Romani and Assyrian representatives were taken into account. While examining 
the case studies, this paper provides some background on the two communities, their history 
and culture, and experiences of persecution in the lead up to the two respective genocides. A 
section on the genocides themselves describes the ideological motivations and outlines how each 
community was targeted for elimination. It argues that in the aftermath of the genocides, deliberate 
efforts were made by governments to prevent any recognition of the genocides, and to blur the 
identity of the victim groups so as to avoid acknowledgement of their losses. Minimal scholarly 
attention, a lack of public commemoration, and limitations of the legal definition of genocide, 
represent some of the obstacles that the Romani and Assyrian communities continue to face as 
they seek recognition of their communities’ respective historical and contemporary experiences of 
genocide and prejudice.
This article presents a new dimension of comparative analysis between the Romani and 
Assyrian genocides. The process of highlighting factors that are common to both has identified 
patterns in the development of the hiddenness of certain genocides. An awareness of these factors 
may help in the pursuit of recognition and redress.   
Theoretical Issues and Debates Concerning ‘Hidden Genocides’
Both the Assyrian and Romani genocides have been primarily viewed, to the extent that they have been 
studied at all, through the lens of other genocides, partly the result of each having occurred concurrently 
to another genocide. Ian Hancock argues that recognition of each case should be pursued “in its 
own context, and not as a corollary to that of another people.”15 While Hancock points out the value 
of exploring the history of each genocide as a singular event, comparative analyses can also be 
beneficial. Comparative analyses can become problematic however, when one genocide is always 
used as the lens for another, to the extent that one is subsumed or obscured by the other.
In genocide historiography, the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry is recognized as the 
paradigmatic genocide, where “other genocides are often seen and interpreted through the lens of 
our understanding about the Holocaust”.16 Indeed, there are important ways that the Holocaust can 
form a useful foundation, not least because of the enormous evidence base it provides to the study 
of genocide. Holocaust scholarship has developed theoretical frameworks for critical examination 
of all other cases of genocide, and the wealth of evidence and analysis in relation to the Holocaust 
provides a strong basis for studying other genocidal atrocities.
One of the unforeseen effects of the extensive attention on the genocide of the Jews, however, 
is that the Romani Genocide has been viewed exclusively in relation to the Holocaust. In practice, 
this has led to the creation of a neat distinction between a sort of “Upper-Case Holocaust” and 
a “lower-case holocaust.”17 The experience of the Romanies has remained on the periphery of 
genocide scholarship and is hardly ever analyzed as a case of genocide in its own right, despite 
research suggesting that “together with Jews, the Romani victims were the only ethnic/racial 
population selected for total annihilation.”18 
‘Armenian Genocide’: How Scholars Unremembered the Assyrian and Greek Genocides in the Ottoman Empire,” in 
Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory, eds. Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas La Pointe, and Douglas Irvin-
Erickson (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014); David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-
Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2006); Stewart, “The Gypsy 
Problem”; Hancock, “Responses to the Porrajmos”; Nicholas Al-Jeloo, “Who are the Assyrians?”, Conference Paper 
at The Assyrian Australian Academic Society, Sydney, Australia, July 2, 2000; Nicholas Al-Jeloo, “Assyrians: Between 
Homeland and Diaspora”, Conference Paper at Assyrian American Cultural Organization of Arizona, Arizona State 
University-West Campus, September 7, 2013.
15 Ian Hancock, “Romanies and the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation and an Overview,” in The Historiography of the Holocaust, 
ed. Dan Stone, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), 395.
16 Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, “2010 Education 
Working Group Paper on the Holocaust and Other Genocides,” United Nations, 2010, accessed March 16, 2016, http://
www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/EM/partners%20materials/EWG_Holocaust_and_Other_Genocides.pdf.
17 Hancock, “Downplaying the Porrajmos,” 82.
18 János Bársony and Ágnes Daróczi, eds., Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma during the Holocaust (New York: International 
Debate Education Association Press, 2008), 2.
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Likewise, the Armenian Genocide is the ultimate early model of a modern, bureaucratic, 
systematic genocide of a minority group viewed as a national, ethnic and religious threat. The 
atrocities against Assyrians that began just prior, in 1914, tend to be viewed, only and always, 
comparatively through the lens of the Armenian Genocide. There are important distinctions 
however, between the Assyrian and Armenian examples. The national, ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic, demographic and religious motivators that influenced the Armenian Genocide should 
not be neglected in the process of recognizing the Assyrian tragedy. However, it is fair to say that 
the Assyrian Genocide has been largely overshadowed by study of the Armenian experience. 
Debate remains as to whether the Holocaust’s status as paradigmatic example nurtures or 
hinders scholarship and memorialization of other genocides.19 In recent years, some genocide 
scholars have claimed that particular victim communities have highlighted their own suffering while 
deliberately shutting out attention and empathy for other communities. Yair Auron has criticized 
the repression of experiences of non-Jewish victims of the Nazis,20 while Dirk Moses has written 
on the phenomenon of competitiveness within genocide memorialization and historiography, 
arguing that groups seek to assert the uniqueness of their own experience while diminishing the 
suffering of others. Moses’ article about the development of the Canadian Museum of Human 
Rights claims that some communities view the memorialization of the genocide of another group 
as a direct threat to the memory of their own experience, and his application of Emile Durkheim’s 
theory of the sacred versus the profane has shown how one’s own history of genocide may be felt 
as somehow special (“events that are loved, venerated, or dreaded, and that are superior in dignity 
to the ordinary world of the profane”),21 relative to others’ experiences of genocide. Hannibal 
Travis has alleged that some scholars of the Armenian Genocide intentionally omitted information 
about the Assyrian Genocide in the construction of Armenian Genocide historical narratives.22 All 
of these theories are highly contested. For instance, in his book review, Uğur Ümit Üngör rejects 
Travis’ claim about Armenian Genocide scholars,23 while Dina Porat at Yad Vashem, the World 
Holocaust Remembrance Center, “vehemently rejects” Auron’s allegations.24 
 The authors of this paper do not believe it is helpful to blame one victim community for 
eclipsing the experiences of another; but rather seek to focus on the interplay of various factors in 
the development of each genocide. Shedding light on less well-known genocides is not intended 
to equate these with their better-known counterparts. In fact, the process of comparative analysis 
actually emphasizes distinguishing features as well as parallels, allowing a deeper understanding 
of the manifold ways that genocides are devised and implemented. It follows that exploring the 
ways in which the Assyrian and Romani histories have been ignored or forgotten, and bringing 
their genocides to light, in no way diminishes the experiences of the Ottoman Armenians or the 
Jewish communities of Europe. 
Background
The Assyrian Community
As the indigenous people of Bet-Nahrain (“the Land Between the Rivers”), the Assyrians have 
inhabited the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates River valley systems since the beginning of 
recorded history. Perhaps as early as the 2400s BCE, Assyrians had formed states in Mesopotamia, 
with their last great state falling in 612 BCE.25 King Abgar of Edessa was the first ruler to convert to 
19 For example, A. Dirk Moses, “The Canadian Museum for Human Rights: the ‘Uniqueness of the Holocaust’ and the 
Question of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 14, no. 2 (2012).
20 Ofer Aderet, “Genocide Scholar Blasts Israel’s ‘Racist’ Teaching of the Holocaust”, Haaretz, January 27, 2016, accessed 
March 13, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.699749.
21 A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 36, no. 4 (2002), 11.
22 Travis, “Constructing the ‘Armenian Genocide’,” 172.
23 Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Book review: ‘Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory’,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: 
An International Journal 8, no. 3 (2014), 101-102.
24 Aderet, “Genocide Scholar Blasts,” para 5.
25 Lawrence Cunningham and John Reich, Culture and Values: A Survey of the Humanities (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009), 10.
Armillei, Marczak, and Diamadis
103
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
Christianity, taking his subjects with him. The geostrategic importance of the Assyrian homeland 
astride key trade and travel routes made the community susceptible to repeated invasions and 
conquests by foreign forces including the Eastern Romans (erroneously named Byzantines),26 
Iranian Persians, and Mongols. 
The development of a modern, national identity amongst the Assyrians of the Ottoman Empire 
inevitably clashed with the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms emerging in the early twentieth 
century. They came to be viewed, like the Armenians, as a threat to the longed-for ethnic and 
religious homogeneity of the Turkish state. By January 1914, six years after the coup d’état that 
brought the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) to power, the long-standing enmity between 
Muslim Turks and indigenous Christian populations was at the point of exploding. 
The Ottoman Empire’s milliyet system classified personal identity by the house of worship an 
individual attended.27 The development of Assyrian Christianity28 led to a split from the Orthodox 
Patriarch in Constantinople, and Assyrians were subsequently classified as being part of the Ermeni 
milliyet,29 with the Armenian Patriarchs of Constantinople and Cilicia being responsible for their 
good behavior.  It is clear that the CUP (also known as the Young Turks), despite expressing a 
secular agenda, was in no hurry to abolish the existing religiously-based social system, reflected in 
the resolutions adopted by the 1910 CUP Congress in Thessalonike (Salonika): 
Musulmans generally should retain their arms, and where they are in a minority arms should 
be distributed to them by the authorities. ... Emigration from the Caucasus and Turkestan 
must be encouraged, land provided for the immigrants, and the Christians prevented from 
purchasing property. ... Turkey was essentially a Moslem country, and Moslem ideas and 
influence must preponderate. All other religious propaganda must be suppressed, as no 
reliance could be placed on Christians, who were always working for the downfall of the 
new regime. ... Sooner or later the complete Ottomanization of all Turkish subjects must 
be effected, but it was becoming clear that this could never be achieved by persuasion, and 
recourse must be had to force of arms.30
Moreover, genocidal language became increasingly common, laying the groundwork for the 
broader acceptance of massacre and deportation, with one of CUP’s chief ideologues, Dr. Behaeddin 
Sakir, stating in 1911, “The nations that remain from the old times in our empire are akin to foreign 
and harmful weeds that must be uprooted.”31
Romani Peoples
The Romani32 population, likely originating from the north-west of India somewhere between the 
fifth and the tenth centuries33 comprises a multitude of sub-groups, scattered across all continents.34 
The community first appeared in Europe under the Byzantine Empire, around the tenth century 
AD and were regarded as “outcasts, intruders, and threats, probably because of their dark skin, 
26 Fergus Millar, A Greek Roman Empire: Power and Belief under Theodosius II (408–450) (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2006), 15.
27 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
28 For additional analysis concerning religious developments within the Assyrian community, see Al-Jeloo, “Who are the 
Assyrians?” and Al-Jeloo, “Assyrians: Between Homeland and Diaspora”. 
29 Kent F. Schull, “Difference during the Second Constitutional period,” in Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood in 
the Former Ottoman Space, ed. Jørgen S. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 79.
30 “The Salonika Congress; The Young Turks and their Programme,” The Times (London) October 3, 1911, 3.
31 Ibid., 3.
32 In this paper, we refer to “Romanies/Romani peoples”, the term which can apply to all Romani groups, including 
but not limited to “Roma” and “Sinti”; Márton Rövid, “Cosmopolitanism and Exclusion: On the Limits Transnational 
Democracy in the Light of the Case of Roma,” PhD diss. (Budapest: Central European University, 2011), 48.
33 Ian Hancock, “The Emergence of Romani as a Koïné outside of India,” in Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle, ed. Thomas 
Acton (Hatfield, UK: The University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000), 1.
34 Letizia Mancini, “Riflessioni sull’identità dei rom,” Jura Gentium 8, (2010-2011), 23-29.  
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their association with [the] invading Muslim Ottoman Empire, and their foreign ways.”35 Over the 
following centuries, the communities developed unique languages and cultural traditions, and a 
way of life that set them apart from the dominant European population. Often referred to using 
pejorative terms such as Gypsies, Zingari, Zigeuner, Gitanos, or Cigani, their marginalized position 
can partly be attributed to a negative view of nomadism: 
…in the superior man, nomadism enlarges the spirit, educates him to wider intuitions … in 
the inferior man, like the gypsy … it creates an instability of character, …it distances him 
from permanent work and facilitates greed for other peoples’ possessions and other peoples’ 
women …  In the inferior man, nomadism destroys every notion of homeland.36
The idea that nomadism was an element of asociality became deeply rooted, and consequently, 
European countries adopted policies for the “sedentarization” (and forced assimilation) of 
Romani peoples.37 For example, Italy introduced a series of institutional measures, with Romani 
communities “treated as a public danger and subjected to bans throughout the Italian peninsula.”38 
As in the Assyrian case, by the 19th century, nationalist ideologies informed the view that Romani 
peoples represented a problem of national security. The resistance displayed by itinerant people to 
the “re-educational” policies39 enacted within different national contexts was subsequently linked 
to pseudo-scientific race theories, whereby a tendency towards crime and asociality was seen as a 
genetic feature of the group. As early as 1876, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminal anthropologist, 
described the Zingari (Gypsies) as a “criminal race.”40  
Influenced by Darwinist theory, Lombroso argued that not only was it possible to identify 
criminals through the use of anthropometric techniques, but that certain attributes, considered 
responsible for creating inferior populations among the species, were hereditary. For this reason, 
Lombroso “believed that deliberate selection was appropriate, to complement and fortify natural 
selection.”41 These perceptions created a context in which genocide, later carried out by the Nazi 
regime in Germany and its counterparts across Europe, would be considered an acceptable 
measure against Romani peoples. With the introduction of the Nuremberg laws in 1935, the Jewish 
and Romani peoples were both identified as “enemies of the race-based state.”42 
Forgotten Genocides
Seyfo (The Sword): The Assyrian Genocide
Massacres of Assyrians began in earnest in 1914, as part of preparations for the invasion of Russia 
and Persia at the year’s end. Starting with the conscription of Christian men of military age, the 
Ottoman authorities ordered massacres beyond the borders of the Turkish state, consolidating 
an established pattern of systematic massacre aimed at eliminating the indigenous non-Muslim 
presence in desired territories.43 Eyewitnesses recorded the treatment of Assyrian victims; 
Australian members of the Dunsterforce for instance, recorded that of the approximately 80,000 
Assyrians and Armenians they had encountered in the Urmiah Valley in August 1918, barely 
35 Carol Silverman, “Early History,” Cultural Survival Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1995), 8.
36 Nando Sigona and Lorenzo Monasta, Imperfect Citizenship: Research into Patterns of Racial Discrimination against Roma 
and Sinti in Italy, Osservazione, 2006, accessed March 13, 2016, http://www.osservazione.org/documenti/OA_
imperfectcitizenship.pdf, 6.
37 Council of Europe, “DOSTA! Enough! Go beyond prejudice, meet the Roma!,” Council of Europe, 2014, accessed March 
16, 2016, http://dosta.org/media/PREMS_45213_GBR_1490_DOSTA_TOOLKIT_A5.pdf.
38 Isabella Clough Marinaro, “Between Surveillance and Exile: Biopolitics and the Roma in Italy,” Bulletin of Italian Politics 
1, no. 2 (2009), 271.
39 Luca Bravi and Nando Sigona, “Educazione e Rieducazione nei Campi per ‘Nomadi’: Una Storia,” Studi Emigrazione 43, 
no. 164 (2006), 862.
40 Giulia Baldini et al., Alla periferia del Mondo: Il Popolo dei rom e dei Sinti Escluso dalla Storia (Milan: Insmli & Fondazione 
Franceschi, 2003), 57.
41 Gabriel Cavaglion, “Was Cesare Lombroso Antisemitic?,” The Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 3, no. 2 (2011), 649.
42 Bársony and Daróczi, Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma, 1.
43 See e.g. “Turkish Raid in Persia. Massacre of Christians,” Evening News (Sydney, NSW: 1869-1931), August 6, 1907, 4.
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half reached safety in British-held Mesopotamia.44 Across the decade of genocidal destruction 
(1914-1924), an estimated half of the indigenous Assyrian population of the Middle East was 
killed.45
The Turkish authorities of the Ottoman Empire, although motivated particularly by a fervent 
nationalism which ideologically fed the drive for ethnic and cultural homogeneity, did not hesitate 
to use religion as a political tool. The Young Turks declared Jihad46 in August 1914 and transformed 
the already existing practice of forced conversion of women and children into official government 
policy. Assyrian and Armenian communities were the targets of a host of genocidal strategies 
which escalated over time. In addition to mass murder, these included sexual violence, forced 
marriage and assimilation, in conjunction with forced deportation under conditions producing 
large numbers of deaths. Cultural destruction was also widespread.
However, there is a great deal of complexity around the targeting of Armenians and Assyrians, 
including geographical variance as well as differing interpretations and orders by CUP officials and 
lower level bureaucrats. In addition, atrocities were committed by a wide range of perpetrators, 
sometimes centrally ordered, sometimes acted on by local populations within a broader context of 
religious and ethnic hatred. In some geographical areas, the Armenian community was specifically 
targeted, with Assyrians and other minorities afforded a greater level of protection, at least in 
theory. In other areas, Assyrians were swept up in massacres of Armenians and both communities 
suffered huge losses.47 For example, telegrams between the governor of Diyarbekir, Dr. Resid Pasha 
and Interior Minister Talaat Pasha in July 1915 indicate divergence in the orders from the most 
senior CUP officials and the actions on the ground, with Talaat aware from German reports “that 
in recent days massacres have been planned of the Armenians in the province, as well as of the 
other Christians without any differentiation according to sect or confession” and instructing the 
governor not to apply the “disciplinary and political measures adopted vis-à-vis the Armenians … 
to the other Christians.”48 Taner Akçam, who has analyzed a wealth of Ottoman documentation, 
has explained that although Talaat demanded the killings apply only to Armenians, the massacres 
of all Christians in Diyarbekir continued. 
Eastern parts of the Empire, astride the corridor linking Anatolia with the Caucasus and 
Central Asia contained large Armenian and Assyrian populations, and because these communities 
presented a physical obstacle to the unification of the Turks in Anatolia with the Turkic-speaking 
peoples in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, this geographic area became a priority target for elimination. 
The records of the ruling political party illustrate their perception of Christian citizens as a hostile 
collective.49 Üngor notes that “Many historical sources including interviews with Assyrian survivors 
suggest that genocidal intent among the CUP elite was strongest towards the Armenians.”50 Yet, 
even though on paper the distinction between Armenian and Assyrian people was recognized, it 
appears that in the minds of the bureaucracy and the Muslim Turkish population, they were often 
seen as one enemy.51 
44 Ross Lloyd, “Savige Saviour: Dunsterforce in Persia,” Wartime, No. 12 (2000), 22-27. 
45 Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors, 433-436.
46 This was widely reported in the media at the time. See e.g. “The Sultan’s Jihad,” The West Australian (Perth, Western 
Australia), December 2, 1914, 7.
47 See e.g. Edward William Charles Noel, Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan (Basra: Government Press, 1919). 
Noel observed that “In Diarbekir itself the Syrian Jacobites were scarcely molested. Of all the Christian communities 
they know how best to get on with the Turks, and when the massacres were ordered they were officially excluded. In 
the districts, however, the Government very soon lost control of the passions they had loose (if they ever wanted to 
keep them in control), with the result that the Jacobites suffered there as much as anybody else.” 28.
48 Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 208.
49 Panayiotis Diamadis, “Australia’s first commissioner for refugees: The ‘Call from Macedonia’ and Australian 
Humanitarian Relief in the League of Nations,” Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 98, no. 1 (2012), 7.
50 Üngör, “Book review: Hidden Genocides’,” 102.
51 Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 115-116.
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Baro Porrajmos (The Great Devouring): The Romani Genocide
The history of the Romani diaspora across Europe has been characterized by centuries of 
persecution, which reached its climax under the Nazi Fascist regimes. The vision of creating a pure 
nation, free from ethnic or other minority influences was embedded in Nazi doctrine, with 500,000 
German Jews the earliest victims.   
The Romani population in Germany numbered between 20,000 and 26,000 at the start of the 
Second World War, and this small number, as well as their marginality in social and economic 
affairs52 meant they were not a high priority for the Nazis. But the goal of creating a “pure” nation 
was deeply embedded in the Nazi regime and in July 1933, a new law introduced the compulsory 
sterilization of those labeled as hereditary ill, applying predominantly to Romanies.
This law triggered a massive hunt for asocials (such as homeless and beggars), leading to 
the intensification of measures directed at destroying “organizations and subcultures considered 
to be breeding-grounds of immorality and deviance.”53 Policies against Romanies, in particular, 
escalated over the course of the war, and many thousands were imprisoned in concentration 
camps, or murdered by bullets and in gas chambers. Countless more were forcibly sterilized in 
order to rip apart the biological and social fabric of the community. Although there are no precise 
figures regarding the number of victims, between 500,000 and 1.5 million Romanies lost their lives 
during the Second World War.54 
To note that the Romani Genocide has been neglected in historical study is not to suggest it 
is equivalent to the Holocaust of the Jews. As Michael Stewart has noted, “‘The Gypsy problem’ 
occupied a totally different place in Nazi ideology that than of ‘the Jewish problem.’”55 Jews were 
undoubtedly considered the ultimate enemy of the Nazis, to be totally wiped out wherever they 
dared live.56 According to the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance, and Research,57 this totality of ideology and implementation distinguishes 
the treatment of Jews from other examples of mass murder committed by the Nazis. So called 
“community aliens”58 were not all treated the same way, and “different policies hit different groups 
at different times.”59 By the mid-1930s, Romanies had come to be viewed as “a racial, rather than 
social threat”60 and the intention to eliminate them from German society became manifest.   
Since the end of the war, academic and public attention has been primarily focused on the 
Holocaust of the Jews, with the fate of Romanies considered a marginal issue.61 According to 
Kenrick, “in the many books written describing the Nazi period and the persecution of the Jews, 
Gypsies usually appear as a footnote or small section.”62 When reference is made to Romanies, 
they are usually grouped together under the category “other non-Jewish victims.”63 Because of 
this lack of recognition, and to emphasize the specific character of their own tragedy, Romani 
52 Nikolaus Wachsmann, “The Policy of Exclusion: Repression in the Nazi State, 1933–1939,” in Short Oxford History of 
Germany: The Third Reich, ed. Jane Caplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142. 
53 Ibid., 125.
54 Commissione Diritti Umani del Senato, “Rapporto conclusivo dell’indagine sulla condizione di Rom, Sinti e 
Camminanti in Italia,” Senato della Repubblica, 2011, accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.senato.it/documenti/
repository/commissioni/dirittiumani16/Rapporto%20conclusivo%20indagine%20rom,%20sinti%20e%20caminanti.pdf.
55 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 147.
56 Wachsmann, “The Policy of Exclusion,” 128; see also Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and The Jews: The Years of 
Persecution: 1933-1939, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009); and Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi 
Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008).
57 Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, “2010 Education 
Working Group Paper,” 10.
58 These could be divided in three major categories: “political opponents (especially those on the left), social outcasts 
(those labelled as deviant), and ‘racial aliens’ (above all Jews)”. See Wachsmann, “The Policy of Exclusion,” 123.
59 Ibid., 128.
60 Ibid., 142.
61 Hancock, “Romanies and the Holocaust,” 394.
62 Donald Kenrick, The A to Z of the Gypsies (Romanies), No. 135 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), xli.
63 Ian Hancock, “On the Interpretation of a Word: ‘Porrajmos’ as Holocaust,” in Travellers, Gypsies, Roma: The Demonisation 
of Difference, eds. Michael Hayes and Thomas Acton (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006), 53.
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scholars introduced the concept Baro Porrajmos, or the “great devouring” of human life, to refer to 
the Romani Genocide.64  
Aftermath of the Genocides
Assyrian Aftermath
The 1920 Treaty of Sevres gave hope to the surviving Assyrians scattered across British Iraq, Persia 
and French Syria65 by offering “a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas 
… [with] full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious 
minorities within these areas.”66 However, often conflicting political interests of London, Paris, 
Rome and Moscow combined with the 1919 revolution led by Mustafa Kemal,67 ensured the 
Assyrian claim for autonomy, guaranteed by the League of Nations and the Great Powers, never 
materialized. In addition, the small size of the Assyrian population, itself a direct result of the 
genocide, was used as justification for the denial of an autonomous homeland for Assyrians on 
their ancient territory. The major consequence of the failure of Sevres was that systematic killing 
of the region’s Christian minorities went on for years, culminating in the destruction of Smyrne 
(Izmir) in September 1922. Despite the fact that persecution and indeed mass killings continued 
after the end of the First World War and well into the republican era, in terms of mobilizing Western 
engagement with Turkey in the decades after the war, there may have been a broad political benefit 
in relegating the Armenian Genocide to the Ottoman era and creating a distinction between that 
time and the new Turkish state. This may partly explain why Western countries allowed the 
genocides of Assyrians and other Christian minorities to fade from collective memory. 
Cultural destruction and denial continued also, as the new national governments under whose 
jurisdiction many Assyrian communities fell, claimed Assyrian land and cultural material as state 
property, and changed the names of Assyrian villages and even the names of Assyrian citizens.68 
These concrete actions were presented as proof that no indigenous Assyrian population had lived 
in the lands which were now part of these newly established nation-states. 
While Assyrians had been subsumed within the category of the Ermeni milliyet before the 
genocide, the hiddenness of Assyrian identity continued in its aftermath. The 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne did not include special protections for Assyrians, nor did it even record the Assyrians 
as an official minority group. When the governments of Iraq and Turkey replaced the Assyrian 
category in the census with broader categories of “Christian Kurds, Turks and Arabs,”69 the result 
was that Assyrians would never be recognized as a distinct group with unique religious, ethnic and 
national characteristics. These developments set the stage for decades of inaccurate descriptions of 
Assyrians as “Turco-Semites”, “Christian Kurds”, and “Semitic” or “Mountain Turks.”70  Not only 
had enormous physical losses been suffered, but the Assyrian right to its indigenous homeland, 
even to its very identity and presence was intentionally disappeared. As Travis has written: “So 
thorough has been the cultural and physical annihilation of the Assyrian people that even the 
memory of their distinctiveness is at risk.”71 
In addition, the pre-genocide Ottoman practice of categorizing people by their religious 
affiliation (for example, Nestorian or Church of the East, Chaldean, Eastern Catholic, or Syrian) 
64 Ibid., 53. 
65 Nicholas Awde, Nineb Lamassu, and Nicholas Al-Jeloo, Aramaic (Assyrian/Syriac) Dictionary and Phrasebook (New York: 
Hippocrene Books, 2007), 11.  
66 “The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920 Section I, Articles 1–260,” WWI Document Archive, May 20, 2009, accessed March 14, 2016, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260.
67 A. E. Montgomery, “The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920,” The Historical Journal, 15, no. 4 (December 
1972), 775-787.
68 Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide,” 133.
69 Ibid., 133.
70 Jan Pacal, “What happened to the Turkish Assyrians?,” Turkish Daily News,  August 29, 1996, accessed March 14, 
2016, http://www.aina.org/articles/turkish.htm; Nigar Karimova and Edward Deverell, “Minorities in Turkey,” 
Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Occasional Papers No. 19, 2001.
71 Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide,” 123.
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continued in a deliberate attempt to blur Assyrian identity and deny the genocide. The long-term 
impact of this has been a lack of academic scholarship on, and public or official recognition of, the 
Assyrian Genocide.72 
Romani Aftermath 
There are several parallels in elements of the aftermath of the Romani Genocide with those identified 
in the Assyrian case. Firstly, and crucially, is the issue of group identity. The Romanies were 
viewed as a social group, although their treatment under the Nazi regime comprised elements of 
racial ideologies that attributed to them a genetic tendency towards criminality.73 The actions taken 
against Romani communities were either dismissed or excused in a postwar environment that 
continued to persecute Romanies based on the very same stereotypes that fueled the genocide in 
the first place. The Third Reich policies against the Romanies were commonly regarded as control 
over criminals, a form of genocide denial that not only diminished the experiences of the group 
and misconstrued the motivations behind their persecution, but then blamed the victims for their 
own suffering.
Any attempts to seek recognition placed Romani survivors in a position where the same 
prejudices were unleashed. In a continuation of the discrimination they had faced for decades, many 
Romani survivors were excluded from official compensation processes, by requiring applicants 
to prove a fixed address and employment.74 Romani survivors who claimed compensation for 
incarceration in concentration camps or for forced sterilization were often told they had deserved 
the treatment they received. Some claiming compensation for physical and psychological effects 
were even examined by doctors who had been involved in the Nazi machinery.75 With Germany 
determining that actions taken against Romanies before 1943 were “legitimate official measures 
against persons committing criminal acts, not the result of policy driven by racial prejudice,”76 the 
notion that the treatment of Romanies had been justified set the precedent for ongoing denial of 
their right to recognition.
This attitude was further exacerbated by the nature of the surviving Romani populations, who 
were, like the Assyrians, scattered across national borders, diverse, and without a central authority 
or national government to advocate on behalf of the community. While a process for reparations 
for Jewish victims was established in the decades following the end of the war, and a small number 
of perpetrators brought to justice via the Nuremburg Trials, Romanies were excluded from any 
justice-seeking processes. In addition, and in contrast with the many Jews who migrated to 
America, Israel, Australia and elsewhere, Romanies generally remained in the countries they had 
been persecuted in during the war, and subjected to the same kinds of discrimination as before. 
Now though, they faced the additional trauma of “a concerted effort across Europe to deny the 
Porrajmos.”77 Alternatively, where it was acknowledged, Romani experiences were subsumed 
within the category of “non-Jewish victims”, which obscured the genocide simply by not naming 
its victims. If it was considered at all, the fate of the Romanies was viewed as a marginal issue. As 
Stewart has written “…the mass murder and sterilization of the Roma, Sinte, and Gypsies provides, 
perhaps, the locus classicus in the modern world of a genocidal catastrophe denied and cast into 
public oblivion.”78
72 This practice of religious categorization continues to this day. For more information, see Blair Baggott, “History as 
a Weapon: The use of Historiography as a Tool to Justify Political Positions in Regards to the Recognition of the 
Assyrian Genocide,” Assyrian Universal Alliance, August 10, 2014, accessed March 14, 2016, http://aua.net.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Commemoration-Of-The-Assyrian-Martyrs-And-Genocide-Day.-10th-August-2014.pdf.
73 Clough Marinaro, “Between Surveillance and Exile”, 272.
74 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 144.
75 Ibid., 143.
76 Katharine Quarmby, No Place to Call Home: Inside the Real Lives of Gypsies and Travellers (London: Oneworld Publications, 
2013), 35.
77 Robbie McVeigh, “Ethnicity Denial and Racism: The Case of the Government of Ireland Against Irish Travellers,” 
Translocations 2, no. 1 (2007), 102.
78 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 140.
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Academic Research and International Law
Assyrian Genocide
While the Armenian Genocide has been recognized by an overwhelming proportion of genocide 
scholars and is now situated within the standard canon of twentieth century genocides, very little 
scholarly literature has been produced on the Assyrian Genocide. In part this is the result of the 
complexity of the religious, cultural, ethnic and national make-up of Assyrian identity which 
comprises a range of sub-groups and religious denominations, as well as the application of various 
exonyms (identities and definitions imposed on the community by others), spreading confusion. 
Partly the lack of scholarly attention paid to the Assyrian genocide is an inadvertent side-effect 
of the inaccessibility of much of the evidence. In addition to Turkish authorities deliberately 
withholding evidence, documents that are available often appear in a range of languages, most of 
them not widely understood.79 Another important reason that the Assyrian Genocide has remained 
in the shadows is the previous emphasis on proof of perpetrator intent. Relative to evidence 
of the Armenian Genocide, proof of intent to eradicate the Assyrian population took longer to 
discover and decipher. As already mentioned, much official perpetrator documentation names the 
Armenian community as the primary group for elimination, though in practice Assyrians were 
frequently targeted.
Racho Donef pioneered research into official documents indicating genocidal intent against 
Assyrians by analyzing telegrams sent in 1914 and 1915 by the Ministry of the Interior, mostly to the 
governors of the southern and eastern Ottoman provinces of Van, Mosul, Diyarbakir, Mamuretu’l 
Aziz, Halep (Aleppo) and Bitlis. These demonstrate that all Assyrians, regardless of denomination, 
were to be “deported” and “resettled”,80 terms usually used as euphemisms for genocide.
Like Armenians, thousands of Assyrians died of starvation, thirst, exposure, disease and local 
violence, in desert camps and along the deportation routes, aligning with articles (b) “causing bodily 
or mental harm”; (c) “deliberately inflicting on the [victim] group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction”; and (d) “imposing measures intended to prevent births” of 
the Genocide Convention.81
The emphasis on mass murder in early genocide historiography tended to overshadow other 
components of genocide such as deportation and forced removal and assimilation of women and 
children. As a result of academic research as well as efforts by respected legal scholars, cultural 
and biological strategies have been proven to have represented government policy, and to have 
constituted genocide in the Armenian case. There is extensive evidence to demonstrate government 
intent to eliminate the Armenian identity via forced assimilation in addition to massacres and 
deportation.82 While there was some divergence between the treatment of Armenians and Assyrians, 
the recognition of forced assimilation in the Armenian case provides a basis for acknowledging its 
effects on Assyrians also. 
Over the last two decades, the Assyrian experience has begun to be included in 
academic conferences83 and works specifically examining the Assyrian Genocide have been 
published.84 Assyrian diaspora organizations have also increased their research output and 
advocacy campaigns. In addition, genocide scholars have begun to incorporate the Assyrian 
Genocide into journal articles and book chapters, with summaries of the Ottoman era now 
79 Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide,” 135. 
80 Racho Donef, “1915: The Deportation of the Assyrians in Ottoman Documents,” Atour, March 6, 2004, accessed March 
14, 2016, http://www.atour.com/~aahgn/news/20040306b.html.
81 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/
RES/3/260).
82 Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime, 290.  
83 See e.g., Panayiotis Diamadis, “To Deny or to Gloat: That is the Question”, Paper Presentation, Portraits of Christian 
Asia Minor International Conference in Sydney, Australia, Published in ITNetwork, Volume 14, Issue 2 Volume 
15, Issue 2 Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies, Division of Humanities, Department of Politics, Macquarie 
University, 1999, 29-30.
84 See Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors; Fuat Deniz, “En Minoritets Odyssé: upprätthållande och transformation av 
etnisk identitet i förhållande till moderniseringsprocesser: det assyriska exemplet” (Ph.D. thesis, Uppsala University, 
1999); Travis, “Native Christians Massacred”; Donef, Massacres and Deportation.
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often noting Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks as victims of displacement and genocide. 
Adam Jones’ Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, for instance, states that “while the events 
of the 1914-22 period have long been depicted in terms of the Armenian Genocide and its 
aftermath, one is justified in portraying it instead as a unified campaign against all the empire’s 
Christian minorities”.85
This view is reflected in an Assyrian saying that refers to the attitudes of the perpetrators: “An 
onion is an onion, red or white. All must be chopped.”86 However, this grouping of victims comes 
with its own issues, such as the risk that the nuances of each case can be overlooked. Combining 
all Christian minorities together as victims of the Young Turks can overstate the role of religion in 
the genocides, and dilute the ethnic, cultural and national aspects of ideologies that informed the 
treatment of the Armenian community in particular. It can also obscure other specifics, such as the 
numbers of victims and survivors. It is recorded that two million indigenous Christian Armenians, 
Assyrians and Hellenes were massacred, deported or forcibly converted to Islam by 1918,87 but 
these sorts of collective statistics fail to differentiate between the communities’ respective losses. 
The other consequence is that those Assyrians who are experiencing persecution today in Iraq 
and Syria, are consistently subsumed within the category of “Christian minorities”, which, while 
recognizing the religious character of the community, overlooks their unique cultural, national and 
ethnic characteristics. 
Romani Genocide
As in the Assyrian case, a lack of documentary evidence has contributed to the hiddenness of the 
Romani Genocide. While the Nazis meticulously documented the murder of Jews, their accounting 
of Romani deaths was deficient. The Romani population was considered to be so marginal, in fact, 
that their elimination did not require any written authorization.88 Once again, the emphasis on 
written government intent placed Romani experiences on the fringes of early academic research 
on genocide.
Survivor testimonies are also rare. In Romani cultures, history itself is an alien concept, 
especially when it is related to the commemoration of death, both individual and collective.89 
Therefore, Romani survivors were “traditionally not disposed to keeping alive the terrible 
memories from their history.”90 The orally-based nature of Romani culture and a disinclination 
to record events in writing meant that Romani survivor experiences have not been recorded or 
studied in depth. As stated by Zoltan Barany, “unlike the Jews and other victims of the Holocaust, 
many of whom were highly educated, Gypsy survivors did not leave behind diaries, did not write 
memoirs, and did not do subsequent research into this subject.”91 In addition to cultural influences, 
those survivors reintegrating into their countries of origin, such as Germany and Italy, were faced 
85 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2010), 150.
86 Varak Ketsemanian, “Remembering the Assyrian Genocide: An Interview with Sabri Atman,” The Armenian Weekly, 
January 8, 2014, accessed March 14, 2016, http://armenianweekly.com/2014/01/08/remembering-the-assyrian-genocide-
an-interview-with-sabri-atman/.
87 Estimates vary as the Turkish state did not keep records. See Jeff Benvenuto and John Lim, “The Genocide of Ottoman 
Greeks, 1914-1923,” Rutgers Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, 
http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/center-study-genocide-conflict-resolution-and-human-rights/genocide-ottoman-
greeks-1914-1923; Jeff Benvenuto, Rachel Jacobs and John Lim, “The Assyrian Genocide, 1914 to 1923 and 1933 Up 
to the Present,” Rutgers Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.
ncas.rutgers.edu/center-study-genocide-conflict-resolution-and-human-rights/assyrian-genocide. Comparing the 
problematic Ottoman census of 1912 with the survivors documented by the League of Nations in Hellas (1.4.million), 
and other agencies in Syria and the Soviet Union, and taking into account natural rates of birth and death, the fates 
of between two and three million men, women and children remain unaccounted for. On forced assimilation see 
Panayiotis Diamadis, “Children and Genocide,” in Genocide Perspectives IV: Essays on Holocaust and Genocide, ed. Colin 
Tatz (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2012); Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime.
88 Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 103.
89 Ibid., 103.
90 Hancock, “Responses to the Porrajmos,” 138.  
91 Barany, The East European Gypsies, 103.
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with enormous pressure to remain silent about their experiences, or, as already noted, blamed for 
their own imprisonment and oppression.
Yet another parallel with the hiddenness of the Assyrian Genocide is the impact of narrow 
definitions of victim groups and unrealistic expectations concerning the explicitness of evidence 
of perpetrator intent. The definition of victim groups under the Genocide Convention may be read 
as excluding Romanies, since they were assumed to have been targeted not as a racial, ethnic, 
national or religious group, but rather as a result of their ‘asociality.’ This stereotype however 
was founded on pseudo-biological racial theories, which attributed supposed criminal tendencies 
to hereditary characteristics, thought to be innate to Romanies as a group. Despite the fact that 
Romanies were targeted based on racial ideologies, early genocide scholars tended to accept 
the exclusion of Romanies from the definition of genocide victims,92 effectively sidelining their 
experiences. As Robbie McVeigh has explained, “if they are not an ethnic group ipso facto they 
cannot have experienced genocide.”93 
Although Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide included biological and cultural 
methods of genocide, when the Genocide Convention was ratified after the Second World War, 
attention was focused, understandably, on mass murder, gas chambers, ghettos and concentration 
camps. Genocidal tools that veered from these very overt and visible measures were discounted, and 
the unprecedented and industrial-scale methods used during the Holocaust became the benchmark 
for genocide. Although many Romanies were murdered by the Nazi regime, forced sterilization 
was a primary genocidal strategy against the Romani population, sometimes carried out in local 
“hereditary health clinics”94 and often unrecorded. Much like forced assimilation of Assyrian 
women and children, forced sterilization was a tactic that remained largely unacknowledged 
as a genocidal tool, despite technically qualifying as a strategy of genocide under the Genocide 
Convention.95
Mirroring another of the reasons for the lack of attention on the Assyrian Genocide was 
a heavy emphasis on clear proof of central and premeditated intent to eradicate a group. The 
treatment of Romani communities was not conducted in a particularly strategic way and although 
documents were produced indicating intent,96 sometimes decisions were made for pragmatic rather 
than ideological reasons, such as in the case of establishing and liquidating the “Gypsy camp” 
at Auschwitz.97 The lack of evidence of a single decision by authorities to eradicate the Romani 
population has been misinterpreted to mean there was no genocidal policy in place at the time. 
A contemporary understanding of genocide allows for some divergence in implementation, 
recognizing that genocide rarely stems from one decision made and documented by authorities, 
but more often progresses over time, and frequently in response to other wartime developments. 
Legally, genocidal intent can be inferred from a coordinated set of actions,98 a fact that sheds new 
92 For more on this, see Hancock, “Downplaying the Porrajmos”.
93 McVeigh, “Ethnicity Denial and Racism,” 101.
94 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 151.
95 Forced sterilization of Romani women continued after the end of the war, particularly in eastern Europe during the 
Communist era. This represented a widespread governmental practice which lingered in some areas even after 
the fall of the Iron Curtain. Although forced sterilization today affects women in many parts of the world, its 
continuing use against Romani women indicates that the relative paucity of interest in the Romani Genocide may 
have allowed practices which formed part of the genocide to continue in subsequent years. See Galya Stoyanova, 
“Forced sterilization of Romani Women–A Persisting Human Rights Violation,” Romedia Foundation, February 7, 
2013, accessed June 21, 2016, https://romediafoundation.wordpress.com/2013/02/07/forced-sterilization-of-romani-
women-a-persisting-human-rights-violation/; Open Society Foundations, “Against Her Will: Forced and Coerced 
Sterilization of Women Worldwide”, Open Society Foundations, October 4, 2011, accessed August 3, 2016, https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/against-her-will-20111003.pdf.
96 For example, Himmler’s April 1942 directive to “treat gypsies as the Jews;” Gilad Margalit, Germany and its Gypsies: A 
Post-Auschwitz ordeal (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 47.
97 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 153.
98 For example, in the context of the Armenian case, Geoffrey Robertson QC explains that “...the court must look to see 
whether there has been ‘a pattern of purposeful action’ from which a genocidal intent may be deduced – and it is 
precisely that pattern of CUP action... from which the CUP’s guilty intention may be deduced,” An Inconvenient 
Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians? (Sydney: Vintage, 2014), 108.   
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light on the Romani Genocide, during which persecution and massacres were carried out at a 
grassroots level by a range of perpetrators and across national borders, from Serbia and Croatia, to 
Italy and Romania, as well as, of course, Germany. But these were not always explicitly directed by 
the Nazis. The Romani Genocide was a prime example of structuralism, where local governments, 
low-level bureaucrats, schools and other local institutions all worked to implement a system of 
discrimination, persecution and eventually genocide. In some places, “municipal camps” were set 
up in order to concentrate Romani communities, where they were examined by scientists searching 
for the gene of asocial behavior.99 Local perpetrators operated in a culture where social and racial 
hatred was condoned and encouraged, and they were well aware that they could act with impunity. 
Yet in the aftermath of the Holocaust, this method of implementation did not align with the notion 
of genocide requiring state-sponsorship or official directions from a central authority.
Public Memory
Assyrian Monuments and Commemoration
Commemoration ceremonies dedicated to the Assyrian Genocide have largely been restricted to 
Assyrian diaspora communities. In recent years, commemoration of the Armenian Genocide has 
attracted increased attention, particularly around advocacy for recognition from the Turkish state. 
High profile speakers such as the eminent Geoffrey Robertson QC, who has become an ambassador 
for Armenian Genocide recognition, and  events including the one hundred-year anniversary of 
the commencement of the genocide (April 24, 2015) have resulted in mainstream media coverage. 
Meanwhile, official acknowledgments by the Vatican, the European Union and various nations 
including the Ottoman Empire’s then-ally, Germany, have created a sense of credibility and urgency 
around the Armenian Genocide, as well as broader public knowledge of its occurrence. In Australia, 
the connections between the Armenian Genocide and the experiences of the Anzacs in Turkey have 
begun to enter the collective consciousness.100 The Assyrian Genocide, however, remains beyond 
the awareness of the general public and attracts little coverage outside of the Assyrian press.
A host of monuments exists to officially memorialize the Armenian Genocide and some of 
these also recognize the Assyrian and Hellenic experiences.101 The establishment of such memorials 
has not, however, been simple to achieve or free from controversy. For instance, much debate 
surrounded the erection of a monument in Sydney specifically dedicated to Assyrian victims,102 
with some local Turkish groups attempting to prevent the memorial. The plaque has been subjected 
to several attacks and acts of vandalism since being erected.103
In addition, sometimes the positive impact of public memorials is diminished by continuing 
confusion concerning Assyrian identity, and debate over how to recognize the religious diversity 
within the community. It is arguable that ongoing theological, political and jurisdictional disputes 
amongst the adherents of the different Assyrian churches are hampering the cause of public 
and political recognition of the genocide. The Church of the East (“Nestorian”) and sections of 
the Syriac Orthodox (“Jacobite”) churches commemorate the “Assyrian Genocide.” Some recent 
monuments have, in response to the assertion by the Vatican-aligned Chaldean Catholic Church 
of the existence of a “Chaldean Genocide”, begun to distinguish between religious denominations 
in public memorials, such as one located in Belgium.104 A memorial unveiled in Sweden in May 
99 Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 151.
100 See e.g. Peter Stanley and Vicken Babkenian, Armenia, Australia and the Great War (Sydney: New South Publishing, 2016).
101 For example, Monument Australia, “Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian Genocides Monument,” Monument Australia, 
2016, accessed March 15, 2016, http://monumentaustralia.org.au/themes/conflict/genocide/display/97793-hellenic%2C-
armenian-and-assyrian-genocides; Monument Australia, “Assyrian Genocide Monument,” Monument Australia, 2016, 
accessed March 15, 2016, http://monumentaustralia.org.au/themes/conflict/genocide/display/93083-assyrian-genocide-
monument.
102 Ibid.
103 Most recently, it was defaced in April 2015, Kate Aubusson, “Assyrian Memorial in Bonnyrigg Vandalized,” The 
Sydney Morning Herald, April 16, 2015, accessed March 22, 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/assyrian-memorial-in-
bonnyrigg-vandalised-20150416-1mmvgt.html.
104 Abdulmesih BarAbraham and Miryam Abraham, “The Assyrian Genocide Monument in Belgium,” Assyrian 
International News Agency, August 9, 2013, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.aina.org/news/2013089120251.htm.
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2015 complicates efforts to bring the Assyrian experience out of its current state of hiddenness, 
by referring to the “Centenary of the Genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans 
and Hellenes.” Similarly, the “Oecumenical Memorial” in Berlin, Germany, identifies the victim 
populations as “Armenians, Hellenes of Asia Minor, Pontus and eastern Thrace, and Arameans 
(Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans).”105 It comprises a set of four elaborate memorials along a wall, 
creating three separate spaces for each group as well as one, common space.
While these memorials are undoubtedly well intentioned, they serve to maintain historical 
factions and divisions that were established under the Ottoman Empire and even earlier, and to 
ensure the Assyrian Genocide remains misunderstood or simply ignored by the general public. 
Romani Monuments and Commemoration
It was not until the 1970s that an important shift occurred in the acknowledgement and 
memorialization of Romani experiences during the Nazi era. Alongside civil rights movements 
and a growing body of scholarly literature, Romanies began to push for greater attention to be 
paid to their experience of genocide.106 A small, albeit increasing, body of literature now focuses 
on the genocide of the Romanies in Germany and other European states that were part of the 
Axis during the Second World War.107 Still today though, Romanies “seldom appear in official 
statistics and Holocaust victim commemoration events.”108 And as Hancock maintains, there is 
still “a long way to go both with our understanding of the Porrajmos and with achieving its proper 
acknowledgement in the classroom.”109 The task of recognition is complicated by the fact that, 
like the Assyrians, the Romanies constitute an internally diverse group, characterized by cultural 
fragmentation as well as factional rivalries, which has prevented the possibility of empowerment 
around common social, cultural and political goals.110
In Italy, the Porrajmos remains highly under-studied and the memory of the Romanies’ past 
is still not officially recognized. Indeed, its very reality continues to be questioned. Historical 
investigation of the persecution and internment of Italian Romanies has been carried out only by 
independent researchers and only since around 1999. An increase in national patriotism is now 
playing a key role in the emergence of an historical amnesia and revisionism which is allowing 
racism to re-emerge, together with the myth of Italian kindness and moral superiority.111
In Germany, on the contrary, Italy’s principal partner in the Axis alliance, this recognition 
arrived in 1982 under then chancellor Helmut Kohl. More recently, on Holocaust Memorial Day in 
2011, Zoni Weisz became the first Romani survivor to address the German Parliament,112 and the 
following year, Chancellor Angela Merkel inaugurated a monument dedicated to Sinti and Roma 
victims.113 In those countries where local populations collaborated with the Nazis and perpetrated 
105 For a visual depiction of the monument plans, see FÖGG, “Konzept der Gedenkstaette”, FÖGG, accessed March 15, 
2016, http://www.genozid-gedenkstaette.de/gedenkstaette/Mahnmal-Konzep-2015.pdf.
106 Symi Rom-Rymer, “Roma in the Holocaust,” Moment, July/August, 2011, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.
momentmag.com/roma-in-the-holocaust/.
107 Michelle Kelso, “‘And Roma were Victims, too’ The Romani Genocide and Holocaust Education in Romania,” 
Intercultural Education 24, no. 1-2 (2013): 61-78; Gilad Margalit, Germany and its Gypsies; Zoltán Vági, László Csősz and 
Gábor Kádár, The Holocaust in Hungary: Evolution of a Genocide (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2013).
108 European Commission, “EU Projects in Favour of the Roma Community. Exhibition Catalogue. Education, Culture, 
Youth Best Practices”, EUROPA, March, 2010, accessed March 14, 2016, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/eu-projects-in-
favour-of-the-roma-community-pbNC8010213/;pgid=Iq1Ekni0.1lSR0OOK4MycO9B0000F_Iix6ef;sid=KuQjploCbS8jrg
zkGci9ATgniCdf9hdhNJY=, p. 10.
109 Hancock, “Romanies and the Holocaust,” 394.
110 Boscoboinik, “Challenging Borders”, 187.
111 Riccardo Armillei, “The Institutional Concealment of the Romanies’ Culture: The Ongoing Legacy of Fascist Italy,” 
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 22, no. 5 (2016): 503.
112 Andrew Bowen and Shant Shahrigian, “German President makes Historic Speech at Auschwitz,” Deutsche Welle, 
January 27, 2011, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/german-president-makes-historic-speech-at-
auschwitz/a-14798859.
113 Karoline Kuhla, “A Monument to the Porajmos: Sinti and Roma Holocaust Victims Remembered in Berlin,” SPIEGEL 
ONLINE, October 24, 2012, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/monument-to-
sinti-and-roma-murdered-in-the-holocaust-opens-in-berlin-a-863212.html.
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their own massacres of Jews and Romanies, there has been little motivation to commemorate the 
victims for fear of highlighting their own complicity. In Romania, despite the unveiling of a $7.4 
million Holocaust memorial to commemorate over 280,000 Jews and 11,000 Romanies who died as 
victims of the Ion Antonescu regime, the murder of the Romani community remains a taboo subject 
(as explored in the 2015 documentary film Valley of Sighs).114 Although Romanies are recognized 
among the victims, the context of their suffering has not been well illuminated, nor perpetrators 
held accountable. As Kelso and Eglitis write, “Roma are simultaneously represented, unrepresented 
and misrepresented in the historical story and memorial of the Holocaust in Romania.”115 
In Hungary, Roma and Sinti Genocide Remembrance Day is commemorated in a number of 
memorial events held throughout the country. In 2014, former President János Áder delivered a 
speech at the inauguration of a new center dedicated to Romani history, culture, education and 
Holocaust remembrance. Despite these steps, Romani survivors and their descendants “are not 
only struggling against attempts to disavow and erase the memory of what happened to them, but 
also against new persecutions.”116 The rise of right-wing ultra-nationalism does not bode well for 
Porrajmos or Holocaust remembrance in Hungary.
 In Bulgaria, March 10 was designated by the Council of Ministers as the “Day of the 
Salvation of the Bulgarian Jews and of the Victims of the Holocaust and of the Crimes against 
Humanity.”117 However, there is no specific statement by the Council as to whether Romanies 
are included as victims. In 2014, Croatia’s parliament adopted August 2 as “International Roma 
Holocaust (Porrajmos) Remembrance Day.”118 Yet, still many Croatian Romanies continue to suffer 
segregation and discrimination that pervades every aspect of their lives, from education to health 
and employment.119 As for the Slovak Republic, terms that express the Romani Genocide, such as 
Porrajmos or Samudaripen (mass killing) are still “not recognized and not acceptable.”120 
Conclusion
The parallels between Assyrian and Romani genocides having been treated as an afterthought of 
history, or ignored completely, are significant. What does this tell us about why some genocides 
are omitted from collective memory and official writing of history?
There is rarely one reason for a genocide having been forgotten. Exclusive attention on better-
known genocides that occurred simultaneously cannot be said, in and of itself, to have obscured the 
Assyrian and Romani cases. There is an interplay between various factors, some inadvertent and 
others deliberate that has resulted in the two genocides remaining on the periphery of academic 
and public attention. Many of these factors began even before the genocides occurred, continued 
throughout, and were consolidated in the aftermath of the events.
In both cases, issues such as a complex group identity that extends beyond neat ethnic, national 
and/or religious lines, as well as definitions imposed by others and intentional muddying of the 
114 Mihai Andrei Leaha, “The Last Roma Testimonies about Transnistria in the Documentary Film ‘Valley of Sighs’,” 
(paper presented at the Gypsy Lore Society Annual Meeting and Conference on Romani Studies, Chisinau, Republic 
of Moldova, September 10-12, 2015).
115 Michelle Kelso and Daina S. Eglitis, “Holocaust commemoration in Romania: Roma and the Contested Politics of 
Memory and Memorialization,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 4 (2014), 487.
116 Katalin Katz, “History and Memory: A Case Study of the Roma at the Komarom Camp in Hungary,” in The Roma. A 
Minority in the Europe: Historical, Political and Social Perspectives, eds. Roni Stauber and Raphael Vago (Budapest–New 
York: Central European University Press, 2007), 70.
117 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Holocaust Memorial Days in the OSCE Region: An Overview 
of Governmental Practices,” OSCE, 2012, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.osce.org/odihr/135916?download=true 
27.
118 Dalje.com, “Croatia declares August 2 Roma Genocide Remembrance Day,” Dalje.com, December 12, 2014, accessed 
March 14, 2016, http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-croatia/croatia-declares-august-2-roma-genocide-remembrance-day/530625.
119 Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2014/15: The State of the World’s Human Rights,” Amnesty 
International, 2015, accessed March 15, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/.
120 Council of Europe, “Overview on the Recognition of the Genocide of Roma and Sinti (Pharrajimos/Samudaripen) 
and on the Officialization of the date of 2 August as a Commemoration day for the Victims of World War II in 
Member States of the Council of Europe,” Council of Europe, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016, http://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680089824.
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group’s identity, have contributed to an ongoing lack of clarity about what constitutes Assyrian 
and Romani identity, let alone the history of their genocides. Calculated strategies to hide the 
history of the communities and annul their identification as a group may even be said to constitute 
genocidal tactics in themselves. In both examples, internal divisions and the absence of a unified 
authority to advocate the cause of recognition continue to exacerbate this situation.
Moreover, the relative lack of official documentation, corroborating evidence and survivor 
testimony, compared with that available for the Holocaust and Armenian Genocide, relegated the 
two genocides to virtual oblivion within academia until recently. In the Assyrian case, in addition 
to the Turkish authorities’ denial and refusal to release documentation, that evidence which is 
available is less accessible, requiring knowledge of many cultures, geographical areas, aspects of 
history, and languages. The tactics used after the war to erase Assyrian identity in official records 
meant that the history has not been easy to reconstruct and analyze.
The Assyrian and Romani genocides were also forgotten due to aspects of early academic study 
of genocide, including the focus on written evidence of perpetrator intent and on direct methods of 
mass murder at the expense of other genocidal strategies. Both the Assyrian and Romani genocides 
were committed by a range of perpetrators; varied from region to region; relied on massacre as well 
as cultural and biological elimination strategies; and involved large-scale deportations causing 
huge numbers of deaths.
Meanwhile, the narrow scope of the Genocide Convention, which provides the legal framework 
for genocide to this day, combined with an ongoing misperception of Romanies as a social, rather 
than ethnic group, effectively excluded the genocide of the Romanies from legal recognition. 
Acknowledgement remains a crucial issue for today’s Romanies and Assyrians. This 
acknowledgement does not, however, rest on equating their experiences with their better-known 
counterparts or blaming other communities for eclipsing their experiences and history. What is a 
critical progression on the path to achieving full recognition of the Assyrian and Romani genocides 
is a better understanding of how the process of forgetting and concealing the two genocides 
developed. Only once these processes are more fully understood can redress occur in academia, 
the law and public commemoration spaces. 
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Abstract: This essay will discuss the research being conducted on Khmer Rouge-era human skeletal remains in 
Cambodia, and the implications of this work. First, the Cambodian project to conserve and analyze the remains 
at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center (Choeung Ek) will be briefly discussed. This exceptional undertaking was 
the first complete scientific analysis of human remains from a Cambodian mass gravesite. Second, the author’s 
independent research at Choeung Ek and a collaborative project at another mass gravesite will be reviewed. The 
author’s research focuses on the traumatic injuries and demographics of the remains at Choeung Ek, while also 
incorporating cultural understandings of these memorials. Finally, the importance of this work within Cambodia 
and the international community will be examined; this essay will attempt to situate the research being undertaken 
in Cambodia within the broader framework of human rights after atrocity.
Keywords: Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, human skeletal remains, forensic anthropology, genocide, human rights, 
traumatic injuries
Introduction
After a deadly civil war in the early 1970s, the Khmer Rouge1 Communist regime came to power 
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in April 1975, subsequently establishing the government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (DK). The DK leadership, led by the infamous Pol Pot, abolished money, education, 
religion and private property, and almost all Cambodians were forcibly relocated from cities to 
collective farms in the countryside. The conditions were severe, and historical estimates state 
that between 1975 and 1979, approximately one quarter of the Cambodian population of nearly 
eight million died from mistreatment, overwork, malnutrition, and violence.2 On January 7, 1979 
Vietnamese troops entered Phnom Penh ending the three years, eight months, and twenty days of 
Democratic Kampuchea.
In April 1994, the United States Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act to investigate 
the Khmer Rouge era atrocities. The following year the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-
Cam) was founded as a research and documentation institute to provide information about the 
Khmer Rouge period to scholars and the public.3 Beginning in 1994, DC-Cam launched a ten-year 
project to locate and map sites of Khmer Rouge atrocities including mass graves, former prisons 
and security centers, and memorials. At the completion of the project, DC-Cam had identified 
19,733 mass graves, 196 former prisons, and eighty-one memorials.4 
One of the most well-known mass gravesites, and the one that is used for national 
commemorations, is Choeung Ek. Located approximately 15 km southwest of the center of Phnom 
Penh, today it is called The Choeung Ek Genocidal Center, although colloquially it is known as 
the “Killing Fields.” After 1977, the former Chinese cemetery at Choeung Ek was used by the 
Khmer Rouge as an execution and burial location for thousands of men, women, and children. The 
majority of the victims came from S-21 (Tuol Sleng), the highest level security and torture center in 
use during the Khmer Rouge period.5 When Choeung Ek was discovered shortly after the Khmer 
1 “Khmer Rouge” is the French derivative of “Khmer Kroham” or “Red Khmer.” This term was first used by Cambodia’s 
King Norodom Sihanouk in the 1960s to describe Cambodian members of the Communist party. Khmer Rouge can 
refer to the regime, as well as individuals who worked for the regime, also known as cadre. Meng-Try Ea, The Chain of 
Terror: The Khmer Rouge Southwest Zone Security System (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2005), xii.
2 Ben Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 
1975-80,” in Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial & Justice in Cambodia & East Timor (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 270-71.
3 Documentation Center of Cambodia, “History and Description of Dc-Cam: Our History,” http://d.dccam.org/Abouts/
History/Histories.htm.
4 “Mapping of Cambodia Killing Fields (1975-1979),” http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Mapping_1975-79.htm.
5 Dacil Q. Keo and Nean Yin, Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at Secret Prison S-21 (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center 
of Cambodia, 2011).
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Rouge were driven from Phnom Penh in January 1979, 129 mass graves were found. Eighty-six 
of these graves were subsequently exhumed, and the remains of nearly 9,000 individuals were 
disinterred.6 In 1988, the Cambodian government built a memorial stupa (shrine) to commemorate 
and protect the physical remains of the Khmer Rouge victims,7 and it is within this stupa that the 
human bones have stayed—virtually untouched—until recently. 
Analysis and Preservation of Human Remains in Cambodia
Conservation at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center
In 2012, with the official consent of Cambodia’s Prime Minister, Hun Sen, a conservation project 
was launched. Under the direction of a Ministerial and Municipal committee, the project sought to 
preserve and curate the human bones, tools/weapons, and textiles at the Choeung Ek Genocidal 
Center. This was the start of the first comprehensive scientific analysis and preservation of human 
remains from mass gravesites throughout Cambodia,8 and the scientific team was exclusively 
Cambodian. 
6 Author’s discussion with Choeung Ek managerial staff, December 2015.
7 Rachel Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials,” in 
Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives, ed. Susan E. Cook (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 
270.
8 Other analyses have taken place since the exhumation of the remains in 1980, but none have assessed all of the remains 
collectively. For example, see: Gregory E. Berg, “Biological Affinity and Sex Determination Using Morphometric and 
Morphoscopic Variables from the Human Mandible” (The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2008); “Case Report 6.1: 
Probable Machete Trauma from the Cambodian Killing Fields,” in Identification of Traumatic Skeletal Injuries Resulting 
from Human Rights Abuses and Armed Conflicts, ed. Erin H. Kimmerle and Jose Pablo Baraybar (New York: Taylor & 
Francis Group, LLC, 2008); “Biological Affinity and Sex from the Mandible Utilizing Multiple World Populations,” 
in Biological Affinity in Forensic Identification of Human Skeletal Remains: Beyond Black and White, ed. Gregory E. Berg 
and Sabrina C. Ta’ala (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2015); Sabrina C. Ta’ala, Gregory E. Berg, and Kathryn Haden, “Blunt 
Force Cranial Trauma in the Cambodian Killing Fields,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 51, no. 5 (2006); “Case Report 4.2: 
A Khmer Rouge Execution Method: Evidence from Choeung Ek,” in Identification of Traumatic Skeletal Injuries Resulting 
from Human Rights Abuses and Armed Conflicts, ed. Erin H. Kimmerle and Jose Pablo Baraybar (New York: Taylor & 
Francis Group, LLC, 2008); Michael S. Pollanen, “Mission Report: Forensic Survey of Three Memorial Sites Containing 
Human Skeletal Remains in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” (Toronto: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2002).
Figure 1. The inside of the memorial stupa at Choeung Ek.
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The human remains within the stupa comprise crania, mandibles, long bones, and other 
skeletal elements (i.e., sacra, os coxae, scapulae, etc.), which were systematically removed, 
cleaned, analyzed, and preserved. Analysis and inventory of the remains were also incorporated 
to properly record the available information for posterity. In particular, the team was interested in 
demographics (i.e., age-at-death and sex) and skeletal traumatic injuries.
The project was completed in December 2015. In less than three years the team analyzed and 
preserved tens of thousands of human bones. This is an extraordinary achievement that has yet to 
be replicated in Cambodia. To date, data derived from the human remains at Choeung Ek have 
not been analyzed and there are no forthcoming publications about this work in either Khmer or 
English. Perhaps this will occur in the future. The analytical/inventory forms for each individual 
have been published in Khmer in a 32-volume set that is retained by the Choeung Ek Genocidal 
Center, the Cambodian Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, and other Cambodian organizations as 
scientific documentation of the work that was completed.
Current Research and Projects
The author was fortunate to be able to join this team at their laboratory for the first time in 2014. She 
returned in late 2015 to begin anthropological doctoral research employing a biocultural (biological 
and socio-cultural) approach to address questions concerning the individuals executed by the 
Khmer Rouge regime and the agency (the effect on living individuals) of the resulting skeletal 
remains. The author scientifically assessed the demographics (i.e., age-at-death, sex, ancestry) and 
evidence of traumatic injuries (e.g., blunt force, sharp force, and gunshot trauma) of more than 500 
crania at Choeung Ek. 
The author’s research is complimentary to the exclusively Cambodian research conducted 
at Choeung Ek and employs different methods and technology to answer additional questions. 
By systematically analyzing the human skeletal remains at Choeung Ek, which directly retain 
evidence of violent actions, the author will integrate previously undocumented data into a more 
holistic narrative of these Khmer Rouge atrocities. The author hopes that her research will greatly 
contribute to the literature on Khmer Rouge violence, as well as the current focus within forensic 
anthropology on crimes against humanity and genocide.
The socio-cultural component of the author’s research will evaluate the incorporation of 
skeletal remains into Cambodian memorials. While these memorials are well-documented, 
research has not specifically addressed the role of the physical skeletal remains within; since these 
structures were built to shelter the remains, studying their primary component (the bones) will be 
an important contribution to the memorial literature. The author directly observed more than a 
Figure 2. The author conducting research at Choeung Ek.
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dozen memorials and conducted interviews with the site’s caretaker(s) to address the role that the 
memorials and/or remains play in modern Cambodia. 
A bio-cultural approach for the author’s research is an anthropological imperative. A 
biological analysis of the skeletal remains provides demographic data and permits quantification 
of the traumatic injuries; but without integrating the socio-cultural context, these remains persist as 
isolated specimens of scientific evidence on the periphery of modern Cambodian life. By evaluating 
the agency, or social impact of these remains—via their presence within memorial structures—the 
author will address the conceptions of bones as both active materials (objects) and as embodied 
memories (subjects).9 Rather than focusing exclusively on what has been done to/with the bones 
since they were exhumed in the 1980s, this research will also evaluate what effect the remains have 
on living people.
After the analysis and conservation of the remains at Choeung Ek finished, the author and the 
Choeung Ek laboratory director wanted to collaborate to continue this important work throughout 
the country. A project proposal was developed to analyze, document, and preserve human remains 
at another mass gravesite in Cambodia called Krang Ta Chan. Krang Ta Chan is a former Khmer 
Rouge prison and gravesite located in Takeo Province. At this site, it is estimated that more than 
10,000 people were executed and at least 3,000 bodies were exhumed.10
With funding granted by the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and additional 
international donations, the Krang Ta Chan project became the fourth11 effort to systematically 
analyze human remains from the Khmer Rouge era. This new project had three primary goals: 1) 
to scientifically analyze the previously exhumed human skeletal remains located at Krang Ta Chan, 
2) to renovate the memorial stupa currently at the site, and 3) to provide documentation about the 
human remains for historical and future research. It is hoped that this project and the associated 
research will contribute evidence of Khmer Rouge violence that has hitherto been undocumented 
in the historical literature.
Employing the same techniques used for the remains at Choeung Ek, this project began in 
April 2016. All of the remains were removed from the stupa and transported to the laboratory at 
Choeung Ek where they were assigned identification numbers, cleaned, analyzed, photographed, 
and preserved. The team documented more than 1,900 crania and thousands of other bones 
belonging to both adults and children. The remains were returned to the renovated (i.e., cleaned, 
painted, and with new glass) stupa in Krang Ta Chan and a solemn Khmer Buddhist ceremony was 
held for the local community to call the spirits back to the mortal remains and wish them well in 
their next lives.
It is the author’s hope that this type of analysis and preservation of human remains from the 
Khmer Rouge era will continue in Cambodia, as much information can be gleaned from studying 
human remains. However, as discussed below, perspectives on this work vary. 
Implications for Analyzing and Preserving Human Remains from Human Rights Atrocities 
and Genocides
While it is informative to describe the aforementioned analytical research, more pertinent is the 
significance of these analyses and research in Cambodia—as well as how this research contributes 
to the international study of human rights and genocide. The following discussion will attempt 
to situate the skeletal research being undertaken in Cambodia within the broader framework of 
human rights after atrocity.
The analysis of modern human remains from violent conflicts is primarily conducted by 
forensic anthropologists. Forensic anthropologists and archaeologists12 have been involved in 
9 Cara Krmpotich, Joost Fontein, and John Harries, “The Substance of Bones: The Emotive Materiality and Affective 
Presence of Human Remains,” Journal of Material Culture 15, no. 4 (2010): 373.
10 Vorn Neang, “Brief History of Kraing Ta Chan Genocide Site,” (Phnom Penh: Culture and Fine Arts Office, 1996), 8.
11 The team at Choeung Ek conducted two smaller analytical and preservation projects while completing the Choeung Ek 
work.
12 A simplified distinction between forensic anthropologists and archaeologists is as follows: archaeologists are primarily 
trained to locate graves and buried bodies and remove them from the ground, while anthropologists are skeletal 
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the investigation of political violence and human rights violations for many decades. The first 
inclusion of forensic experts— particularly anthropologists— in a human rights investigation was 
in 1984 when professionals were asked to investigate the “disappeared” from Argentina’s military 
dictatorship (Dirty War) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.13 
As the discipline of forensic anthropology becomes more widely recognized internationally, 
it is now common for these professionals to be involved in the identification of disaster victims 
and victims of human rights violence.14 Presumably this trend will continue in the near future as 
anthropologists and archaeologists are able to provide information that is otherwise inaccessible.
The responsibilities of forensic anthropologists and archaeologists often include (mass) grave 
exhumation, skeletal and material culture analysis (primarily analyses and documentation of 
biological characteristics and traumatic injuries), assisting with identification of the decedents, 
providing legal testimony, and collecting ante-mortem (before death) data on decedents.15 
Therefore, in the context of human rights violence or genocide, the work of forensic anthropologists 
can demonstrate that multiple individuals residing within a common grave was purposeful rather 
than coincidental; it can provide evidence suggesting the cause of death; and the work can offer 
specialists trained to analyze the recovered remains. In some areas of the world, forensic anthropology and 
archaeology are distinct fields, while in others they are combined. In some cases a professional can have training and 
expertise in both specialties.
13 Dawnie Wolfe Steadman and William D. Haglund, “The Scope of Anthropological Contributions to Human Rights 
Investigations,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 50, no. 1 (2005): 1.
14 Dawnie Wolfe Steadman, “The Places We Will Go: Paths Forward in Forensic Anthropology,” in Forensic Science: Current 
Issues, Future Directions, ed. Douglas H. Ubelaker (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2013), 145-47.
15 Ibid., 133-36; Steadman and Haglund, “The Scope of Anthropological Contributions to Human Rights Investigations,” 3.
Figure 3. The Krang Ta Chan memorial and remains in Takeo, Cambodia. 
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biological information which has the potential to lead to personal identifications. Additionally, 
forensic anthropological contributions to the analysis of traumatic injuries and violence at the 
population-level (i.e., taking the injuries of entire groups of victims into account rather than simply 
analyzing one victim individually) allows for geographic and temporal comparisons of such 
atrocities,16 which directly contributes to the global nature of genocide and human rights studies.
Returning to Cambodia, after the Khmer Rouge regime officially ended in January 1979, 
citizens and local governmental authorities throughout the country proceeded to collect human 
remains and artifacts from mass graves and place them in memorials for preservation. In the 
subsequent decades, however, the memorials and the remains began to deteriorate. After noting 
this degradation, the Cambodian government issued directives in 2001 to preserve the remains of 
the victims of the Khmer Rouge. “In order to preserve the remains as evidence of these historic 
crimes and as the basis for remembrance and education by the Cambodian people as a whole, 
especially future generations,” as the government circular states, “all local authorities at province 
and municipal level shall cooperate with relevant expert institutions in their areas to examine, 
restore and maintain existing memorials, and to examine and research other remaining grave 
sites, so that all such places may be transformed into memorials…for both citizens and tourists.”17 
The preservation of remains and memorials in Cambodia, was therefore, officially sanctioned and 
encouraged.
The projects at Choeung Ek and Krang Ta Chan are fulfilling the aforementioned goals 
established in 2001 for the preservation and examination of both the human remains and the 
memorials. Despite a fifteen-year delay, the work is now being conducted in order to document 
the violence inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, preserve the human remains for future generations of 
Cambodians and international visitors, and maintain the memorials to protect the remains and 
provide a location for visitors to pay their respects to the deceased. However, it must be noted that 
the work with the human remains in Cambodia is not currently forensic as these data and results 
are not directly contributing to legal cases. This status may change in the future, but currently the 
term for the work is more correctly classified as applied skeletal biology or osteology (the study of 
human bones) rather than forensic anthropology.
Additionally, both projects as well as the author’s research are providing information that has 
not been available until now. While there are historical and eyewitness accounts of the violence 
that transpired during the Khmer Rouge era, the physical remains were not analyzed until three 
years ago. Human remains, in contrast to historical records, provide direct evidence of traumatic 
events—in the form of distinct skeletal injury patterns—that can be assessed to discern one of the 
key tenets of anthropology: human behavior.18 Thus, this research is vital for a comprehensive 
understanding of this time period and for international awareness.
Controversies
However, in Cambodia as well as other countries, the exhumation of mass graves, the analysis 
of the human remains within, and the subsequent disposition of these disinterred remains are 
not without controversy. It must be noted that human remains resulting from genocide or crimes 
against humanity are rarely accessible for research primarily because they are politically, culturally, 
ethically, and religiously sensitive. If the unidentified remains are not buried or cremated, and 
therefore potentially available for study, it is generally not possible to ask for family permission 
to work with the remains, which is problematic. As mentioned above, only recently has the 
Cambodian government granted permission for large-scale analysis of skeletal remains from the 
Khmer Rouge era; however, as all of the remains are unidentified, families cannot be consulted 
to provide permission. Given the varying socio-cultural and religious contexts of post-atrocity 
16 Debra A. Komar and Sarah Lathrop, “Patterns of Trauma in Conflict Victims from Timor Leste,” Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 57(2012): 5.
17 Royal Government of Cambodia, “Circular on Preservation of Remains of the Victims of the Genocide Committed 
During the Regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1978), and Preparation of Anlong Veng to Become a Region for 
Historical Tourism,” http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Victim_Memorials.htm.
18 Dennis C. Dirkmaat et al., “New Perspectives in Forensic Anthropology,” Yearbook of Physical Anthropology 51(2008): 38.
Fleischmann
127
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
regions, the ramifications of working with human remains must be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis and should include governmental, cultural, and familial/community parties.
Prior to the graves being exhumed and the remains disinterred, many scholars have recently 
begun to discuss the conflicting ideologies and desires of forensic science/anthropology and other 
groups. As Rosenblatt19 and Crossland20 note, for example, justice, evidence, and truth mean 
different things to different political, social, and religious stakeholders. In many post-atrocity 
nations, religious leaders citing various beliefs and doctrines, have objected “to exhumation, 
autopsy, and other forensic practices, even when the mass graves in question contained crucial 
evidence of atrocities committed against their own members.”21 Rosenblatt continues by stating 
that the division between religious groups and forensic investigators is not that the forensic teams 
are disrespectful of the dead or are mistreating them; rather, it is about disturbing the bodies 
and the graves (or sacred spaces) that they occupy. Religious or cultural groups may believe that 
forensic teams profane the spaces and the individuals within if the grave is disturbed.22 
Crossland23 provides another example of contested forensic work: although the exhumations 
of the mass graves in Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s were politically sanctioned, mothers and 
other surviving relatives of the victims were opposed to the exhumations stating that rather than 
resulting in a reappearance of their family members, the forensic disinterment was a definitive 
indication that their children and relatives were deceased. Until those who committed the crimes 
were held accountable, the mothers wanted to remember their children as alive rather than dead; 
as long as their children were “disappeared,” the mothers could protest for accountability. These 
are two examples of contested spaces and ideologies in which forensic anthropologists and 
archaeologists find themselves and which must be considered before any forensic investigations or 
analysis of human remains are begun.
Finally, the disposition of disinterred remains can be fraught with controversy. In post-atrocity 
nations such as Guatemala,24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and many others, the disinterred remains have 
been buried, often as a means to counter the disorder of the mass violence and mass graves.25 
In Rwanda and Cambodia, however, human remains are publicly displayed.26 In Cambodia, the 
display of the human remains at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum (the former Tuol Sleng/S-21 
detention center in Phnom Penh mentioned above) came under scrutiny by the late Cambodian 
King Norodom Sihanouk in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
When Tuol Sleng was converted into a museum in 1980, a map of Cambodia was created 
from 300 disinterred human crania and other bones and hung on the wall within the museum.27 In 
opposition to the governmental rhetoric of “human remains as ‘evidence,’” the late King Sihanouk 
employed religious discourse in 2001 requesting that the remains of the Khmer Rouge victims be 
19 Adam Rosenblatt, “Sacred Graves and Human Rights,” in Human Rights at the Crossroads, ed. Mark Goodale (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 125.
20 Zoe Crossland, “Evidential Regimes of Forensic Archaeology,” Annual Review of Anthropology 42(2013): 131.
21 Rosenblatt, “Sacred Graves and Human Rights,” 125.
22 Ibid., 132-33.
23 Zoe Crossland, “Violent Spaces: Conflict over the Reappearance of Argentina’s Disappeared,” in Matériel Culture: The 
Archaeology of Twentieth-Century Conflict, ed. John Schofield, William Gray Johnson, and Colleen M. Beck (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 119-23.
24 Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 39.
25 Sarah E. Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica’s Missing (Berkeley: University of 
California Pre, 2008), 204.
26 See Elena Lesley, “Death on Display: Bones and Bodies in Cambodia and Rwanda,” in Necropolitics: Mass Graves 
and Exhumations in the Age of Human Rights, ed. Francisco Ferrándiz and Antonius C.G.M. Robben (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) for an informative comparison of the presence of remains in Cambodia and 
Rwanda.
27 Wynne Cougill, “Buddhist Cremation Traditions for the Dead and the Need to Preserve Forensic Evidence in 
Cambodia,” Documentation Center of Cambodia, http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Buddhist_Cremation_Traditions.
htm; Alexander Laban Hinton, “Genocide and the Politics of Memory in Cambodia,” in Hidden Gennocides: Power, 
Knowledge, Memory, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas La Pointe, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2013), 159-60
Working with the Remains: Skeletal Analysis after Atrocity
128
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2
cremated in Khmer Buddhist tradition to honor the spirits and allow them to be re-incarnated.28 
However, Sihanouk later retracted his request for cremation possibly because of political and public 
opposition to his proposal.29 The map of skulls was later dismantled in 2002 citing the deteriorating 
condition of the bones.30 
In response to the late King’s request, Prime Minister Hun Sen did offer to hold a referendum 
on the issue of cremating the human remains throughout the country, but not until after the trials 
of the Khmer Rouge leaders at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, 
also commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal) conclude, “in case remains were needed as 
evidence before the court.”31 As the ECCC cases are still ongoing, it is likely that the discussion 
regarding disposition of the human remains from the Khmer Rouge era will be renewed in the 
future.
Although forensic anthropologists and archaeologists have long been involved in the 
assessments of genocide and crimes against humanity, the amalgamation of forensic science and 
human rights is still in its infancy. Discrepancies between various stakeholders, political narratives, 
religious ideologies, and local and international communities will continue to pose challenges to 
the exhumation of mass graves, the analysis of the human remains, and the disposition of these 
remains. The questions and issues arising from working with atrocity-derived human remains 
are valuable and must continue to be discussed within the forensic science and human rights 
communities. Cambodia is merely one example of the work being done with human remains from 
an era of mass violence; while certainly not representative of past or future endeavors, perhaps this 
research and preservation serves as an illustration of what is possible.  
Conclusion
While forensic anthropologists and archaeologists are not generally positioned to prevent mass 
atrocities such as genocide, they can contribute pertinent information about atrocities after they 
occur so that the victims are not forgotten. Although more than thirty years passed between the end 
of the Khmer Rouge regime and the beginning of skeletal analysis in Cambodia, the information 
derived from the human remains— as well as the preservation of the remains— is important 
for current and future generations of Cambodians and foreigners. While the display of human 
remains in Cambodia may be religiously and culturally contentious, for the time being, the display 
of remains throughout the country serves as a reminder of the past, and a lesson for the future.
28 Ibid; Rachel Hughes, “Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidde Crimes, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia,” in Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory, ed. Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 185.
29 “Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidde Crimes, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,” 187.
30 Ibid., 188.
31 Ibid.
Figure 4. The original map of skulls at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum.  The photograph is undated, but was likely 
taken in the 1980s.  Photo courtesy of the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum archives.
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The analytical and preservation project at Choeung Ek was the first systematic assessment of 
the human remains from the Khmer Rouge period, and as the author’s research and the project 
at Krang Ta Chan demonstrate, there is much more work to be done. The Choeung Ek team and 
the author sincerely hope that the information gathered from the remains will contribute to a 
more accurate and holistic understanding of the violence that transpired under the Khmer Rouge 
regime. There is also the potential that the Cambodian skeletal and cultural data will be useful for 
international comparisons of such atrocities thereby furthering the global comprehension of mass 
violence. While much research still needs to be completed in Cambodia, the author hopes that 
this brief introduction has shed some light on the work being done and how this research may 
contribute to the larger fields of forensic anthropology and genocide studies.
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This is an important book about a deadly conflict that has been overshadowed by higher-
profile violence in neighboring Darfur and South Sudan. Although somewhat biased in favor 
of the rebels who claim to represent the main victims in the conflict, the book includes several 
more balanced chapters that allow a careful reader to gain a better understanding. The only thing 
missing, regrettably, is the government’s side of the story, which would have facilitated a holistic 
perspective.
The book’s underlying thesis—conveyed most clearly in two chapters, one by Rebecca Tinsley 
and the other by the book’s co-editor, Samuel Totten—is that impunity perpetuates atrocity. In the 
early 1990s, according to the book, Sudan’s emerging Islamist regime perpetrated genocide against 
the Nuba people of South Kordofan. When the regime suffered no punishment, it was emboldened 
to replicate that violence in Darfur a decade later. When that crime too went unpunished, the 
regime was emboldened to resume genocide against the Nuba the following decade. It is a clear 
thesis. Less clear is whether the facts support it, especially with regard to the most recent violence 
in the Nuba Mountains, as elaborated below.
What is indisputable and amply documented in the book’s opening chapters is that the Nuba 
people—a catch-all name for the Black Africans who live in the Nuba Mountains and share some 
cultural attributes but speak dozens of different languages—have suffered terribly for a long time. 
In centuries past they were captured and enslaved. Under British rule, they were isolated from 
modernization. After independence, their fertile land was seized by well-connected Sudanese elite 
for large agricultural projects, forcing them to retreat into the mountains. Seasonally, the sedentary 
Nuba farmers also faced competition for land with migratory Arab pastoralists seeking to graze 
their herds.
Violence reached new heights in the context of Sudan’s second north-south civil war that 
started in 1983. The Nuba lived just north of the historical internal border but shared grievances 
with the southerners regarding neglect and discrimination by the Khartoum elite. In 1987, some 
of these Nuba welcomed a commander from the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) to launch a northern front in the rebellion against Khartoum. The Nuba thereby became 
a Fifth Column in the southern rebels’ war against the north, and accordingly soon suffered the 
punishment that often falls upon suspected domestic accomplices of the enemy during wartime.
The book makes a strong case that the Sudanese government’s retaliatory violence against 
the Nuba escalated to genocidal levels in the early 1990s due to the ethnoreligious fervor of the 
Islamist regime that seized power in Khartoum in 1989. As J. Millard Burr, Guma Kunda Komey, 
and Alex de Waal explain in their respective chapters, Jihad was declared against the Nuba people, 
including its Muslim majority that was characterized as apostate. The regime also attempted to 
modify the region’s demographics by forcibly relocating tens of thousands of Nuba to “peace 
villages,” a process that involved segregating the women and subjecting them to sexual violence 
by Arab forces. The resulting death toll is disputed in several of the book’s chapters, but may have 
been in the range of 100,000, about ten percent of the Nuba population at the time.
That round of violence in the Nuba Mountains ended in the context of negotiations over 
the north-south war, culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, 
which offered the south a secession referendum in 2011. Several of the book’s contributors—
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Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, Alex de Waal, and Jok Madut Jok—contend that the SPLM effectively 
double-crossed its Nuba allies, initially using them as a stalking horse for leverage against 
Khartoum, and then signing a peace deal that abandoned them to the north. SPLM leader John 
Garang personally supported staying in a reformed Sudan, but after he died in a helicopter crash 
in 2005, the south increasingly embraced secession, leaving the Nuba with little to show for their 
years of fighting and suffering. Under the CPA, South Kordofan would not hold a referendum but 
only a “popular consultation” within four years so that its legislature could assess the CPA, but 
even this modest procedure never was implemented.
The CPA also called for democratic elections in South Kordofan, which eventually were held 
a year late in May 2011. The book’s most fascinating details – in chapters by John Young and 
Siddig Kafi – reveal the local politics behind this vote and thereby shed light on its consequences 
too. The gubernatorial battle pitted two notorious military commanders. The regime’s candidate 
was Ahmed Haroun, who had led government troops against the Nuba in the 1990s and then 
oversaw the brutal counterinsurgency in Darfur in the 2000s. The candidate of the SPLM-
North (SPLM-N)—as the party was renamed in Sudan following the south’s secession—was 
Abdelaziz al-Hilu. He had helped launch an ill-fated rebellion in Darfur 1991 and then, as deputy 
commander of the Nuba rebels, was accused of targeting civilians. 
As Young documents, the regime candidate won the election narrowly, according to all three 
relevant authorities: the national election commission, the domestic observation mission, and the 
international observation mission of The Carter Center. The SPLM-N’s al-Hilu, however, rejected 
that outcome and resumed a war footing. The regime then issued an ultimatum for his forces 
to disarm or depart for South Sudan, as envisioned under the CPA. When al-Hilu refused, the 
government forcibly attempted to disarm his troops in June 2011, triggering a new war in South 
Kordofan, which soon spread to Blue Nile state. Fighting in these “Two Areas” has continued until 
the time of this writing in July 2016. According to Young, it was the SPLM-N’s original refusal to 
accept its electoral loss that “set the Nuba Mountains on a course of war.”
Western critics of Sudan’s regime, by contrast, claim that it stole the election and thus is to 
blame for the resumption of fighting. However, several of the book’s chapters explain how and why 
the SPLM-N actually did lose, thus casting a very different light on the party’s refusal to accept that 
outcome, and on the resulting violence. As Mudawi Ibrahim Adam reports in his chapter, “The 
Dilemma of the Nuba,” the SPLM-N in South Kordofan often acted as an exclusively Nuba party, 
which alienated other ethnic groups that otherwise disliked the regime and might have supported 
the SPLM-N. Another factor undercutting SPLM-N support, as detailed by both Siddig T. Kafi and 
John Young, is that the Nuba themselves were divided, and many of them resented the domination 
of the SPLM-N and al-Hilu, whose roots lay outside South Kordofan. One Nuba commander, Gen. 
Talafon Kuku, actually ran against al-Hilu – upon which the SPLM imprisoned him in South Sudan 
– while another northern Nuba commander (Gen. Ismail Khamis Jallab) dissociated himself from 
the SPLM-N.
As a longstanding senior commander of the SPLA, al-Hilu favored the secession of both 
South Sudan and Abyei from Sudan, but these stances proved unpopular in the western part of 
South Kordofan and even among many Nuba who stood to become more isolated and vulnerable 
in a rump Sudan, as detailed by Young in his chapter on “South Kordofan State Elections, May 
2011.” Many Nuba also distrusted al-Hilu for having cooperated with the regime as deputy 
governor under the CPA from 2009-2011, even though living conditions improved during that 
time. Finally, the regime deftly engaged in coalition politics, courting traditional Sudanese 
parties in South Kordofan, while the SPLA alienated them by refusing to pledge a coalition 
government. All these missteps help explain how and why al-Hilu managed to lose an election 
to Haroun, a candidate who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war 
crimes in Darfur.
Several of the book’s chapters regrettably stretch the truth by not only blaming the regime 
for the resumption of war but also accusing it of an extermination campaign. Jok Madut Jok, for 
example, asserts that the “genocidal actions of the 1990s have been unleashed once again, and the 
survival of the Nuba people hangs in the balance” (160). Gillian Lusk similarly contends that the 
regime is driven by an annihilationist agenda akin to that of al Qaeda or ISIS. Thankfully, Young’s 
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chapter exposes such hyperbole, criticizing Lusk’s analysis as marred by “a visceral hatred of the 
[regime] and failure to acknowledge SPLM failings” (174).
There is enough blame to go around. The SPLM-N is guilty of refusing to accept its loss in 
the 2011 democratic elections, which sparked the renewal of war. But the regime might well have 
done the same if it had lost. During the campaign, Sudan’s President Omar Bashir declared that 
the regime would win “either by ballot boxes or bullet boxes” (217). This mirrored the SPLM-N’s 
threatening campaign rhetoric that announced voters had a choice between “the star [its party’s 
flag] or the gun” (171). In light of such signaling by both sides of unwillingness to accept possible 
electoral loss, the resumption of war may have been inevitable.
Regrettably several contributors—especially Jok, Lusk, Tinsley, and Totten—blame the regime 
alone for the ongoing humanitarian deprivation in the Nuba Mountains. The Khartoum government 
does bear some responsibility, as it has blocked international NGOs from entering rebel-held 
territory via Sudan, on grounds that such organizations in the past have aided Sudanese rebels and 
assisted international prosecution of regime officials. At the same time, however, the SPLM-N has 
rejected repeated regime offers of a temporary cease-fire to enable neutral international actors to 
deliver humanitarian aid and administer vaccines in rebel-controlled areas. Apparently, the rebels 
fear that an informal humanitarian cease-fire could reflect well on the regime and undermine 
their negotiating leverage. The SPLM-N thus also bears some responsibility for perpetuating the 
suffering of its own Nuba civilians.
In several places, the book exaggerates the suffering of Nuba civilians by denying the existence 
of an aid pipeline. For example, Totten writes that as of April 2014, “no such humanitarian corridor 
has been established” (129). To the contrary, in spring 2012, the United States initiated regular 
shipments of humanitarian aid by an international NGO via South Sudan to hundreds of thousands 
in South Kordofan, as U.S. and SPLM-N officials have confirmed in published accounts.
Several of the book’s contributors also mischaracterize the regime’s aerial bombing as 
targeting civilians. Totten, for example, cites “almost daily bombings by Antonovs of civilian 
targets (suqs, churches, villages, farms, and other places where relatively sizeable groups of people 
congregated)” 129). In reality, most of the government’s bombing has targeted rebels or sparsely 
populated areas. As Wendy James notes in her chapter on the parallel war in Blue Nile state, such 
targeting of rebels has succeeded in forcing them to retreat to the border region near South Sudan. 
When the government has targeted supposedly “civilian” areas, she writes, those are “where the 
SPLA-N was indeed holding out” (205).
During the first three years of renewed war in South Kordofan—according to data compiled 
by the anti-government Sudan Consortium that is not cited in the book—aerial bombing killed 
approximately one non-combatant per week, a relatively modest rate that is not indicative of 
targeting congregated civilians. Indeed, the combined military and civilian death toll from war in 
the Two Areas since 2011 is estimated at only hundreds per year (see, for example, the U.S. State 
Department Human Rights Reports for Sudan in 2012 and 2013). While any war death is tragic, 
such statistics suggest that the nature of violence is quite different from the allegedly genocidal 
campaigns of the early 1990s.
Cogently, a few of the book’s contributors interrogate the actual aim of the rebellion. The 
people of the Nuba Mountains clearly have legitimate grievances. For example, as Komey 
delineates in his chapter on “The Nuba Plight,” none of the CPA’s promises regarding the Two 
Areas—sharing of power and wealth, integration of the civil service and military, return of 
displaced persons, resolution of land disputes—has been fully implemented. Likewise, many of 
the Nuba’s longstanding demands—self-determination, compensation for past abuses, cultural 
autonomy, and transitional justice—remain unfulfilled. In addition, as Tinsley points out in her 
chapter, “Who Will Remember the Nubans?” when South Sudan seceded and took with it much of 
Sudan’s non-Muslim population, the Khartoum regime declared Sharia to be national law, further 
alienating the substantial minority of Nuba who are not Muslim.
However, rebellion has made life worse, not better, for the Nuba. Despite this reality, the 
SPLM-N steadfastly refuses to accept the regime’s offer of negotiations on a political and security 
settlement for the Two Areas. Instead, the rebels demand to negotiate on nationwide political 
change, which the regime has made clear it will not do with them while the war continues. (In Jok’s 
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biased chapter, he mischaracterizes this as the rebels continuously offering negotiations, while 
the regime responds only with military threats.) Meanwhile, the suffering of the Nuba people 
continues as the SPLM-N instead pursues its national political agenda. As Kafi notes in his chapter 
on “The Nuba Mountains Crisis,” this dynamic was further highlighted when the SPLA-N formed 
a military alliance with Darfur’s rebels and invited them to South Kordofan, where they promptly 
abused the local population.
Adam’s analysis of the rebels’ ill-fated strategy is worth quoting at length: “The Nuba are 
now fighting against Khartoum, but it is not clear for what they are fighting. Certainly they are 
not fighting to join the south, which has betrayed them. Are they fighting for a New Sudan in the 
north? For an autonomous region? If the antagonism with the local pastoralist tribes continues 
apace, such an autonomous region would certainly be a dismal failure” (41). Adam thus implies 
that the Nuba might be better off negotiating with the regime on a local political settlement, which 
the SPLM-N refuses to do.
According to James, this realization is dawning on local populations. As she frames it, the 
aggrieved people of the Two Areas have two choices: embrace a nationwide military struggle to 
overthrow the regime in Khartoum (which could have high costs and low prospects), or “pursue 
local peace agreements with the government” (206). As she observes, “The government’s preference 
is clear, and it is dividing opinion among the people of the Two Areas”(206). 
If the international community really wanted to help the Nuba people, it would promote 
a negotiated agreement for the Two Areas, rather than acquiescing to the SPLM-N’s pursuit of 
regime change in Khartoum, which only perpetuates suffering in the Nuba Mountains. Fostering 
such a soft landing, however, would require applying pressure on the SPLM-N. Regrettably, the 
West has done just the opposite so far, giving a pass to the rebels while exclusively pressuring the 
regime. As Kafi succinctly observes “The international community has ignored the abuses of the 
rebels and concentrated only on the abuses of the government. This encouraged the rebels to go on 
committing atrocities against the citizens, without any regard for innocent lives” (190).
To ensure that future intervention is more effective, it is vital to assess accurately the impact of 
past international responses to conflict in Sudan. Totten is likely correct that the failure to punish 
crimes of the 1990s in the Nuba Mountains emboldened the regime to repeat such tactics in Darfur 
in 2003-2004. However, the international reaction to Darfur in the mid-2000s was far more robust 
and did impose costs on the regime, which Tinsley fails to acknowledge and which may explain 
why conflict in the Two Areas since 2011 has followed a different course. In response to Darfur’s 
atrocities, the United States declared “genocide,” refused to lift sanctions as it had pledged to 
do, and coerced Khartoum to sign a peace deal including substantial concessions. Meanwhile 
the African Union and United Nations deployed tens of thousands of peacekeepers, and the ICC 
indicted Sudan’s president and three of his subordinates. Tinsley and Totten may view such 
international response as inadequate, but it had a major impact on the regime’s calculations.
Indeed, when I conducted interviews in Khartoum in 2013 with current and former regime 
officials, virtually all of them said that the government’s scorched earth response to rebellion in 
Darfur had been a mistake, and that their president knew it, precisely because it had turned the 
world against the government. Since 2011, the regime again has used deadly force in the Two 
Areas, but it has not repeated the genocidal tactics previously employed in Darfur or the Nuba 
Mountains. This represents significant progress that the book fails to acknowledge. Admittedly, 
the current situation in the Nuba Mountains remains wretched, which is why the international 
community should promote both enhanced humanitarian access and a negotiated settlement. But, 
as those of us who study genocide know all too well, it could be a lot worse.
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We underestimate corruption. These three words sum up the driving thesis of Sarah Chayes’ 
Thieves of State. In fact, we—including scholars, commentators and especially Western political 
and military leaders and advisers—underestimate almost every facet of corruption. We misread 
its pervasive extent and its networked, systemic nature. We fail to appreciate its crushing impact 
on those who suffer under its yoke. We downplay the sinister social, political, cultural, and even 
religious shifts it drives, and the way such dynamics fuel civil strife and armed conflict. And as 
a result of all of these underestimations, the international community (and the U.S. in particular) 
make catastrophic strategic miscalculations when engaging with struggling states like Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
With its brave claims, gripping anecdotes and grim insights into the wheels of power from 
Kabul to Washington, Thieves of State makes for an engaging read, quite suitable for a lay audience. 
Despite its popular (footnote-less) format, the book boasts more than enough careful argument 
to warrant scholarly attention. Chayes’ work will be of immediate interest to those who work in 
corruption or governance studies: a motley array of disciplines including law and constitutionalism, 
criminology, political science, and economics. But because of the link she draws between endemic 
corruption and widespread civil strife, her work also will be helpful to scholars of international 
relations, global security and governance, human rights, and genocide studies.
Rather than dividing corruption into petty and grand types, Thieves of State instead focuses 
on endemic corruption systems or ‘Malign Actor Networks’ (136). In such networks, the entire 
system of government is better understood as a vertically integrated criminal organization: petty 
bribery and extortion by local public officials is made possible by the higher-level ‘grand’ political 
corruption that protects it and profits from it—and vice versa. Money, influence, protection, power 
and resources course through these inter-locking networks in complex ways, giving rise to a 
toxic environment where it is integrity and honesty—rather than corruption and chicanery—that 
become perilous endeavours. “Corrupt and corrupting,” as one figure sums up the atmosphere in 
Nigeria (132).
Chayes leaves her readers in no doubt as to the effect on populations suffering under the 
authority of these malign networks. While scholars may debate the legal minutiae of understanding 
endemic corruption as a violation of human rights, the vignettes sprinkled through the book 
present all-too-perfect expressions of arbitrary interferences with fundamental freedoms, backed 
up by kleptocratic state power. 
Yet Chayes’ signature claim lies in what happens next: the population’s response to the 
endemic corruption. She argues that the daily, inescapable indignities of networked corruption 
strip any vestige of legitimacy from the reigning political regime, and from everyone and everything 
associated with it. Hardworking, peaceful citizens withdraw their support for the government: “If 
I see somebody planting an IED,” vows an Afghan, outraged at the impunity for police violence 
when they shook down his brother, “and then I see a police truck coming, I will turn away” (6). But 
for so many others, resistance takes a more violent, proactive form. Chayes’ argument weaves from 
one conflict-zone to the next, covering Iraq, Afghanistan (Chapters 4, 11), Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia (Chapters 6, 8), Egypt (Chapter 7), Uzbekistan (Chapter 9), and Nigeria (Chapter 10). While 
the particular organization of the corruption network may differ (as Chayes helpfully models in 
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the book’s Appendix), in each case she hammers home to the reader the decisive causal role played 
by corruption and state-sanctioned theft in triggering civil strife and revolt. As much as Western 
observers might prefer to conceive the population’s animus lying in familiar concerns with human 
rights violations, or democratic deficits, or economic inequality, or religious intolerance, Chayes 
takes dissidents at their word when they rail against their leaders’ corruption and greed. By 
throwing open the door to all manner of civil strife, corruption threatens global security.
The Arab Spring showed—at least in its beginnings—that such dissident movements may be 
secular (Chapter 6). Yet Chayes’ perhaps most intriguing claim lies in linking endemic corruption 
and puritanical religious extremism—a link she stresses is by no means constrained to Islamic 
extremism, or even to modern history. ‘Corruption’ in every language implies both moral and 
material depravity—and the purity of religion can often present as the best or only weapon with 
which to combat it (116). From al Qaeda to Boko Haram, from Protestant rebellions to Nigerian 
Pentecostal churches, the flagrant corruption of the political elites engenders a puritanical response. 
From this basis, Chayes aims to inject concerns with corruption into the thinking and 
strategizing of all actors in international relations and global security. One key lesson is to avoid 
seeing civil strife in foreign countries through the short-sighted Western preoccupation with 
terrorism and religious extremism. Civilians on the ground harbor very different priorities to those 
of their occupiers or benefactors. Faced with flagrant criminal regimes, populations may well 
countenance tyrannies or theocracies as the lesser of two evils.
In terms of informing policy, especially in military engagements like Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Chayes stresses how state corruption works as a force-multiplier for insurgents. In supporting 
and protecting existing governments, foreign troops become entangled in their extortion, and are 
viewed by the local population as complicit in the ensuing shake-downs, extortions, land-grabs and 
theft of national resources. A similar theme holds for diplomatic, development and humanitarian 
action; shrugging off claims of humanitarian neutrality Chayes avers that in the context of endemic 
corruption, “economic or even capacity-building support is always political” (198). Ultimately, 
international actors must be as willing to challenge corruption as they are to call out human rights 
violations and democratic deficits. 
Yet wariness about corruption need not drive a blanket rule to disengage. In her final chapter, 
Chayes considers a wide array of remedies, including tools in the hands of international leaders, 
diplomats, business and civil society, that can increase the costs and risks of corruption by 
developing country governments. While her recommendations here should be required reading 
for all international actors, Chayes offers less advice about internal efforts to combat domestic 
state corruption—though her Epilogue rightly reflects on the Global Financial Crisis, showing that 
systemic corruption networks are not purely a developing world problem.
In terms of evidence and argument, much of the book’s persuasive force comes from stories 
and experience accrued in Chayes’ life and research on the ground in these geopolitical hotspots, 
particularly Afghanistan. Since 2001, Chayes worked as a journalist, ran an NGO, and then was 
called upon in 2009 to serve as special adviser to ISAF commanders. Her thesis dovetails with the 
grim recent history of the Middle East, and in particular with the failures of the U.S. to grapple with 
the problems besetting Iraq and Afghanistan, including its all-too-late realization that corruption 
fueled the strategic threats of insurgency and extremism.
As well as this hands-on experience, the work is shot through with intriguing scholarly 
argument and historical evidence. In Chapter Two, Chayes scours the ‘mirrors’ for ‘Princes’; 
guide-books written by hopeful advisers to their monarchs, spanning from the eight century to 
the sixteenth, written by Islamic and Christian scholars. Chayes draws one persistently recurring 
admonition out of this trove: the advice that monarchs shun the theft of their subjects’ possessions, 
lest they drive the population to insurrection. As she observes, even Machiavelli—hardly a political 
theorist drawn to unnecessary moralizing—upheld this prohibition in The Prince. 
Chayes returns to the history twice more. In Chapter Twelve she reflects on the Dutch revolt 
against absolutist monarchy and its corrupt envoys, which fed into later attempts to create limited 
government, through John Locke in England and then the founding fathers of the United States. 
The next chapter moves further back in time, highlighting Luther’s challenge as an indictment 
of the Catholic Church’s corruption. The history, Chayes stresses, tells a consistent message. 
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Whatever else they may put up with, the masses chafe under flagrant, corrupt, thieving rule—
whether temporal or spiritual.
Like any work that hones in on a single causal factor, Chayes’ focus on corrupt kleptocracy 
risks under-emphasizing other triggers driving civil strife—a limitation she explicitly notes (187). 
So too, more empirically-minded social scientists may wish for further, quantitative evidence to 
demonstrate the correlation and causation existing between endemic corruption and civil strife. 
But it would take a stern critic not to be persuaded by Chayes’ fundamental thesis that corruption 
deserves more consideration in conversations about global security.
Several elements of Thieves of State carry relevance for scholars of genocide and atrocity 
crimes. To be sure, concerns with corruption are not unknown in this context. The United Nations 
OSAPG’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes lists corruption as a circumstance that impinges 
on state’s capacity to prevent atrocity crimes. But if Chayes is right about the causative link between 
kleptocracy and civil strife, then corruption may warrant inclusion as a prime factor placing states 
under stress and making them vulnerable to social breakdown.
The key question in this context is whether in stripping resistance to insurrections and violent 
terror, endemic corruption contributes to the wholesale breakdown in social functioning that 
often characterizes atrocity crimes. While further research on this question beckons, Chayes’ work 
provides some prima facie reasons to think it does. 
First, Chayes argues that endemic corruption fuels puritanical religious extremism, with 
normative ideas about purity seen as an answer to secular government’s moral and material 
depravity. Such extremism can feed into the type of identity politics, and beliefs about the moral 
impurity of others—both within and outside one’s sect—that can foment violent solutions.
Second, kleptocracy gives rise not only to rebellions, but ones who have lost faith in all 
institutions associated with the rampant corruption. All too often, secular government, economic 
development, democracy, western-style education, and human rights are tarred with the same 
brush (115). The rejection of these ideas and institutions may strip societies of vital cultural 
resources capable of stymieing their collapse into ethnic or religious violence. So too, subsequent 
international interventions, for example through offices of the United Nations, will be viewed as 
unwelcome and illegitimate. Cosmopolitan, international and secular actors are seen as complicit 
in the very problem that drove the insurgency.
Finally, peacekeepers and humanitarians can be important actors in genocide prevention 
efforts. Yet these groups are routinely forced to work alongside existing governments, supporting 
and protecting their interests. As such, many of the concerns with complicity Chayes canvassed 
with respect to U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan will be relevant here, giving force to 
recent work on the challenging questions arising between peacekeeping and corruption.
In all, anyone who deals with the conflict-related harms, human rights violations and atrocities 
that can follow from the wholesale collapse of civic trust will profit from a careful reading of 
Thieves of State. In conversations and action on works on global security and international affairs, 
we can no longer afford to underestimate endemic corruption.
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The violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia, with its most brutal manifestation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from 1992 to 1995, has been the subject of sustained scholarly 
interest for the past two decades. One of the main points of contention and fierce debate 
has been the issue of genocide: if it has been committed, where, when and by whom. These 
disagreements are largely the result of scholars applying different understandings of the concept 
of genocide, where one group of scholars uses the definition from the 1948 United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, while others consider 
that definition, which was subsequently adopted by international criminal tribunals, to be too 
limited. In this personal account, Edina Bećirević argues that Srebrenica was not the only instance 
of genocide in BiH but a “culmination of a planned and widespread genocidal process begun in 
the spring of 1992 and meant to exterminate Bosnian Muslims throughout the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” (p. xii). 
The work focuses on seven municipalities of eastern Bosnia, exploring the patterns of mass 
violence in Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Rogatica, Foča, Višegrad, and Srebrenica. Given that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has prosecuted 
dozens of individuals for crimes in BiH since the end of the war, the evidence, testimonies, and 
judgments have significantly influenced academia, not least because of the incredible amount 
of documents that are available to researchers in ICTY archives. The author of this book relied 
extensively on those archives in her research. Another significant case that influenced how the war 
in BiH is understood by scholars is the ruling of the International Court of Justice, also in The Hague, 
in 2007. Both courts, one determining individual responsibility and the other those of states, came 
to the conclusion that the one incident, i.e. set of events, that qualifies as genocide in the case of BiH 
is Srebrenica, in July of 1995, where Bosnian Serb forces over-ran a protected enclave populated 
mostly by Bosnian Muslims, resulting in mass executions of around eight thousand men and boys. 
The detained men were locked up in schools and warehouses, sometimes beaten, then killed in 
summary executions, their bodies scattered in mass graves only to be dug up again in secret, some 
months later, in an attempt to hide the evidence. The independent scholarly community has, by 
and large, accepted the rulings and consider Srebrenica to be the ‘only’ genocide not only in BiH, 
but in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
In five chapters, Bećirević analyzes the campaign of the violent expulsion of non-Serbs, starting 
in the spring of 1992, detailing the role of local authorities in putting the campaign in motion. 
Her analysis provides us with a better understanding of how mass expulsions, dispossession, and 
detention of thousands and their exposure to torture and inhumane conditions were orchestrated. 
Significant attention is given to the post-war period, where Bećirević places much attention on 
the denial of mass atrocities, murder and rape committed by Serb forces during the conflict. The 
author is a Bosnian native and her book shows an intimate understanding of the communities, 
which coupled with extensive research of evidence material presented at the ICTY, makes it a 
valuable contribution to the debate. However, the tone often drifts from scholarly to journalistic 
and the evidence and analysis do not always sufficiently support her bold claim of genocide in the 
entire territory of BiH, throughout the war. At times, it seems that the author is more interested in 
advocacy than a detached scholarly analysis.    
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The violent campaign aiming to remove non-Serbs from the territories claimed by the 
Serb leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s is largely accepted 
in scholarship and was described in many works, from James Gow’s analysis during the early 
days of the war, to the recent contributions by Robert Donia. The aim of the campaign was the 
creation of a homogeneous, contiguous territory populated by Serbs. Those contributions stop 
short of calling what the Bosnian Serb leadership did, with support from the Belgrade regime and 
Slobodan Milošević, genocide. Mark Mazower states that the goal of the campaign was not the total 
extermination of Bosnian Muslims but their removal from the territory and that “ethnic cleansing 
was an integral part of nation-building, or to be more precise nation-enlarging” for the Bosnian 
Serb and Serbian authorities.1 That view is shared by Dulić and Hall who make a convincing case 
when stating that Bosnian Serbs made excessive territorial demands, but “did not seek to control 
the entire country.” The Bosnian Serb forces “refrained from capturing municipalities where 
Serbs constituted a small minority of the population, unless these were of extremely high strategic 
importance.”2 They continue by saying that “massacre and expulsion were means by which they 
‘cleansed’ territories and thus obtained demographic control over contested space.”3 War crimes 
were an essential part of the Serbian strategy in the war, claimed Gow.4 
Bećirević’s contribution seems to suffer from what Christian Axboe Nielsen calls “genocide 
myopia” in relation to BiH, where any conclusion that a set of crimes committed against non-Serbs 
was not genocide, be it by a judicial or scholarly authority, is considered flawed.5 For Bećirević, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes are not enough, as if those qualifications are somehow 
less serious, or less deserving of condemnation. Genocide is a concept that was born out of the 
advocacy of Raphael Lemkin, and the definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention is a result of 
negotiations. Much criticism has been leveled at it for not including political groups among those 
that are considered protected. That definition is limited, and proving that charge in a courtroom 
has been challenging for prosecutors. Claiming that everyone who subscribes to this definition 
and thus finds it impossible to accept her argument that genocide has been committed on the 
entire territory of BiH, from 1992 to 1995, and calling them deniers, as Bećirević does, is wrong 
and fundamentally unfair. Many of those that accept ICTY and ICJ judgments in calling Srebrenica 
genocide, but refrain from doing so for other municipalities, have no history of political bias and 
have spoken out about the violent take-over of municipalities, the mass detentions, the killings and 
rape committed against non-Serbs.   
The approach taken by the author could be more nuanced when she analyzes the relevant 
actors i.e. those that put the mass violence in motion. Too often, she speaks of ‘Serbs’ as actors, a 
homogeneous agent with a homogeneous leadership led by the puppet master Milošević and his 
allies in BiH. This approach is reductionist and is belied by extensive documentation and evidence 
presented at the ICTY. Catherine Baker makes a good point when she asks authors to be specific 
and attribute actions to individuals and institutions instead of groups, “even though it lengthens 
sentences.”6
Ideology, or nationalism, is emphasized as the main driving force of the violence, and the 
book makes ample use of historical events which have allegedly primed the Serb communities to 
separate themselves from others, in this case Bosnian Muslims, and commit genocide. However, 
it is not clearly explained how those processes allegedly took place. Historical events become 
myths that are then used to mobilize nationalist sentiment, but as Siniša Malešević rightly argues, 
1 Mark Mazower, “Review Essay Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century,” The American Historical Review 107 (4) 
(2002), 1163. 
2 Tomislav Dulić and Jonathan Hall, “The logic(s) of ethnic violence: Control, ideology and the spatial distribution of 
indiscriminate violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-45/1992-95” (Unpublished manuscript, Uppsala University, 
2014), 5.  
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: C. Hurts & Co., 2003), 2.  
5 Christian Axboe Nielsen, “Surmounting the myopic focus on genocide: the case of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
Journal of Genocide Research, 15:1 (2013), 22. 
6 Catherine Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3. 
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nationalism is not inherently violent and more attention should have been given to analyzing how 
and why that particular nationalism turned violent.7 It would have also been interesting to discuss 
the similarities and differences between state-level elite and local leaderships and their motivations. 
Dulić and Kostić have argued that ideology has dominated the motivations of the elites, while fear 
and insecurity played a more significant role at the local level.8 
In sum, this book is thought-provoking and valuable in the micro analysis of the dynamics 
of violence and the role of local Bosnian Serb authorities in orchestrating the violence that swept 
the country in the spring of 1992. However, it has made the mistake of arguing more than it can 
actually prove. A dreadful machinery of violence that left one hundred thousand dead and over a 
million displaced was set in motion in early 1992 by Bosnian Serb authorities: it included camps, 
expulsion, dispossession, mass murder, torture and rape. Not labeling all of those events as 
genocide does not minimize the experiences of those who suffered through them, or perished. The 
narrower understanding of genocide, as defined by the UN Convention, and its application to BiH 
simply aims to differentiate between types of mass violence. The mass executions after the fall of 
Srebrenica, in 1995, were indeed unique in their systematic nature and the consequences they had 
on those communities. Srebrenica can be understood as a culmination of the policies set in place 
three years earlier, but it should be categorized as distinct—as genocide. 
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Contending with a subject that has provoked sustained interest across many disciplines within 
the social sciences, Nicole Rafter’s latest book is an important addition to the ever-expanding field 
of genocide studies, one which will be appreciated by scholars and students of genocide from, 
for instance, history, sociology, psychology, law, political science and international relations. That 
Rafter herself is aware of the attention from diverse audiences that her book might inevitably 
garner is evident from the skilful way in which she engages with and navigates through the wealth 
of existing multidisciplinary scholarship and research on genocide throughout her book. This is 
all the more impressive given that this was Rafter’s very first book on genocide, having only taken 
an interest in genocide in recent years. For those deeply immersed in genocide studies and its 
evolving conceptual and empirical concerns, Rafter’s book successfully speaks to, and builds upon, 
important work that has already been done in the field, particularly concerning colonial genocides, 
the gendered nature of genocides, and the micro-level variables that enable and sustains genocides. 
Meanwhile, for those newly acquainted with genocide studies, the book provides an accessible 
overview of the key debates and studies that have come to define the field.
Rafter is a criminologist and her book, as its title suggests, is an examination of genocide from a 
criminological perspective. While criminologists have started to contribute to the study of genocide, 
this body of scholarship is still, as Rafter points out, relatively small. Rafter’s key aim, therefore, 
is to demonstrate more forcefully how, and to what extent, criminology can contribute towards 
a better understanding of genocide. Rafter stamps her unique mark in contemporary genocide 
scholarship by weaving together an overarching framework to wrestle with the phenomenon that 
is genocide. Capitalizing on criminology’s interdisciplinary character, Rafter draws upon ideas 
from political science, psychology, sociology, and legal philosophy to construct her analytical 
building blocks. The result is a comprehensive conceptual vocabulary for genocide, one aimed at 
simultaneously grappling with the macro, meso and micro elements of genocide. In this regard, 
a number of Rafter’s novel conceptual ideas have the prospect of guiding future research on 
genocide. This includes her idea of “genocidal propensity,” which is aimed at predicting which 
states are more predisposed towards committing genocides, in order to more effectively prevent 
genocides before they occur; the idea of “hot genocides,” which indicates how the intensification of 
genocide’s emotional dynamics mark turning points in genocidal violence; and finally, the idea that 
“genocidal organizations” create “states of exception,” as a tool to mobilize genocidal destruction 
without fear of consequences.
Rafter’s empirical task is ambitious: a comparative study of eight historical cases of genocides, 
occurring across the world and covering the period between 1900 and 2000. Following a common 
position embraced by many genocide scholars, she adopts a definition of genocide that goes 
beyond the one currently enshrined in international law. The destruction of political groups—
notably excluded from the Genocide Convention—is added as a protected group in Rafter’s 
analysis, alongside national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. This allows the genocide of the 
Herero by the German colonial army, the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks, Polish nationalists by 
Stalin, Indonesian anti-communists by Suharto’s regime, political opponents by Pol Pot’s regime, 
the Mayas by the Guatemalan state, and the Tutsis by the Rwandan Hutus to fall under the scope 
of her study. This is relatively uncontroversial; what is controversial, however, is her inclusion 
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of killing of the disabled (people with mental and physical disorders) by the Nazis. Even under 
the broader definition of genocide she adopts, it is unclear under which protected group they fall 
under. Do they constitute a political group, construed in the broadest possible terms? Or, do they 
amount to a racial group, given that their destruction, as Rafter notes, was aimed at improving the 
purity and power of the Aryan stock?
Nonetheless, Rafter executes her empirical task with considerable ease and confidence. Each 
historical case-study is stripped down to its bare and essential facts, while historical details are 
selectively chosen and strategically employed to further her main arguments about each of these 
genocides. This approach clearly aids Rafter’s conceptual mission, namely, to compare genocides 
across multiple dimensions, in order to generate generalized conclusions about what genocides 
“looks like” as a phenomenon and what they share in common. Some of the important conclusions 
she draws, in this regard, are the macro dynamics that enable genocide (war and major political 
upheavals, state failure; ethnic and racial persecution; ideology; colonialism; and impunity); the 
psychological reasons why individuals are capable of committing genocide (processes of moral 
disengagement, empathy shutdown and the objectification of victims); and the factors that enable 
the mobilization of genocidal destruction (the formation of genocidal organizations and the 
creation of states of exception). 
Occasionally, the elegant ideas presented in each chapter are not adequately developed or 
illustrated through the book’s historical case studies, even though this is what Rafter sets herself out 
to accomplish. For example, Rafter seeks to use the Indonesian genocide to illustrate the emotional 
dynamics of genocide, which involves, she argues, the framing and reframing of victims’ identities 
by perpetrators, through the creation of social stereotypes or the development of ‘us versus them’ 
thinking (Chapter 4). Beyond claiming that this in fact occurred in the case of Indonesia, actual 
historical evidence for this is missing within Rafter’s analysis. A stronger case could have been 
made by tapping into the wealth of historical analysis, debates and sources that this period of 
Indonesian history has prompted. To illustrate another example, Rafter suggests the Cambodian 
genocide usefully demonstrates the micro-level factors that are at play in genocides, namely, 
the social psychology of genocide perpetrators (Chapter 5). Here, Rafter argues perpetrators are 
psychologically capable of committing genocide because they undergo a “splitting process,” a 
process that centres on “moral disengagement,” “empathy shutdown,” and the “objectification of 
victims.” In her historical discussion of the Cambodian genocide, however, she does not concretely 
demonstrate how, or to what extent, the perpetrators themselves underwent the process which she 
articulates. In certain parts of the book, therefore, there is disjuncture between the chapters’ main 
conceptual argument and its empirical substantiation. This, in turn, unfortunately diminishes the 
overall strength of Rafter’s main claims, which could have been avoided if the historical analysis 
was used more directly to engage with, and to buttress, core conceptual arguments.
All throughout, Rafter rightly insists that genocide needs to be understood, first and foremost, 
as a “crime.” Genocide studies, as she writes, is a crowded, multidisciplinary field but it has 
seldom dealt with genocide as a crime. This is an insightful point; genocide’s inherent criminality 
is easily overlooked, especially when it is subsumed, as it often is, within broader topics such as 
political conflict, state (in)stability, external interventions or legal prosecutions for human rights 
violations. Given criminology’s core preoccupation with the study of crime, it is particularly well-
placed, Rafter suggests, to interrogate what constitutes the essence of genocide’s criminality. 
This important point is not conceptually pushed far enough by Rafter, however, resulting in her 
providing a somewhat unsatisfactory answer to the very question she maintains contemporary 
genocide scholarship has thus far neglected to assess, and which she seeks to address through her 
book: “What kind of crime is genocide?” 
Rafter’s answer to this question rests upon unpacking how key concepts in criminology—
specifically, the perpetrators and victims of crimes—figure and feature in the case of genocide. 
According to Rafter, genocide is a crime whose perpetrators commit their deeds during wars and 
periods of upheaval; they are likely to mobilize genocidal organizations to help with the killing; 
they attempt to purify a human group or territory through some sort of “cleansing,” be it ethnic, 
genetic, political, racial, religious or social; and finally, they operate with the confidence that no 
consequences will follow from their actions. A further aspect of genocide’s criminality lies with its 
Randhawa
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victims. They tend to be attacked in their own country, where they live alongside their perpetrators 
and where, sometimes, no prior conflict existed between them and their perpetrators; the victims 
are often unsuspecting or helpless, lacking “guardians” who could have protected them; and they 
are negatively labelled by the perpetrator based on race, ethnicity, political views, or status. It 
is not entirely convincing, however, why these particular characteristics concerning genocide’s 
perpetrators and victims make it a distinct crime in its own right or, as the title of the book 
suggests, the “crime of all crimes.” Arguably, these same characteristics could conceivably apply 
to other crimes that equally provoke opprobrium for their heinousness, a significant point that 
Rafter does not herself contemplate. Key examples that immediately come to mind, in this regard, 
are international terrorism and crimes against humanity. 
If Rafter had perhaps engaged a little more with the fact that genocide is not simply any 
ordinary crime but rather, an “international crime,” the significant point she makes about the 
need to uncover the essence of genocide’s criminality could have been pushed a step further. 
What seems missing from Rafter’s take on genocide’s essence as a crime are its unique origins 
and historical development, which saw it being globally condemned as an act that violates the 
fundamental norms of the international community. An additional line of enquiry, then, to the 
question Rafter poses—“What kind of crime is genocide?”—lies in the reasons why the act of 
genocide was specifically fashioned into, and accorded with the special status of, an altogether 
unique and distinct category of criminal conduct – that of an international crime. Arguably, this is 
a matter which criminologists, given their interest in how crimes are constructed, would be well-
suited to explore. On balance, however, Rafter’s book takes the study of genocide an important step 
forward. Having shown crucial ways in which the discipline of criminology can have a meaningful 
conversation and connection with genocide, she had laid further foundations from which other 
criminologists interested in genocide and other atrocity crimes can fruitfully build upon. 
Book Review: The Crime of All Crimes
Ronald G. Suny, “Book Review: An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?” Genocide Studies and Prevention  
10, 2 (2016): 144-146. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2.1418
Book Review: An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?
Ronald G. Suny
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians? 
Geoffrey Robertson
London, Biteback Publishing, 2015
300 pages; Price: £20.00
Reviewed by Ronald Grigor Suny, The University of Michigan; National Research University – 
Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia
About the time of the centennial of the mass deportations and murders that constituted the 
Armenian Genocide of 1915, that deliberately obscured and neglected crime against humanity 
had finally found a large number of champions. The official Turkish state campaign to deny that 
a genocide had taken place, and the persistence of diaspora Turks and a few pseudo-scholars 
defending the government’s claims, were largely seen as groundless obfuscations. A cascade 
of serious scholarly books and articles appeared; the rich and famous, including a number of 
Kardashians, visited Armenia; and Pope Francis publicly acknowledged the genocide. With the 
publication of German, Austrian, Vatican, American, and other archival documents, as well as the 
work of honest Turkish and Kurdish historians, most people familiar with the facts accepted the 
record of what had happened to the Ottoman Armenians and Assyrians during World War I as 
indisputable.
One of the most prominent people to have taken up the project of rectifying public 
understanding of the tragedies of 1915 is the international lawyer Geoffrey Robertson, the author of 
at least fifteen books on issues of law, freedom, and justice. Born in Australia and today a barrister 
and law professor in Great Britain, Robertson has defended numerous people in free speech 
and expression cases and taken on risky cases, such as those of the novelist Salman Rushdie, the 
Canadian artist Rick Gibson, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, and the boxer Mike Tyson. He has 
had his own television program in Australia and received the honor of an appointment as Queen’s 
Counsel. In the Genocide’s one hundredth anniversary year he worked with Amal Clooney before 
the European Court of Human Rights in the notorious case of a Turkish denialist, Doğu Perinçek. 
In An Inconvenient Genocide Robertson provides a careful study of the legal issues surrounding 
crimes that might be considered genocide. While such state-initiated mass killings had occurred 
earlier in history, and in the twentieth century with the Herero and Nama in German Southwest 
Africa, the Armenians and Assyrians, and Jews, Roma, and others in the Holocaust, the Polish 
Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin did not invent the word “genocide” and conceptualize the crime 
until mid-way through the Second World War. Not until the 1990s, Robertson writes, did the 
United Nations “deliver on the Nuremburg legacy, by setting up international courts to punish 
genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans,” with the first verdict coming down (for Rwanda) in 1998.1 
Significantly, the court clarified the language in the Genocide Convention of 1948 “deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part” to mean “methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill 
the members of the group but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.” Thus, starvation, 
systematic expulsion from homes, and inadequate medical services directed against a targeted 
ethnoreligious people would constitute genocide. All of these practices were carried out on the 
Armenians.
After a brief history of the events and a discussion of the eyewitness, diplomatic, and archival 
evidence, Robertson notes that after the German government aided the escape of the Young Turk 
leaders, the successor government of the late Ottoman Empire held trials of perpetrators. In these 
1 Geoffrey Robertson, An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians? (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015), 33. 
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precursors of the Nuremburg Trials, the accused were found guilty of crimes against humanity.  “It 
is sad,” writes Robertson, “that Turkey can never take pride in this moment of its history, and tends 
either to portray the liberals as ‘quislings’” (in the words of a principal American denier) “or to see 
the trials as little more than a cunning attempt to gain an advantage at [the post-war] Versailles 
[Peace Conference].”2 
Robertson’s principal contribution to the discussion of the Armenian Genocide is his review of 
the law and the place of genocide in international jurisprudence. Within the larger rubric of crimes 
against humanity, genocide is a crime against an ethnic, national, racial, or religious group, distinct 
from the crimes of extermination or persecution against political or social groups (politicide or 
classicide). “[I]n effect, all genocides are crimes against humanity, but by no means do all crimes 
against humanity amount to genocide.”3 To be considered genocide destruction need not be total, 
and responsibility falls not only on who directly carried out killings but on those leaders, like the 
Ottoman government, that ordered deportations knowing “that the marches would kill – and were 
killing – most of those who marched.”4 Intention to commit genocide can be inferred from words 
and deeds, knowledge of consequences, and public statements. 
Intention, however, is different from motivation. Whatever the reason behind deportation 
or killing – greed, fear, a sense of betrayal, religious conviction, race hatred, or as an element of 
warfare – the intention to destroy a group and prevent its collective reproduction is sufficient to 
convict someone of the crime of genocide.  A government need not have a premeditated policy 
or a prior plan to commit genocide. “There is no doubt,” Robertson makes clear, “that in 1915 the 
Ottoman government continued the deportations in the knowledge that many of the deportees 
would die, and that it passed laws and regulations that enabled it to seize their property on the 
pretense that it was ‘abandoned’ – that is, that they would not be allowed to return and reclaim it.”5 
Those who deny that a genocide took place have argued that the Armenians of Ottoman 
Anatolia were conspiring to rebel against the empire and that they constituted an existential threat 
to the government, the Turkish nation, and to Ottoman war effort against Russia and Britain. 
Historians, however, have concluded that no such insurrection was being planned or was even 
possible in the context of World War I. Most Ottoman Armenians were loyal to the empire, though 
they desperately and in vain hoped for reforms to improve their lives and protect them from the 
predations of Kurds. Tens of thousands of Armenian youth were mobilized and fought in the 
Ottoman Army until they were forcibly demobilized by their superiors, turned into work battalions, 
and eventually slaughtered. Even if Armenians had been an internal threat, the arguments of both 
officials and a few denialist scholars that “military necessity” required their removal would not 
hold up as a viable defense in international tribunals. “‘Necessity’ in war can never justify the 
deliberate killing of civilians: if they are suspected of treason or loyalty to the enemy they may be 
detained or interned, or prosecuted, but not sent on marches from which they are expected not to 
return.”6 
The stunning achievement of this book is that a sharp legal mind, carefully and systematically 
laying out irrefutably the argument that 1915 constituted a genocide, manages both to constrain his 
rage at the obscenity of denialism and allow the reader to feel the author’s passion for justice.  As 
fiercely as he exposes the lies of the deniers, Robertson opposes laws that would prohibit people 
from freely expressing such reprehensible and malicious views on genocide. Such expression 
should not be criminalized “unless there is an additionally proved intention to stir up race hatred 
or else a threat to public order or social cohesion.”7 In 2005 the right-wing Turkish nationalist Doğu 
Perinçek deliberately declared in a public meeting in Lausanne that the Armenian Genocide was 
“an international lie.” Swiss courts found him guilty of breaking a law against genocide denial, but 
2 Ibid., 85. 
3 Ibid., 122. 
4 Ibid., 101. 
5 Ibid., 108.
6 Ibid., 117.
7 Ibid., 208. 
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the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg reversed the verdict and found that Perinçek’s 
rights to free expression had been violated. Robertson defends Perinçek’s right to speak but is 
appalled that the court went on to cast doubt on the Genocide itself by claiming the historical facts 
were difficult to ascertain and that denial was “part of a heated debate.”8 The case has been referred 
to the Chamber for review.
The present-day Republic of Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, and because 
of its continued denial of the Genocide and its near century of appropriation of Armenian property 
and discrimination against Armenians within Turkey, “it has continued the original wrong.”9 Some 
form of recognition – apology, reparations, restoration of property and cultural monuments to the 
heirs of the original owners – Robertson argues, must be part of the settlement of claims against 
Turkey -- and against Germany for complicity in the deportations and massacres. There is right 
now a museum in Iğdır in eastern Turkey claiming that there were Armenian massacres of Muslims 
amounting to genocide as well as a permanent exhibition in Istanbul’s military museum making 
the same argument. Perhaps one form of compensation might be to build a Persecution Museum in 
Istanbul, one that would acknowledge and illustrate the atrocities not only against Armenians and 
Assyrians but against Greeks, Alevis, Kurds, and others that continue to the present time. 
8 Ibid., 204. 
9 Ibid., 228. 
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At the beginning of Against Forgetting, Carolyn Forche quotes Bertolt Brecht to affirm that “In 
the dark times, will there also be singing? Yes, there will also be singing, about the dark times” 
underlining the importance of poetry, even in the midst of atrocity.1 This continues to be proven 
important; one cannot help but think of art produced in even the darkest of circumstances as bearing 
insight into the experiences of people within a society undergoing violence. Since the early 1990s 
when Against Forgetting was published, the study of poetry of witness has expanded, integrating 
into the broader body of literature on genocide and mass atrocity, with a general recognition that 
literature speaks to the intangible horror in a way that more analytical work will never fully grasp. 
So too do poetry and oral traditions reflect the feelings of diaspora, recording the ways that feelings 
and identities change over time and the ways that they endure. Rarely, however, does analysis 
begin with poetry, expanding then to a broader history of mass violence. 
Kapteijns’ Clan Cleansing in Somalia the Ruinous Legacy of 1991, whose research rests on a strong 
analysis of Somali literature, does just that. Examining Somali poetry, songs, publications, as well 
as interviewing key Somali officials on their time in the 1990s, Kapteijns provides an excellent 
account of the ethnically—or clan-based—violence that became so prevalent in Somalia in 1990 as 
the Siyad Barre regime collapsed. This account is significant because it discusses the clan-oriented 
nature of the violence frankly without subscribing to the fixed categories that leaders used to 
mobilize violence and provides important discursive links between the way that elites spoke and 
the changes in the nature of violence at that period. Most importantly, the book seeks a unified 
narrative for the violence, assigning responsibility to political figures for the discourse and the 
ensuing “clan cleansing” of 1990-1991. 
Kapteijns’s central focus began with a study of Somali discussions of this period, primarily in 
poetry and song, a focus that builds off of her previous work on Somalia. Looking at “prestigious 
poetry” that rises above clan audiences to speak to the larger Somali community, clan-oriented 
poetry that often addresses specific clan groups and pushes forward clan-hate narratives, and 
unconventional forms of Somali literature including contemporary poetry and novels by Somalis in 
diaspora, Kapteijns sheds light on ways that Somali artists discussed and failed to discuss violence 
from this period. Prestigious poetry, Kapteijns notes, is upfront in condemning the violence that 
occurred and the destruction of the state. Poets such as Mustafa Sheekh Cilmi, Axmad Naaji Sacad, 
Cabdi Muxumed Amiin, and Cabdulqaadir Cabdi Shube all denounce the violence in no uncertain 
terms, positioning themselves within a national Somalia that rejects divisions. At the same time, all 
of these poets shied away from discussing explicitly the nature of the problems in detailed terms, 
and all were careful to avoid pointing out who was responsible for such problems. While these 
poets imply that certain groups, such as the United Somali Congress (USC), a rebel group that 
eventually entered Mogadishu and overthrew Siad Barre’s regime, were responsible, no groups are 
named explicitly, either in terms of politics or clan. On the other hand, clan-oriented poetry from 
1 Carolyn Forche, introduction to Against Forgetting: Twentieth-century Poetry of Witness, by Carolyn Forche, (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1993), 29.
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this period speaks of the clans themselves, calling on listeners to perpetuate violence and promoting 
stereotypes regarding other clans. It is only in some unconventional literature, whether novels by 
Somalis in diaspora or the poetry of Somali-Canadian poet Mohamud Togane, that violence is 
discussed reflectively with reference to clan, with an acknowledgement of the relationship between 
the mass violence and clan hatred narratives that became so prominent in the early 1990s. 
With these narratives and this polarization in mind, Kapteijns uses the next two sections to 
provide a historical narrative of the violence and collapse of the state that Somalia experienced 
from 1989 to 1991. This narrative takes us from the power dynamics at play in the late period of 
Siyad Barre’s reign as president into the period of rebellion, where various rebel groups, most 
prominently the USC but including several others, armed themselves and sought to overthrow the 
regime. Somalia in the late 80s, even before state collapse, was marked by extreme violence, and 
Barre’s government was the first among many groups to encourage collective punishment against 
groups where certain members proved resistant to government rule. In addition to the violence 
seen in Hargeisa and Somaliland, such dynamics were at play in other large cities. At the same 
time, this violence was not just collective punishment—rather, the discourse changed, both within 
the Barre regime and later within rebel groups. Systemic inequalities had existed before, but fell 
along largely regional lines, with those centered in Mogadishu gaining more resources than those 
living elsewhere. In the late 80s, however, Barre’s regime and rebel groups used collective blame 
and new hate narratives in order to mobilize mass violence on behalf of particular political causes. 
Thus, rebels intentionally conflated support of government with Darood identity and Hawiye 
identity with rebellion against the government, leading to massive, ethnically based violence that 
ultimately ignored almost entirely who had actually supported the regime and who had not. 
The book concludes by discussing the implications of such discourse and the fracturing 
of Somali society that it prompted. Such changes were the result of what Kapteijns terms “clan 
hate mythologies,” drawing on genocide literature regarding the ways that violent groups create 
justifications for violence that have their roots in particular interpretations of history. These histories 
often have basis in fact—for example, that certain groups might have more access to resources 
or more power, but require interpretation and the argument that such dynamics have created 
long-standing animosity in order to create a justification for violence where one had not existed 
previously. Historically, the Barre regime found its support through patronage networks that went 
along clan lines at times, although it traversed such divisions to find supporters who could be paid 
in other clans. Such complexity was obscured entirely by the discourse of clan hatred, and the 
violence that ensued was not centered around political issues but exclusively on clan. One of the 
ironies of the state collapse was that those in power did not shift entirely; rather, those who went 
on to take part in the next transitional government included prominent supporters of Barre, spared 
simply because they were Hawiye. On the other end, Kapteijns recounts an anecdote in which both 
a prominent supporter of Barre and an opponent of his regime lived next door to each other in a 
refugee camp in Kenya, both fearing for their lives because of their clan identity.2 
Clan Cleansing in Somalia’s stated goal—to name and make explicit the role that clan played 
during the disintegration of the state in Somalia— is important, and Kapteijns carries it out with 
the sensitivity and consideration necessary. Concluding that the term genocide is not particularly 
productive in the context of the Somali state’s collapse, she nonetheless draws on a body of genocide 
literature regarding hate narratives and othering to create a greater understanding of the process 
by which armed groups who originally aimed their violence at an authoritarian state could turn to 
mobilizing mass violence against particular clans. She notes
Few are the scholars who critically examine the construct of clan rather than just accepting 
it, treating it as an unproblematic, ‘natural’ category, and attributing agency to it as if it 
were a single body or a machine operating automatically. Those who did refuse to take the 
concept of clan for granted successfully uncovered other principles of social and political 
organization and behavior…However, they—including the current author—mostly did not 
2 Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), 141-142.
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engage how and under what circumstances clan as a feature of politics and society became 
a real historical political force.3 
Kapteijns draws upon this paradox—on one hand, emphasizing the constructed nature of 
clan identity and the way that such identity change in the 1980s and 90s, while at the same time, 
showing how identity in 1990-91 was ultimately used as a bedrock for mobilization, proving more 
salient that previous political affiliations had been. As such, her analysis of 1989-1991 is particularly 
instructive in that it acknowledges the discourse heavy discussion of identity and its malleability 
without minimizing the importance of such constructs in the context of conflict. 
Part of why this is possible is because of the source material drawn upon. Kapteijns undertook 
interviews with eye-witnesses to the violence and elites who were involved with resistance to 
the Barre regime; however, the bulk of her sources are songs and poetry from the period. As a 
result, the book seeks to draw essential links between the discourses prevalent at the time and 
the violence which occurred. Discourse analysis is used in many fields of social science and 
often draws out interesting truths about the nature of power relations and the ways that people 
conceptualize phenomena in their daily lives. It is far rarer for it to illustrate the mechanisms by 
which social movements and violence actually occur. In Clan Cleansing in Somalia, we not only see 
how the concept of clan is discussed, the ways elites and media makers spoke of clan, but also 
the results; the ways that elites used clan-related discourses to mobilize mass violence, ultimately 
at the expense of the populations that they claimed to represent, and the ways that this in turn 
led to alliances and reactions by the communities involved. Kapteijns notes “That the civilians 
of particular communities of victims initially sided with the USC or even participated in the clan 
cleansing campaign is an aspect that is often concealed by authors advocating for these groups…
Pointing out that this was so does not excuse the injustice that was done to these communities but 
is a crucial analytical clarification of the different stages and contexts of Somali civil war violence.”4 
Since the violence has continued in various forms until the present day, the discourses that are at 
the root of such communal violence take on greater weight. As Togane, a Somali-Canadian poet, 
concludes in his poem “Afweyne’s Swansong,” “That is why today/ MOGADISHU/ Our erstwhile 
capital of the Somali nation/Is clannish hell visible/ bearing Dante’s invisible hellish inscription”5 
In the process of drawing upon these strains of Somali history, Kapteijns manages to create 
a unified narrative that remains specific and assigns responsibility to particular political groups 
and elite figures of state and rebel actions. This sort of narrative, present for most other national 
histories (with some notable exceptions, all of which also face regular violence), is particularly 
important in the context of Somalia. Eugene Weber described in From Peasants into Frenchmen how 
nation-building requires both remembering and forgetting, so that in order for collective identities 
to function, society must be compelled to remember particular, unifying things while underplaying 
more divisive truths.6 The violence that ruptured the Somali state in 1990 and the ongoing violence, 
both clan-based and otherwise, has fundamentally fractured society, leading to remarkably little 
communication between different communities. Such fragmentation can even be seen online, where 
diaspora groups divide along clan lines, communicating in different chat forums and assigning 
responsibility to different figures.7 In this context, it makes sense that historical accounts, as well as 
the society at large, would be fractured, and in desperate need of common historic narratives, ones 
that are inclusive and seek reconciliation through accountability. Kapteijns’s work then participates 
in the process of rebuilding Somalia, starting at the intellectual underpinnings of society, ones 
that can be used to reinforce and forge more positive communal identities. Her narrative allows 
3 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 73.
4 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 203.
5 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 68.
6 Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1979). 
7 Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, “The Internet and the Somali Diaspora: The Web as a New Means of Expression,” Bildhaan: An 
International Journal of Somalia Studies, 6 (2006) 54-67, accessed August 4, 2016, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/
bildhaan/vol6/iss1/8.
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Somalis to grapple with a violent past and acknowledge the divisions that have rent society for 
over twenty years, while also urging readers to lay aside their divisions by recognizing the role that 
elites on all sides played in fostering such divisions. By “remembering” the violence and the way 
that it was manufactured, even while “forgetting” the manufactured divisions, society can seek to 
forge new connections and rebuild itself even as southern-central Somalia pushes towards greater 
stability in the face of attacks by al-Shabab and other armed groups. 
If anything seems to be lacking for this book, it would be only a community of scholarship 
that can contextualize the history that Kapteijns presents. Indeed, it is shocking how little work 
exists on the past twenty-five years of Somali history and how difficult it is to this day to gather 
information on a period so close to the present day. The same scholars repeat again and again 
in bibliographies about Somali history, not exclusively due to their quality, but also due to the 
impediments to studying this period and the limited number of people capable of doing so. Too 
often, the focus of scholarship on Somalia seems to be exclusively oriented towards the present 
and the most recent elements of the conflict there. Kapteijns states explicitly that her nine oral 
interviews should not be taken as a comprehensive look at what happened politically or socially 
during her period of study. Undoubtedly this is true and fair, but the fact that few examinations 
exist elsewhere today simply underscores how much needs to be discussed further. It seems that in 
the absence of a national archive, and in the absence of a stable state in which to conduct research, 
the barriers to careful, comprehensive research grounded in the personal experiences of Somalis 
became (at least in part) prohibitive, and little was put forward—although that is changing and one 
hopes this change continues. 
It is now then that poetry takes on such great importance in the study of Somalia and Somali 
history. Yes, Somali poetry has long had great status in Somali society, and yes, its prestige is 
historical, with a rich oral tradition that only continues with the aid of mass media. And indeed, 
diasporas tend to value literature that brings them together and forge communities. Yet for Somalia, 
poetry stands out as a way to bind together a diaspora not without a center, but one with a center 
whose turbulence has made it difficult to reach, albeit increasingly less so in recent years. Poets and 
scholars write not really to bind a diaspora to the center, but to surround it, trying to reach a place 
whose reality was too difficult, too violent and unstable to inhabit directly for a long time. Kapteijns 
succeeds not only in discussing clan and violence in an innovative way, but also in touching upon 
this unreachable center, bypassing impediments that stifled so much work on Somalia.
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Auschwitz presents “a multiplicity of realities, a multiplicity of meanings, perspectives 
and approaches that co-exist simultaneously.”1 Son of Saul is director László Nemes’ cinematic 
interpretation of one specific perspective of Auschwitz as envisaged by the film’s protagonist, Saul 
Ausländer, a prisoner of the camp, who, as a member of the Sonderkommando, was assigned a 
particularly onerous task—working in the gas chambers and crematoria of Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
Son of Saul should have provoked debate about the enactment of those events, and the placement 
of a camera at the threshold of that sacral, albeit mimetic space. If, according to Theodor Adorno, 
writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,2 what about creative endeavours seventy years after 
Auschwitz? With the passage of time between the realities of Auschwitz and their contemporary 
re-creation, the boundaries of the limits of representation have become increasingly indistinct. The 
near universal praise from film critics, and numerous prestigious awards bestowed upon Son of 
Saul (such as the Grand Prix at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival and the Academy Award for Best 
Foreign Language Film), suggest an almost unquestioned acceptance of the film’s leitmotif, which 
is no longer considered artistically transgressive in this visually permissive YouTube era. The 
film’s acclaim, coupled with affirmative nods from French philosopher Georges Didi-Huberman3 
and filmmaker Claude Lanzmann4 (who has long rejected fictional cinematic representations 
of the Holocaust) seem to support Son of Saul as both a tour de force and the realization of an 
effective representational strategy within the challenging genre of Holocaust cinema. Son of Saul 
is a demanding film that is difficult to watch; it takes the audience on a journey where few artistic 
endeavours have gone before. By setting the film in the gas chambers and crematoria of Auschwitz-
Birkenau, and by expressing that he “wanted to show people how the situation really was”5, Nemes 
sets the moral and representational stakes high; a critique of the film must therefore be considered 
accordingly. 
More than one million victims, mostly Jews, died in Auschwitz-Birkenau, making it the most 
lethal of the Nazi concentration and death camps. The epicentre of the killing took place in the 
four crematoria buildings housed in Birkenau, the largest within a network of camps and sub-
camps which made up the Auschwitz complex. It is the main setting for Son of Saul, as evidenced 
by the unequivocal mise-en-scène of the film; the viewer is immediately plunged into the terror 
of this univers concentrationnaire.6 It is the latter half of 1944, the time gleaned from the storyline 
of the prisoner revolt, which resulted in the sabotage of Crematorium IV. The Sonderkommando, 
or Special Squads, were comprised of prisoners, predominantly Jewish, forced by the SS to usher 
1 Jonathan Webber, The Future of Auschwitz: Some Personal Reflections (Oxford: Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew 
Studies, 1992), 8. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), 34.
3 Georges Didi-Huberman, Sortir du noir (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 2015).
4 Jordan Cronk, “‘Shoah’ Filmmaker Claude Lanzmann Talks Spielberg, ‘Son of Saul’,” The Hollywood Reporter, February 
5, 2016, accessed March 18, 2016, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/shoah-filmmaker-claude-lanzmann-
talks-869931.
5 Peter Howell, “TIFF: Son of Saul Actor Géza Röhrig on How He Came to Grips with Auschwitz Role,” The Toronto Star, 
September 10, 2015, accessed March 16, 2016, http://www.thestar.com/entertainment/movies/2015/09/10/tiff-son-of-
saul-actor-gza-rhrig-on-how-he-came-to-grips-with-auschwitz-role.html.
6 This term comes from the title of a book written by David Rousset, L’univers concentrationnaire (Paris: Editions de Pavois, 
1946).
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victims to their deaths in the gas chambers and to dispose of their bodies. Eyewitness accounts 
written by members of the Sonderkommando, buried in 1944, were unearthed in the grounds of 
Birkenau after the camp’s liberation and published as The Scrolls of Auschwitz.7 The testimonies 
contained in this book were the inspiration for Nemes and co-writer Clara Royer’s script for Son of 
Saul. 
Son of Saul accurately portrays certain mechanics of the Sonderkommando’s grim undertakings. 
The film begins with the arrival of a new transport of Jews. Saul and his fellow Sonderkommando 
instruct the unsuspecting victims to undress and await a shower and hot soup. “Remember your 
hook number” a voice instructs the new arrivals. Son of Saul captures the deception perfectly—the 
undressing room is the antechamber to death. Moments after the gas chamber doors are slammed 
shut, the screams begin, getting louder and louder—then silence. The naked bodies of the dead are 
removed and the floor is scrubbed clean in preparation for the next victims. During one of the so-
called operations, Saul witnesses a young boy survive the gas chamber. The child’s resuscitation 
is but a momentary reprieve, as the boy is soon smothered to death by a Nazi camp doctor. Saul 
insists the dead boy is his own son, although we are never sure of the truth of this assertion, 
or whether the boy reminds him of his son or is a projection of a son he will never have. Saul 
searches frantically for a rabbi to perform the proper Jewish prayers and to somehow find a way 
in this incendiary hell to bury the child according to Jewish tradition. This quest appears obsessive 
and irrational, and one film critic even goes so far as to summarize Son of Saul as “a movie set 
in Auschwitz that concerns a member of the Sonderkommando who goes mad.”8 Concurrent to 
this mission of ritual, Saul is recruited into Birkenau’s resistance movement. Saul’s role in the 
Sonderkommando revolt and his attempt to bury the boy are the two intertwined narratives that 
structure the film. 
While cinematic representations of concentration camp privation and death are prone to 
aestheticization, Nemes does nothing to placate the harshness and ugliness of the events portrayed. 
He rejects decontextualized memory cues of the Holocaust, the clichés such as barbed-wire fences, 
smoke rising from crematoria chimneys, and victims passing though the “Arbeit macht frei” gate—
and forgoes a sentimental music soundtrack for only screams of terror. Nemes’ script also avoids 
using conventional Hollywood narrative structures such as a hero-rescuer, successful escapes, or 
survival against the odds, which all offer up a positive narrative resolution. Through avoiding 
these tropes he denies the audience a happy ending or emotional catharsis à la Schindler’s List 
(Steven Spielberg, 1993). He even shuns character identification and empathy. There is nothing 
particularly special or even likeable about Saul. We learn very little about him as a person or as 
a prisoner, and we know even less about the supposed son. Nemes here rightly acknowledges 
that within this massive loss of life, the stories and memories of individual lives forever remain 
unrecoverable. Son of Saul remains a film about people who were killed rather than a film about 
survivors, reflecting the reality of the Holocaust, that the vast majority of European Jewry did not 
survive. As Stanley Kubrick noted about Schindler’s List, “The Holocaust is about six million people 
who get killed. Schindler’s List is about 600 who don’t.”9 Nemes’ directorial choices, however, do 
not suggest that Son of Saul entirely eschews stylization or fully transcends cinematic conventions, 
or the dangers of the aesthetic seduction of violence. 
Nemes implicitly explores what Primo Levi describes in his book The Drowned and the Saved 
as “the grey zone,” in his depiction of the work assigned to the Sonderkommando. The grey 
zone was the ambiguous ethical space inhabited by the Sonderkommando—an area outside the 
boundaries of usual human morality where the categories of guilt or innocence, perpetrator or 
7 Ber Mark, ed. The Scrolls of Auschwitz, trans. Sharon Neemani (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 1985). Books by 
surviving members of the Sonderkommando were also likely used as resources, such as Shlomo Venezia’s Inside the 
Gas Chambers: Eight Months in the Sonderkommando of Auschwitz and Filip Müller’s Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in 
the Gas Chambers.
8 J. Hoberman, “10 Can’t-Miss Films of 2015,” Tablet Magazine, December 16, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.
tabletmag.com/scroll/195866/10-cant-miss-films-of-2015.
9 Stanley Kubrick quoted in Liel Leibovitz, “Listless,” Tablet Magazine, December 13, 2011, accessed April 11, 2016, http://
www.tabletmag.com/jewish-arts-and-culture/85945/listless.
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victim are not easily applied. Levi considers the formation of the Sonderkommando to be one of 
the most insidious crimes of the Nazi regime; that is, forcing Jewish prisoners to participate in the 
destruction of their own community. Were the Sonderkommando collaborators who betrayed their 
fellow Jews in return for a momentary reprieve from their own demise? Or were they as much the 
victims of Nazi oppression as other prisoners in the concentration camps? The Sonderkommando, 
the “bearer of secrets” as the film’s only intertitle states, held additional burdens not experienced 
by other camp prisoners in both the secrecy of their actions and the guilt at having participated 
in the process of murder. Even though the Sonderkommando hold a highly contested place in 
Holocaust history, the film’s articulation of the predicament of the Sonderkommando within this 
grey zone is inadequate. While an exploration of the grey zone as a central theme in the film may 
not have been the intention of the filmmaker, the necessary, (but unanswerable) questions which 
should be provoked by the tragic moral quandary of the Sonderkommando, are difficult to form 
within the paucity of the film’s frames of reference.10 
In crafting a film with abstract messages, each viewer journeys through this nightmarish 
nether world responsible for their own interpretive work. Son of Saul seems to explore the necessity 
of meaning in life even within a state of suffering—perhaps a cinematic reading of Viktor Frankl’s 
Man’s Search for Meaning.11 The film never makes clear why Saul is so determined to bury the boy. 
Regardless of whether the boy is, in fact, the son of Saul, Saul’s quest to give the child a proper 
burial infuses his life with a sense of purpose. It is through the performance of a universally-held 
ritual that Saul sees one last tenuous link to life as it was lived “before.” Saul’s final meaningful 
act connects him to ethical humanity and enables him to feel again; it is a transformational act. In 
Son of Saul, the necessity of meaning is given precedence over the cause of the resistance and even 
over survival itself. A fellow Sonderkommando, Abraham, reprimands Saul: “You failed the living 
for the dead.” The film purports to explore the material and spiritual facets of resistance and the 
nature of survival, but in pushing Saul’s obsession to the brink of madness, the credibility of Saul’s 
character as a conduit for such questions becomes suspect.
Son of Saul engages with the issue of the radical de-subjectification of the victims of the Holocaust 
by giving agency to a seemingly powerless Auschwitz prisoner. In the film de-subjectification is 
starkly expressed when Nazi officers refer to the murdered Jews as “pieces”—they yell orders to 
the Sonderkommando, “move the pieces, burn the pieces.” The victims have become mere physical 
objects to be processed and then disposed of. Saul’s quest for a ritual burial for the child is a kind 
of refutation of this ultimate loss of subjectivity. No matter how futile, Saul’s actions are perhaps 
meant to serve as a corrective to the perception of Jews through the lens of Nazi history, as weak, 
passive, and lacking in any sense of agency; abject images from liberator’s and movie director’s 
cameras further perpetuate Jews as representational victims. However, with the exception of the 
boy, victims in the film are still denied their individuality and subjectivity by being shown as 
anonymous heaps in burn pits or blurred corpses being dragged out of the gas chambers. The 
victims remain objectified and dehumanized. The film reiterates the perpetrator’s perspective, that 
the dead are just a mass of corpses, nothing more. With poor character development of Saul’s 
Sonderkommando comrades, and other minor dramatis personae, neither the living nor the dead 
victims in Son of Saul are recovered from the impersonal machinery of destruction. 
Nemes appears to take an ethical position on the representation of atrocity through his 
particular use of technique. Son of Saul focuses on the experience of one individual, Saul Ausländer; 
the film is from the visual and experiential viewpoint of that single witness. In all but a handful 
of shots, the viewer sees Birkenau through the eyes of Saul. The square visual format (a 4:3 aspect 
ratio), and use of medium and extreme close-up shots of Saul (who is typically placed in the centre 
of the frame), combined with the camera’s shallow depth of field, provides a severely limited visual 
perspective, creating a feeling of confinement and claustrophobia. Echoing the fear and confusion 
of the victims upon entry into the camp, the camera intentionally throws spectators off balance. 
Long, unbroken hand-held shots add to the film’s rawness. On top of providing no orienting shots 
10 A similar failure to describe the essence of Levi’s conception can be seen in Tim Blake Nelson’s 2001 film The Grey Zone, 
which also focuses on the Sonderkommando.
11 Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).
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that grant a wider view of the camp, Nemes provides nominal visual references with few narrative 
clues to situate the characters or the action. What little space is left in the visual field is usually 
out of focus and/or in partial view. In this oblique approach to representation, the brutality of the 
murder process occurs just beyond our line of sight, or is shown at the edges of the filmic space. 
The violence and its aftermath is suggested rather than clearly visible. While these techniques 
are both effective and affective, they are not original, as some film critics have noted.12 One also 
questions whether a blurred representation of systematic murder set in the periphery of the frame 
resolves the representational challenges of depicting atrocity. 
Nemes deviates from his own methodology, oscillating between mostly oblique visuals, 
graphic glimpses, and explicit sounds. From being indistinct and hazy, bits and pieces of the 
bodies come into focus. In this way, Nemes forwards a representational double standard, with 
the horrors of Birkenau situated on the periphery, but the referent is unmistakable; we see quick 
flashes of naked, dead bodies being dragged away over concrete floors stained with excreta and 
corpses being fed into ovens. In one memorable scene, a column of recently arrived victims is 
pushed to the edges of a pit where they are shot to death at close range. The brutality is excessive, 
not only in its aestheticization of violence but in the fact that such shootings in pits, while typical of 
the mass-murder operations of the Einsatzgruppen in the occupied Soviet Union,  did not occur in 
Auschwitz.13 A death camp seems like the last place where violence would need to be embellished. 
It is the close-up detail of the corpses of dead women that appears in the aftermath of a gas 
chamber sequence that is among the most problematic visuals in the movie. In the scenes set in the 
crematoria, both naked male and female bodies are evident. However, in one sequence the camera 
lingers, in focus, on a voluminous breast. The positioning of the corpse in a sexualized manner 
and the cropping of the image leaves the victim disembodied. One could argue that the expression 
of the perpetrator’s sheer power over the victim, and the brutality of the murder is correctly co-
related to images of the dismemberment of the female body.  But Son of Saul more consistently 
neglects the consideration of gender in the Nazi’s process of dehumanizing their victims, and in the 
manner in which the Final Solution was carried out. While there was an ultimate common fate for 
all Jews during the Holocaust, Jewish women were victimized as Jews, and as women. Upon arrival 
at Auschwitz, men and women had an unequal chance of surviving the initial selection process. 
And, visibly pregnant women, and women with infants and young children were immediately 
consigned to the gas chambers. The film could have succinctly conveyed these realities without 
disrupting the two principal storylines, but did not, and thus the placement of the cadaver in 
the aftermath of the gassings was likely not intended as a comment on the vulnerabilities and 
exploitation faced by women in the concentration camp system; rather Nemes’ inclusion of the 
violated female body elicits possible scopophilic responses.
Son of Saul is mostly a wordless film, but it is by no means silent. The technically impressive 
sound design by Tamás Zányi serves not only to augment the visuals but acts as a representational 
proxy for the un-visualized. For example, it is through the marrying of images and sound that the 
chaos and fear experienced by people being unloaded from the transports and prodded into the 
unknown is vividly captured. These scenes in particular ring true to survivor accounts of arriving 
at Auschwitz, and they reflect the fact that there were “no smoothly functioning killing machines, 
12 For example, Richard Roeper, “‘Son of Saul’: An Original, Devastating Take on the Holocaust,” Chicago Sun Times, 
January 28, 2016, accessed March 23, 2016, http://chicago.suntimes.com/entertainment/son-of-saul-an-original-take-
on-the-holocaust-breathtaking-and-devastating/ and Steve Pond, “‘Son of Saul’ Cannes Review: Rookie Director 
Shocks Festival with Wrenching Holocaust Drama,” The Wrap, May 14, 2015, accessed April 2, 2016,  
http://www.thewrap.com/cannes-film-festival-2015-review-son-of-saul-holocaust-drama/.
13 During the Hungarian Action in 1944, thousands of Jews who arrived daily were murdered in the gas chambers; 
there was a relatively small number of Jews who were not able to walk to crematoria and they were shot on a ramp 
outside of Birkenau. See Robert Jan van Pelt, The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2002), 187. Shootings did take place in the yard of Block 11 of Auschwitz 1, with the victims 
being mostly Soviet prisoners of war and Poles. There were executions in the gravel pit area just outside of walls of 
Auschwitz, but these did not involve victims of the Hungarian Action. See the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and 
Museum, “Shooting,” accessed April 7, 2016, http://auschwitz.org/en/history/punishments-and-executions/shooting.
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quick deaths, or German efficiency when it came to mass murder.”14 While the film visualizes the 
“before” and the “after,” the actual moment of murder through gassing is conveyed through a horrific 
collection of sounds. Nemes’ camera, by focusing on Saul, does not enter the gas chamber before 
or during the gassing. Sounds are used as part of the imagining of the horrific events occurring in 
the interior of the gas chamber—the thud of the gas chamber door, the pounding of hands from the 
inside, the screams and moans of the victims. The not seen, or the barely seen but heard, leaves the 
rest to the viewer’s imagination (although very little is left to the imagination). If the point had not 
already made, the Sonderkommando enter the chamber after the murder by Zyklon B to take away 
the bodies and clean the space in preparation for the next group. While Nemes has crafted a sensory 
and visceral film experience that transports the audience to the right “there” of constant fear and 
dread this scene serves as an admonition: we understand cinema’s inadequacy as a medium for 
recovering the fact and memory of Birkenau’s industrial-scale mass murder. Within this mimesis 
there is also an obscenity—that some inchoate representational limit may have been breached. 
If, as cultural theorist Andreas Huyssen believes, the question of Holocaust representation will 
always return to the problem of unspeakability, then the gas chambers of Birkenau should be that 
place of silence. Just because one can depict, does not mean one should. Does hearing rather than 
seeing the murder process, make it any less representationally problematic? But beyond theoretical 
issues related to representation, a simpler and more general question should be posed—what does 
cinema at this abyss advance? 
Nemes’ representational approach, that of an experiential and immersive cinematic encounter, 
does not facilitate an understanding of the history of the Holocaust. While Son of Saul does not 
purport to be a historical film, it employs a specific historical setting and quotes actual historical 
events that took place in Auschwitz-Birkenau. History, however, seems more of a backdrop to Saul’s 
story, and just as the composition of the film gives us a limited view of the actions taking place, the 
larger history is also kept outside the frame. The focus on the character of Saul comes at the expense 
of the broader context. Too little information is provided as guidance to viewers unfamiliar with the 
Holocaust, which leads one to wonder what audiences Nemes had in mind while crafting his film? 
In order to properly follow its storylines, Son of Saul demands a certain level of knowledge from its 
viewers. It seems surprising that Nemes assumed such knowledge, even for a Hungarian audience. 
One could leave this film not actually knowing something about the Holocaust as it unfolded at 
Auschwitz. Do we understand the scale of the crimes committed at Auschwitz and during the 
Holocaust in general? Why did Nemes open the film with an intertitle about the Sonderkommando 
but choose to provide absolutely no information about the Holocaust and Auschwitz-Birkenau – 
something akin to an exhibition didactic panel, in film intertitle form, containing brief and concise 
orienting text? No film can offer a comprehensive or totalizing understanding of Auschwitz, or 
the Holocaust. However, Nemes’ technique of contextual minimalism, and the privileging of 
immersive and impressionistic memory, risks at least the partial erasure of the specific historical 
events referred to in the film. How does such an approach promote Holocaust remembrance and 
education, which surely must have been one of the motivating factors behind the creation of this 
film?
Son of Saul can be said to offer an artistic response to the catastrophe of the Holocaust, situated 
between the demands of historical veracity and the more malleable needs of artistic interpretation. 
All art involves some rearranging of the facts in its imaginative reworking of reality. The artifices of 
stylization, and narrativization, for example, have the potential to impose unreliable and untruthful 
structures that occlude the historical memory of the Holocaust, but not necessarily so. Popular 
culture representations such as films have been delegitimized by being unfairly juxtaposed with 
some absolute standard of historical truth. By evaluating film as history, and only on history’s terms, 
the ability of film to provide both historical awareness and entertainment is not fully contemplated. 
Son of Saul makes us consider the very fine balance necessary where both these demands converge 
in a film set in Auschwitz. The film is unsteady in negotiating both these interests, as fact and 
fiction intermingle freely, and the viewer left uncertain where they are within this dynamic. For 
14 Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (Toronto: Random House of Canada 
Ltd., 2014), 278.
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those watching without in-depth knowledge of the history of the camp, it is difficult to know what 
events in the film are pure drama, what accounts are based on events which took place in the 
camp, and which scenes are a hybrid of fact and fiction. One example of this hybridization is the 
storyline that forms the basis for Saul’s mission throughout the film. That a child was pulled from 
the gas chambers alive and then quickly put to death by a camp doctor was based on an account 
by Miklós Nyiszl, who had worked in Birkenau as a physician for the Sonderkommando and as a 
pathologist assisting Josef Mengele. He survived Auschwitz and wrote a chronicle of his life and 
work at the camp: Auschwitz: A Doctor’s Eyewitness Account.15 Nemes takes Nyiszl’s account and 
modifies it to suit the needs of the film, thereby fictionalizing a significant event in the historical 
record of Auschwitz. 
Questionable are not the necessities of filmic abbreviations or the creative license taken to 
achieve an immersive spectatorial experience, but, rather, the overall abstraction of the film. Son of 
Saul alludes to specific events that took place in the camp but without describing them in enough 
detail to discern what is actually taking place. Who were the victims of Auschwitz that the film 
shows arriving in trains and leaving as ashes? The events depicted are likely the destruction of 
Hungary’s Jewish community or the remnant of the Jews of the Lodz ghetto, but the film provides 
few clues as to the nationality or identity of these victims. Nor is there a clear chronology. The film 
opens in a time period just prior to the Sonderkommando revolt, which took place on October 
7, 1944. From May until early July 1944, under the direction of Adolf Eichmann, in just eight 
weeks 437,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau; the camp reached its peak 
killing capacity during this time. It was during this brief period that one third of the total number 
of victims of Auschwitz were killed.16 More than 75 percent of those who were deported were 
murdered in the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau. In August, 67,000 Jews from the Lodz ghetto 
were transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau where 67 percent of them perished in the gas chambers. 
Son of Saul depicts a frantic rush to kill larger numbers of Jews even more rapidly. There is a 
specific historical reason for this.17 The impending defeat of the Third Reich, in the military sense, 
did not deter the other arm of the Nazi’s total war—the genocidal campaign against the Jews, (the 
Final Solution) was not abandoned, but rather its pace accelerated. Early in the film the disposal 
of the murdered corpses takes place in the crematorium, but a later scene shows piles of bodies 
being burned in an area outside of the crematoria complex. During this last phase of murder in 
Auschwitz, the incoming volume was so great that the crematoria could not handle the volume, 
and corpses were incinerated in open-air pits. The incineration of the bodies of the victims was a 
part of the concealment of evidence of the mass murder that had taken place there. Son of Saul does 
not make these facts known and therefore misses an opportunity to inform its audience about this 
last critical phase in the destruction of European Jewry and thus diminishes the film’s value for 
Holocaust and genocide education. 
Saul’s participation in the underground resistance is the other main narrative thread of the film. 
The storyline is punctuated by vague references to a planned rebellion among the Sonderkommando 
(snippets of conversation, items to be gathered), but Saul’s assignments within the resistance are 
difficult to follow. There is a scene that takes place in a Birkenau warehouse where goods plundered 
from the victims are being sorted. A mysterious meeting between Saul and a female prisoner is 
arranged. Who is she and what is the nature of their relationship? She passes him a bundle. This 
visit is clearly linked to the revolt in the making, but like many other scenes in the film, the action 
is confusing. Was Saul facilitating the transfer of smuggled gunpowder to members of the camp’s 
resistance movement? Toward the end of the film, a revolt does takes place, but it is difficult to 
understand the scope of this revolt; it appears that amid the chaos of the rebellion a few prisoners 
managed to escape, soon to be captured and killed by camp guards in quick pursuit. 
15 Nyiszl recalls in this book that a teenage girl had survived the gas chambers. She was found alive at the bottom of a pile 
of corpses. Nyiszl revived the girl, but soon after Erich Mussfeld, a supervising SS officer, perceived her to be a risk to 
the order of the camp, as a witness to the gas chambers, and ordered her to be killed.
16 Debórah Dwork and Robert Jan Van Pelt, Auschwitz, 1270 To the Present (New York and London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996) 342-345.
17 Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford UP, 1990), 499–524.
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It is curious that the film does not convey that the smuggled gunpowder was fashioned into 
the crudely-made grenades and explosives, which were used by the Sonderkommando to launch 
the uprising. Crematorium IV was destroyed in the revolt and never used again, but Son of Saul 
fails to describe the scale and “success” of the October 7, 1944, rebellion and the story of one of 
the most significant acts of resistance in the history of the Holocaust. The film omits the story 
of the important role that women played in the Sonderkommando rebellion. It was a group of 
Jewish women who smuggled small amounts of gunpowder from a munitions factory, located 
within the Auschwitz complex where they worked, to men and women in the camp’s resistance 
movement and then eventually to the Sonderkommando. One of the key figures in the underground 
group responsible for smuggling the gunpowder was Róza Robota, who, like the mysterious 
woman in the film, worked at a clothing depot in Birkenau; one wonders why Nemes left the 
female figure in the depot so undeveloped as a character and the culmination of her courageous 
actions so vague. 
Son of Saul touches upon another form of resistance—resistance through acts of documentation. 
The Nazis planned the total erasure of European Jewry, all the physical and evidentiary traces. 
Photographs taken by a Sonderkommando from inside Birkenau represent another significant 
act of resistance during the Holocaust - an act which, in the film, is inexplicably de-emphasized. 
Although none of the four photographs show the murder itself, the images, which capture the 
preparations for murder (a group of undressed women being readied for the gas chambers) and 
the aftermath (the Sonderkommando burning bodies in open-air incineration pits), are the only 
extant visual documents that depict the process of mass killing perpetrated at the gas chambers 
in Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Sonderkommando photographs are both an important expression of 
witnessing, documenting the lives of victims soon to be obliterated, and evidentiary documents 
whose purpose was to inform the outside world about the murderous events taking place at 
Auschwitz. These photographs represent a collective act of resistance by the organized underground 
movement: those who smuggled the camera into the camp, the photographer who captured the 
images, the people covering for the photographer, and those who smuggled the images out of the 
camp and handed them over to the Polish resistance. Saul is recruited by the resistance to provide 
cover for the Sonderkommando assigned to take the clandestine photographs by fixing a lock on 
a crematorium door. Saul’s rescue of the entire mission—by sensing the approach of SS officers 
and quickly hiding the camera in a duct—appears as an incidental moment in the film and the 
gravity of this act is lost. The Sonderkommando photographs are exceptional visual documents 
of immense historical importance, yet in Son of Saul the viewer would not know that the events 
depicted are part of the recorded history of the camp. Nor would they learn about the fate of these 
photographs. Son of Saul passes over yet another opportunity to educate audiences about a pivotal 
event in the history of the Holocaust.
With its cache of high-profile awards and large audiences (by Holocaust film standards), Son 
of Saul is one of the texts now shaping the memory of the Holocaust and, by extension, impacting 
our culture’s social awareness of the event. But what kind of memory and awareness is this film 
advancing? Nemes’s filmmaking seems to acknowledge a shift in the representation of human 
suffering in an age of media saturation; the privileging of the evidentiary, the factual and the 
graphic in the interest of preventing atrocities, having not yielded positive results, has given rise 
to alternative approaches to memory-work. But Nemes’s filmic memory-work presents audiences 
with too little and too much concurrently: there is a lack of explanation and reflection and an 
excess of sensorial disturbance. The problematic consistent throughout the film is that the complex 
and almost incomprehensible reality it refers to calls for more historical context than is provided. 
Perhaps Nemes purposefully rejects such attempts at elucidation, and in doing so suggests that 
there are neither simple meanings or lessons to take from the Holocaust. The Holocaust compels 
us to think deeply, and the disorientations and dislocations that Nemes places in the viewer’s 
path may be those irritants that provoke individual contemplation, in contrast to the prescribed 
interpretations generally advanced in Holocaust-themed films. In refusing to offer explanations 
for one of the most complex historical events in human history, the film’s equivocality may seem 
appropriate. However, rejecting the narratives of convention does not allow for the near complete 
rejection of the narrative of history.
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Title of the Film: Saul fia (Son of Saul); Director: László Nemes; Producers: Gábor Rajna, Gábor 
Sipos, Judit Stalter, Robert Vamos; Screenplay: László Nemes, Clara Royer; Cinematography: 
Mátyás Erdély; Film Editor: Matthieu Taponier; Sound Designer: Tamás Zányi; Country: Hungary; 
Year of Release: 2015; Production Company: Laokoon Filmgroup. Duration: 107 minutes.
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